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Crime Management and Forensic Science: The Role of Digital Technologies in the 21st Century

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Abstract

Crime management is an indispensable speciality in determining crime processing and the quality of criminal justice administration in society. When crime is poorly managed, the stakes are that of criminal proliferation and miscarriage of justice. Therefore, this article was carefully designed to assess the role of digital technologies in crime management and forensic science in the 21st century. The article is theoretically based and descriptive in nature. It relies on secondary data to establish the roles of digital technologies on crime management and forensic science in the 21st century. It revealed that crime management before the 19th century was analog, aiding criminals to evade justice due to the lack of credible evidence. However, digital technologies in the post-19th century have proven integral to crime management and forensic science. The article concludes that digital technologies in the 21st century have aided victim's emergency assistance, crime scene security, videotaping, photographing, sketching, writing reports and taking down notes, collating and processing evidence that is physical in nature, searching, interrogating witnesses and suspects to obtain vital information, identifying suspects, conducting surveillance, raids, stakeouts and undercover operations, and finally witness testimony in court.

Keywords: Crime Management, Forensic Science, Digital technologies, Criminal Investigation

1.0 INTRODUCTION

As society evolves from simple to complex stages, so does crime. Historically, the acts of crime have evolved from mere infractions requiring little or no efforts in evidence collation and presentation for adjudication of justice; to more complex, highly networked, and sophisticated acts with little or no physical evidence to substantiate the basic elements of crime establishment. However, the need for admissible criminal evidence remains indispensable in the administration of criminal justice. Generally, criminal labelling is a product of conviction arising from proof of evidence to indicate beyond every reasonable doubt that an offender was indeed criminally liable. With the evolution of digital technologies in the mid-19th century, complex technologies have become the hub of criminality as criminals have taken undue advantage of several digital

technological innovations in the commission of common and complex crimes. This posed a new challenge in the field of evidence-based criminal investigation and crime management.

The word “Investigate” is etymologically derived from the Latin word “*Vestigare*”, which implies to track or to trace. It entails a patient, step-by-step process of determining, gathering, labelling or identifying, and the presentation of evidence to determine the actual status of a criminal event. Investigations seek to unravel the cause(s) and who is/are the culprits and victims in a criminal case by way of utilizing specific pieces of evidence via deductive reasoning. For instance, finding the suspect’s identification card at the scene of an armed robbery incident is great evidence that the suspect was physically present at the scene of the robbery. The process of crime investigation usually involves careful examination and evidence recording (Donlon, 2007).

The genesis of contemporary criminal investigations has been attributed to several notable individuals and events. The first of these individuals and events was the appointment of Henry Fielding in 1748 as Magistrate of England’s Bow Street. As a response to widespread crime and disorder throughout his jurisdiction, Fielding formed the Bow Street Runners, which became the first paid detective unit. Also, Eugene Francois Vidocq is another important individual in the evolution of criminal investigation. He was a former criminal who later became a crime fighter. In 1811, Vidocq organized a plain-clothed civilian detective unit called the *Brigade de la Surete*, which is also referred to as “Security Brigade”. Consequent upon the realization of the value of this unit, the police officially converted it to the National Police Force, with Vidocq appointed as the first head of the unit. He is credited with the introduction of undercover work, ballistics, and criminology. He made the first plaster shoe cast impression and created indelible ink and unalterable bond paper (Bowen & Scheider, 2007).

Besides, by 1842, England’s Scotland Yard created an investigative branch. However, in the United States, the pioneer municipal detective divisions were beginning to take shape. Allan Pinkerton, who immigrated from Scotland to the United States in 1842 played a significant historical role in modern police investigations. He was appointed the first detective in Chicago in 1849 and was a co-founder of the Northwestern police agency, which later became the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, whose symbol was a watchful eye and whose motto was “We Never Sleep”. Pinkerton’s agents were the forerunners of the United States Secret Service. He developed

several investigative techniques still used today in law enforcement such as stings and undercover works, as well as the surveillance method of shadowing and following targets or suspects. Pinkerton was also known for initiating a central database for criminal identification records that is now being utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). After Chicago, investigative units started developing in other police agencies with Detroit establishing a detective bureau in 1866, followed by New York in 1882 and Cincinnati in 1886 (Hess & Matison, 2013).

In 1882, the use of biometrics and identification systems was incorporated into a criminal investigation when a French police officer, Alphonse Bertillon (who is now recognized as the father of personal identification), unveiled the Anthropometry system that identifies offenders by their unique physical measurements, as well as their personality characteristics and individual markings, like tattoos and scars. In 1884, Bertillon used his technique to identify 241 multiple offenders, demonstrating that the Bertillon system could successfully distinguish first-time offenders from recidivists. Bertillon further standardized the criminal mug shot and advocated that crime scene pictures must be taken before the scene is contaminated in any way (Moradoff, 2010). Other forensic techniques credited to Bertillon include forensic document examination, ballistics, the use of moulding compounds to preserve footprints, and the use of the dynamometer to determine the degree of force used in breaking and entering.

2.0 EVOLUTION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE

Criminalistics and Forensics gradually evolved in 1910, with Edmund Locard's "Exchange Principles", which held that criminals would intentionally contaminate a crime scene and unintentionally abandon incriminating evidence. Locard was a French Criminologist who is recognized to have set the pace for forensics and criminalistics as many law enforcement agencies and their agents have subscribed to his exchange principle for crime investigations. Evidence gathering is a crucial aspect of crime investigation, the act of which was revolutionized with the advent of technological devices (Ramirez, 2003). Law enforcement agencies now recognize the import of their agents learning the law of evidence in order to extract quality and admissible evidence in any criminal investigation process. August "Gus" Vollmer, also called the father of contemporary policing, became the first recognized American to have implemented the use of blood samples, fibre, and soil analysis in criminal investigations in 1907. Also, in 1920 he became

the first police chief to have utilized the lie detector (as developed by the University of California) in criminal interrogations (Hess & Orthmann, 2011).

Before the emergence of forensic science, criminals or lawbreakers often escape punishment because of the absence of justifiable evidence against them. Traditionally, evidence of crime commission was only extracted from suspects via duress or witness testimony. xi Yuan Ji Lu, which is translated as “Collected Cases of Injustice Rectified, was the original trial of medicine and entomology to administer justice to different criminal cases. This was composed in a song “Dynasty China” by Sung Ci, in 1248. An instance of one of the accounts was a murder case where a sickle was the primary tool. The death investigator directed all suspects to bring their sickles to one location. The sickle used in the murder attracted flies due to the smell of blood and the murderer was identified and apprehended. In order to determine the cause and manner of death, medical experts in the army began to explore different strategies in sixteenth-century Europe. At that time, a French army surgeon developed an interest in systematically unravelling the effects of violence (as a cause of death) on internal organs. Additionally, two Italian surgeons began the process of modern pathology by trying to understand the changes that happen to human organs as a result of an infection or disease. The late 1700s witnessed the evolution of scholarly expressions in this area. Some of these expressions include “A Treatise on Forensic Medicine and Public Health” by French Physician Fodere and “The Complete Police Medicine” by German medical expert Johann Peter Frank (Fantino, 2007).

Sweeden chemist, Scheele, determined a way of identifying arsenous oxide in significant quantities. By 1806, this discovery was further advanced by German chemist Val Ross, who specialized in the discovery of poison around the stomach walls of a victim. Whereas, an English chemist James Marsh, utilized chemical processes to implicate arsenic as responsible for death causes in an 1836 murder trial. In forensic science, the use of logic in criminal procedures was demonstrated in some individual legal trials. For instance, in 1784, John Toms was tried and convicted for killing Edward Culshaw using a pistol. After examining the dead body of Culshaw, a pistil wad (A type of crushed paper used to hold powder and balls in the muzzle) was discovered in his head wound. It matched perfectly with a torn newspaper found in Tom’s pocket (Fantino, 2007). Similarly, In Warwick, England in 1816, a farm labourer was tried and convicted of the

murder of a young maidservant. She had been drowned in a shallow pool and bore the marks of violent assault. The police found footprints and an impression from corduroy cloth with a sewn patch in the damp earth near the pool. There were also scattered grains of wheat and chaff. The breaches of the farm labourer who had been threshing wheat nearby were examined and corresponded exactly to the impression in the earth near the pool. Later in the 20th century, there were several British pathologists, Bernard Spitsbury, Francis Camps, Sydney Smith, and Keith Simpson.

Essentially, forensic science plays a significant role in criminal investigations. It remains crucial in the administration of justice. The discipline of forensic science only became popular in contemporary society. The word “forensic” originated from the Latin word “forensic”, meaning “forum” (Safertein, 2007). It implies the application of scientific methods and principles to solving crime issues and answering the questions of law and justice. Forensic science may still be in its formative stage, it is, however, developing its significance dates back to ancient civilizations. Its earliest application dates back to ancient Greek and Roman societies, where significant contributions to the field of medicine and Pharmacology were made.

Forensic laboratories have in most criminal cases been indispensable in the processing of physical evidence. Therefore, it is now common to find law enforcement agencies possessing sophisticated forensic science laboratories for criminal investigations. Usually, these laboratories are located in the most protected and largest city of a state and are available for use by all law enforcement agencies in that state. Hess and Matison (2013) Identified some of the most frequently examined pieces of evidence that are analysed using biometrics. According to Moradoff (2010), Biometrics entails the study of an individual’s biological data and identity via the measurement of his/her special physical or behavioural features. A few digital technologies exist for the identification of an individual’s biometrics. They range from fingerprints to voice recognition techniques, facial recognition, etc. However, fingerprints and the iris of an eye are considered the most reliable biometric digital evidence.

- **Fingerprint:** Aside from DNA testing, fingerprinting is considered the most novel and significant innovation in crime management and criminal justice. DNA is the only rival to fingerprints concerning a person’s identification (Jetmore, 2008). All humans have a

unique presence and well-arranged lines at the tip of their fingers. These small lines are called friction ridges. They function to provide the fingers with traction when an individual manipulates an object. There are sweat pores within the friction ridges. Sweat from the sweat pores when mixed with body oils and other matter, can rub off on any surface the finger touches, leaving behind evidence of a fingerprint especially when the surface is smooth. Fingerprints are essential during criminal investigations. No two persons have the same friction-ridge patterns. An individual's unique friction-ridge are formed even before birth and remains unchanged throughout his/her lifetime. Therefore, fingerprint analysis is useful in determining if a suspect was present at the crime scene or not. Digital technologies developed by researchers at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico are novel in fingerprint detection using X-rays that do not distort the ridge patterns of fingerprints in any way.

- **Voiceprints:** This is a graphic record produced by a sound spectrograph of the energy patterns emitted by speech. Just like fingerprints, every individual has a unique voiceprint. It is important in identifying criminals who utilize phones illegally. Hence, audio forensic investigations have become invaluable to most law enforcement agencies. Phone calls usually retain voiceprints. Such voiceprints are usually compared with a sample of a suspect's voice to ascertain the actual criminal. Spectrographic examination is a technique used to compare an unknown recorded voice sample with a known verbatim voice recorded and transmitted on the same device (Waggoner, 2007). Although, the use of voiceprints in criminal trials has been controversial. In many cases, criminal convictions via voiceprints have been reversed because they were found not to be sufficiently reliable. It is however worthy of note that advances in voiceprint technology have continued to give investigators an edge on the quality of evidence.
- **Language Analysis:** The origin, gender, age, race or even the nationality of a suspect can be traced via his/her language of communication. An analysis of a suspect's language can further provide a clue into his/her political orientation, religious views and educational level. All these elements put together can provide reliable insight into a criminal motive. The technique of psycholinguistics is often utilized in language analysis. The victim,

suspect or witness' state of mind can be determined by the analysis of the language used at the crime scene. The comments at that time are born out of excitement.

- **DNA Profiling:** It is common knowledge that human cells are made up of discrete packs of chromosomes considered as DNA. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is an organic substance found in the nucleus of a cell. It is utilized in determining an individual's personal characteristics. For instance, DNA can be used to create a genetic fingerprint for the identification of a person. All individuals have their unique DNA structure except for identical twins. Through DNA analysis, forensic scientists can determine an individual's hair colour, eye colour, gender, and ethnicity. The technique of DNA profiling can be done by utilizing cells from any part of the human body for assailant identification, paternity testing, missing persons, unidentified body cases, etc. For instance, DNA testing was the basis of identification for many unidentified bodies in the September 11, 2001 World Trade Centre attack (Garrett, 2009). Before the 21st century, DNA evidence was only investigated for violent crimes. However, in the 21st century and with the aid of digital technologies that have simplified the process of testing, DNA technologies are now being used for evidence collection for crimes such as burglary and theft (Wilson, 2010).
- **Blood and other Body Fluids:** Although blood is often analyzed for DNA, its combination with other body fluids such as urine and semen can produce useful evidence in a criminal conviction. Evidence of blood is sufficiently admissible to the fact that a violent crime was committed. It could help determine the path of a victim or suspect and establish or eliminate a suspect from the incidence of crime. Body fluids are usually evident on clothes, floors, walls, furniture and other objects around the crime scene.
- **Hairs and Fibers:** This is another frequently utilized biometric evidence. Hair and Fibers are however difficult to trace without careful search and good lighting. They are commonly located on beddings, carpets and other surfaces around the crime scene. Hair and fibres are very useful in forensic criminal investigations because they can easily be used to identify suspects around crime scenes.

3.0 THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES AND FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIME MANAGEMENT.

Crime management in the 21st century is heavily dependent on technology-enabled forensic examination of criminal events. The digital revolution and preponderance of electronic devices pervading life, such as cell phones, pagers, Personal Digital Assistants (PDA), Computers, iPods, gaming systems and global positioning systems (GPSs) have generated a new class of evidence and requirements for handling it (NIJ, 2007). Digital technologies are being utilized in the forensic examination of nearly every crime today. All digital media relating to an offence or a crime, such as digital cameras, flash drives, computers, cell phones, etc. can only be examined forensically (Garrett, 2009). According to Miller and Loving (2009), Crime management and investigation experts must take into consideration any electronic device found in and around crime scenes since data can be saved or stored on any drive.

To effectively identify the specific electronic device utilized by criminals, investigators need to learn about the suspects and their social habits. Digital data recovered from suspect's devices can reveal a lot of information to investigators. For instance, a forensic examination of a suspect's in-vehicle Global Positioning System (GPS), can reveal to investigators the pattern of a suspect's movements and associates (Miller & Loving, 2009). For instance, cell phones dominate the array of digital technological devices with the most criminal information extracted via forensic examination. Cell phones are often pervasive and can contain a large amount of useful information that may facilitate an investigation (Reiber, 2009). Therefore, the seizure of suspects' cell phones is a critical aspect of investigators for forensic examinations (Heinecke, 2007). According to Puente (2007), cell phones usually leave trails. As soon as they are powered on, they register their presence including a serial and phone number to any communication tower nearby. Spraggs (2009) pointed out that data gathered from cell phones are often vital in determining the exact period during which a criminal event happened. Ultimately, the inbuilt Global Positioning System (GPS) in cell phones enables law enforcement agents to track and apprehend criminals as well as victims in need of rescue.

Evidence collection from a cell or mobile phone is a very delicate process. Handling the device is the first and most crucial aspect. This is because handling the device carelessly could lead to the

contamination of evidence. Every investigator must be careful not to change the state of the evidence. Maintaining the state of the device as a piece of evidence is a basic rule of evidence collection. It is also important for investigators to keep themselves abreast with the state's law on evidence collection concerning electronic technologies. While some states may require a search warrant, others may need a court order (Miller, 2008).

Aside from cell phones, a plethora of other digital technologies that can preserve vital digital evidence exist. However, the need for proper training of investigators for forensic examinations and evidence collection is crucial. According to Reiber (2009), Computer forensic training is designed to ensure that investigators do not only have an idea of understanding complex data, how they are stored and how to extract them but also how to present digital evidence in court when they are expected to do so. Therefore, the study of digital forensics is trending in most Universities to equip potential forensic experts/investigators with the requisite skill and knowledge on how to conduct forensic examinations (Whitcomb, 2007). Additionally, several academic publications are available to enrich the investigator's knowledge. For instance, a journal titled "The Investigative Uses of Technology: Devices, Tools and Techniques published by the National Institute of Justice to provide vital information regarding digital evidence is a good example.

Forensic science plays a vital role in criminal investigation and management, especially in the area of criminal tracking and suspect development. Forensic tracking is often defined as the science of finding, keeping and explaining footprints and tyre tread impressions to justify criminal events. Footprints have become the "missed evidence in many jurisdictions" (Hanratty, 2007). This is because it can provide valuable clues to criminal tracking and crime establishment. Through forensic examination of the length of strides and depth of impression, footprints can reveal the height of a criminal and also tell if the criminal was with a heavy load or not (Sonenshein & Nilon, 2010). For instance, forensic experts usually determine the height of criminals from their show prints by measuring the shoe print length in inches and dividing it by two to arrive at the height in feet. An example of this is a footprint that measures 22 inches in length will reveal that the criminal is 11 feet tall. This instance helps investigators to rule in or rule out potential suspects (Hanratty, 2007).

Tyre prints are also an important element of evidence gathering by investigators. Criminals who commit offences using a vehicle can be tracked by their tyre prints. For instance, sticky soil marks on the road are a fantastic way of ascertaining the direction of the criminal vehicle(s), as wet sand, clays or mud will stick to the tyres. According to Lee (2007), “as the vehicle continues moving, this material will fall off the tyres in the direction the vehicle is headed. If the tracks shine in the grass, they have headed away from you. Tyre tracks coming towards you will show faintly as an off-colour to the surrounding grass”. Tracking of footprints and impressions has the potential of revealing many investigative leads. Criminals seeking refuge outside are likely to leave foot, hand, knee, body or heel impressions. Broken tree branches can expose when the branch was broken; the lighter the colour of the branch, the more recently it was broken. The dirt or moist side of stones can indicate how recently they were overturned.

Another area where technology has significantly influenced crime management is surveillance. Several technological devices and procedures exist in the conduct of surveillance. Devices such as telescopes, body wires, binoculars, night vision equipment, costumes and disguises are prominent in conducting surveillance. Over the years, surveillance equipment and systems have been advanced and sophisticated. For instance, there exists a surveillance system that conceals a periscope in what mimics an air vent on the rooftop of a van. It rotates 360 degrees and remains undetachable. The area under surveillance is usually videotaped using remote motion detectors. Additionally, GPS technology plays an important role in surveillance operations. Areas that are inaccessible by foot or vehicle are accessed via aerial surveillance. Operational movements are often facilitated by communication between ground vehicles and air surveillance. The aerial pilot is usually a police officer with good knowledge about the area under surveillance. Visual or video surveillance provides video images that stand as viable evidence, especially in the investigation of high-profile criminal cases. Today, criminal acts are increasingly being captured on analog video tapes and in digital formats from closed-circuit television systems, cell phone cameras and other forms of security and surveillance equipment. Such video pieces of evidence are generated from places like schools, Banks, malls, office complexes, retail shops, hotels, parking lots, restaurants, etc. (Pincince, 2007).

According to Dee (2009), crime-prone zones are increasingly being monitored using 24-hour surveillance cameras strategically mounted on utility poles, buildings and other strategic points. These surveillance cameras are being monitored at a central recording station. Although there may not be someone viewing or monitoring the output of the cameras all the time, the live activities are however recorded for reassessment in the event of any criminal incident or accident. Most surveillance cameras are equipped with night-vision or telephoto lenses as well as time and date generators and printers that can produce digital evidence against criminal suspects. In order to secure admissible evidence, investigative officers normally place surveillance cameras overtly to conduct covert surveillance. They do this by disguising the surveillance recording equipment in a variety of ways unknown to the culprit. These cameras can be hidden in picture frames, clocks, domes and exit signs to record criminal acts such as drug trafficking, shoplifting, money laundering, Bank robberies, etc.

The vitality of digital technology with specific reference to audio or electronic surveillance cannot be overemphasized. In very unique instances, electronic devices are utilized in surveillance. The technique of surveillance may include secretly wiring a person who is going to be interacting with a suspect or getting involved in a fraudulent business establishment through participant observation. The most frequent forms of lawfully authorized electronic surveillance at the disposal of law enforcement agents are pen registers, contents interceptors and trap and trace devices. Trap and trace devices and pen registers record dialling and signalling details used in processing and routing telephone communication, such as the signals that identify the dialled numbers of outgoing calls or the originating numbers of incoming calls. Electronic surveillance and wiretapping are considered forms of search and are therefore permitted only with probable cause and a court order (Katz, 1967).

4.0 SOME DIGITAL FORENSIC TECHNIQUES FOR CRIME MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY

A good number of advanced technologies have evolved for solving crime problems. Ranging from retinal scanning to unraveling the nature of criminal evidence, to fingerprint identification; forensic technologies of the 21st century have assumed an advanced position in solving complex crime problems in society. The increasing demands for Forensic experts and forensic science technicians

have given credence to the fast-growing relevance of the field of forensic science. Some basic knowledge of forensic science techniques and digital technologies are often dramatized on television programmes like the Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) and Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). Several advancements in forensic science technologies have continued to develop to bridge the gaps that criminals utilize to evade justice. Kimmy (2023) identified some advanced digital technologies used in forensic science investigation and crime management as follows:

- a. Carbon Dot Powders:** This is a technology developed by researchers for easy fingerprint reading and identification. Fingerprints are crucial in any crime scene investigation; however, their detection has been hampered by factors such as high toxicity, low sensitivity, low contrast, etc. Consequently, carbon dot powders have been developed to give fingerprints a fluorescent appearance under Ultraviolet (UV) lights which makes them quite easy to detect and analyse (Jetmore, 2008). The application of the Carbon Dot Powder makes fingerprints under Ultraviolet light reflect as red, orange, or yellow.
- b. Artificial Intelligence (AI):** This technique, although applied in many other fields, is new in forensic science but developing rapidly. AI is being utilized in key stages and processes of criminal cases today. It is utilized in the analysis of crime scenes, comparing fingerprints and arriving at a conclusion about the various factors of crime establishments.
- c. Nanotechnology:** Nanosensors have been developed to be utilized for forensic investigations at the molecular level. Forensic analysis at the molecular level allows investigators to x-ray all possible evidence available at a crime scene. This technology is often used to scrutinize the availability of explosive materials, illegal drugs, or even biological agents at its minutest level. Hence, scientists utilize this technology to analyse the existence of carbon and polymer-based nanomaterials. This has significantly aided many investigations.
- d. Proteomes:** The use of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) to ascertain if an individual is a suspect or a victim is a common practice by forensic scientists. Similarly, in the 21st century, technological advancement has made it possible for scientists to identify and detect proteins. This has given credence to Proteomes as a crucial tool in forensic investigations. Generally, Proteomes are regarded as the total set of proteins that an

organism or a living being can produce. They can be detected and analysed in biological materials such as bones and blood. The analysis of these biological materials can allow scientists to determine if a person is connected to a criminal incident or not. The dynamic nature of Proteomes makes them different from DNA and gives scientists an edge in determining a victim's age and other causal environmental factors that may be cumbersome to detect via other forensic investigative methods.

- e. **Foldscope:** This can be described as a 21st-century paper microscope that is small in size, easily disposable and inexpensive technology. The foldscope is highly portable and as a result, it can be utilized in any crime scene for on-the-spot investigation of forensic samples like soil, hair, blood, etc. However, the findings from foldscope are usually preliminary, but they can facilitate early investigation processes of criminal cases.
- f. **DNA Phenotyping:** DNA serves an important purpose in identifying suspects by comparing their samples with those found at the crime scene. It can also be used to determine the physical outlook of suspects. Essentially, there are 23 chromosomes embedded in DNA that can reveal the outward appearance of a person (Berson, 2009). Forensic scientists utilize DNA Prototyping to aid investigation processes by providing investigators with relevant traits of suspects such as skin colour, eye and hair. Advanced technologies can further provide investigators with a prediction about the age and biological background of suspects.
- g. **Biosensors for Fingerprint Analysis:** Fingerprints are essential elements that could authenticate suspects in criminal incidences. Available fingerprints at crime scenes are matched and compared to identify suspects. The major setback with fingerprints is that they are most times not readable. With the aid of Biosensors, scientists can now seamlessly analyse body fluids found in fingerprints to determine the actual suspects. The biosensor can detect the suspect's age, lifestyle, gender and possible medications the suspect could be on. This technology is also useful in analysing other bodily fluids found at crime scenes.
- h. **Immunochemistry:** This technology is a method that is utilized to ascertain suspects' existing diseases. It is operationalized by applying a small sample onto a prepared test strip. The results or findings from this technique are quite quick and reliable. Most tests

that utilize this technique are HIV, COVID and even pregnancy tests. The technique of immunochromatography is utilized primarily to detect substances in suspects' bodily fluids like medications and drugs. Scientists have advanced this technology by developing a smartphone sensor capable of evaluating a saliva sample on the spot without necessarily going to the laboratory.

- i. **Suspect/Victim Geolocation:** Forensic scientists have also developed techniques for stable isotopes of water for the tracing and geographical location of suspects or victims (Donahue, 2007). Atom-to-atom variations between isotopes exist with a unique signature. By the isolation of isotopes in water samples found on suspects or victims, investigators can ascertain the origin of such samples. In the event that there are multiple samples, the isotopes can recreate the suspect's or victim's paths. This method of isotopes is further utilized to know the number of people present at a time.
- j. **Forensic Palynology:** This technique of forensic science deals with the study of pores, pollens, grains or seeds, which can be utilized to determine the location of subjects. Pollen and pores are atomic in nature and can be stored on skin and clothes largely undetected. Therefore, forensic palynology is a technique used by scientists to collate and compare these trace materials as evidence to be presented in court.
- k. **Blockchain-Based Solution Cloud Forensic:** Cloud storage has become the trending and ideal storage location for individuals and corporate organisations and institutions. According to Kimmy (2023), "over 50 percent of personal and corporate data are now stored in the cloud or remote servers". Consequently, it is pertinent for digital forensic scientists to innovate techniques that will enable them to collect, analyse and evaluate data from the cloud. The use of blockchain technology ensures that the privacy, security and integrity of the cloud data are guaranteed.
- l. **Counter Currency Detectors:** Currency counterfeiting is a trending type of criminal activity with a high rate of victimization. The emergence of technologies to facilitate digital printing and scanning has simplified the act and heightened the sophistication of currency counterfeiting. How is it possible to detect counterfeit currencies? Identifying a counterfeited currency is usually not an easy task (Erin, 2008). Therefore, scientists have

developed counter-currency detectors to identify fake currencies and ring an alarm when such currencies are found. Different types of counterfeit currency detectors have been developed by forensic scientists. They include but are not limited to counterfeit money detector pens, counterfeit currency UV detectors, magnetic currency detectors, magnifying currency detectors, currency watermark detectors, etc. (Shermer, 2004).

5.0 CONCLUSION

Crime management in the 21st century could have suffered significant setbacks in the absence of advancements in digital forensics. Forensic investigations are essentially targeted at exposing leads and to objectively pursuing such leads to logical conclusions that will establish victim and suspect status for criminal justice administration (Safertein, 2007). Digital technologies play significant roles in forensic investigations. According to Oetinger, (2010), investigators perform numerous functions including victim's emergency assistance, crime scene security, videotaping, photographing, sketching, writing reports and taking down notes, collating and processing evidence that is physical in nature, searching, interrogating witnesses and suspects to obtain vital information, identifying suspects, conducting surveillance, raids, stakeouts and undercover operations, and finally testifying in court. Crime management is more effective and well-coordinated when the 21st century digital technologies are utilized. Investigators utilize crucial information extracted from the findings of forensic analysis of crime incidence and institute legal actions with verifiable and admissible evidence. Crime scene management is exemplified when patrol officers on the beat are usually the first officers detailed to arrive at a crime scene. Such officers need to establish priorities by handling emergencies first and securing the crime scene before they can commence investigations. Professionally, any suspect found at the crime scene should be detained for interrogation and later arrested or released depending on the outcome of the interrogation. If the officers get a hint that a suspect has recently left the crime scene, the description, vehicle, direction of the suspect and items taken from the crime scene must be obtained, and the headquarters must be notified immediately.

Once emergencies have been taken care of, it is of utmost importance for officers to protect the crime scene and the evidence embedded. To aid preliminary investigations, necessary measures (including barricading, locking, roping, and guarding) to protect the crime scene must be put in

place to avoid contamination of critical evidence. Officers are bound to commence the preliminary investigations as soon as the crime scene is secured. The preliminary investigations should include interrogating witnesses, suspects and victims; photographing, measuring, videotaping, sketching the crime scene; evidence collection, identification, examining, and processing; and statements recording (Miller, Hess & Orthmann, 2011). The process of evidence establishment is the crux of criminal investigations. Forensic experts are required to authenticate relevant evidence to ascertain the actual suspects and victims of crime. It is important for investigation officers to ascertain as early as possible if a crime has been committed or not. This should be done by establishing the main elements of each crime and admissible evidence that supports the crime committed. It is also important to determine exactly when the crime happened.

Law enforcement agents are primarily saddled with the responsibility of solving crime issues. This responsibility should be deliberately made cooperative and well-coordinated. This is expected especially outside the police stations. There is a need for investigators and uniformed law enforcement agents to interrelate with agents of the criminal justice system and key players of the correctional institutions. This is because the investigation of criminal activity is a collaborative and mutual responsibility. Effective crime management is therefore a product of the utilization of advanced digital technologies and the collaboration of relevant stakeholders in criminal investigation, prosecution and rehabilitation.

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Poverty, National Poverty Eradication Programme and Youth Violence in Bayelsa State, Nigeria

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Abstract

It is believed that poverty and violent activities/social vices are intertwined in diverse perspectives, and the Nigerian scenario is a crystal indication. Thus, National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) was constituted not just to reduce the high rate of poverty, but also to curb violent activities (or criminality), particularly among the youth, however, the reverse has been the case in Nigeria, particularly in Bayelsa State. Given this menace, this paper examined the impact of NAPEP in relation to poverty and violence activities (social vices) in Bayelsa State. It employs the structural-functional theory and explores qualitative research with specific reference to relevant journal articles, textbooks, the internet and other archives. Thus, content analysis was utilized to unravel the nexus between poverty, NAPEP and youth violence in Bayelsa state, and Nigeria at large. The paper found that despite the enormous mineral resources' endowment and NAPEP, over 95 million Nigerians are still living in abject poverty, which makes the poverty situation very paradoxical. This has occasioned various violent activities or social vices among youth, such as kidnapping, hostage-taking, armed robbery, among others. It therefore recommended among others that to reduce violent activities/social vices, the Bayelsa State government should properly partner with the federal government on subsequent poverty eradication programmes; provide start-up capitals for beneficiaries and monitor closely to ensure that skills and business acquired through such programmes are sustained.

Keywords: Bayelsa, NAPEP, Poverty, Social vices, Violence, Youth

1.0 INTRODUCTION

It is believed that violent activities in Nigeria to some extent, are an offshoot of poverty. This is hinged on the endemic nature of poverty, particularly among the youth(s) in the Nigerian State. Generally, poverty has become a threat to national development in Nigeria, despite the vast endowment of mineral and human resources in the country is endowed with. The Poverty World Clock (2020), has revealed that Nigeria is the capital of poverty in the world. The cable News Network (CNN, 2018), reveals also that the level of poverty in Nigeria is more than that of India in respect to the number of her population that are entrapped in the web of poverty. CNN also captures over 87 million Nigerians living on less than US\$1.90 daily.

India's population is about 1.38 billion which is equivalent to 17.7 percent of the world's population. China is the most populous country in the world, which is about 1.44 billion in 2020, equivalent to 18.4 percent of the total population of the world (World Bank Report 2020), with no match with Nigeria in terms of natural resources endowment, yet the population of Nigerians entrapped in the web of poverty in Nigeria is more than those of India and China

According to the United Nations Data (2020), Nigeria's population is estimated to be 206 million which is equivalent to only 2.64 percent of the world population, with a massive endowment of oil and other numerous natural resources, yet 87 million people in Nigeria live in extreme poverty. This accounts for 44 percent of our entire population who are not measuring up with the expected poverty line of US\$1.90 per day, in comparison with 73 million of the Indian population living below the expected line of poverty. Bayelsa State, the study area of this paper, has had its fair share of the scourge of poverty in Nigeria.

In a bid to call the federal government to review the 13 percent derivation fund given to oil bearing communities, Governor Douye Diri stated that Bayelsans are like people inside the river. It feels like taking our birth in the river and soap is entering into our eyes and we are looking for water in a bucket to wash the soap from our eyes (Vanguard, 2020); this is paradoxical. Sule and Adamu (2019) observed that it is scarcity amidst numerous natural resources. Bayelsa State is a privileged state that is enormously blessed with oil resources that serve as a major foreign exchange earner for the federation. As a matter of fact, crude oil was first discovered in 1956 at Otuabagi– Oloibiri, which was formerly part of the Eastern Region. The state was later situated in Rivers State but in present day Nigeria, it is situated in Ogbia Local Governments Area of Bayelsa State (Okolo, 2016, Etekpe and Okolo, 2011). However, there is no proof for this, as poverty in all its characteristics features is still ravaging the state.

Basically, the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), was one of such past efforts of the government to fight the scourge of poverty in this country, and according to Egbe (2018) should reduce the prevalence of violent activities among youth in Bayelsa State. However, despite NAPEP implementation, the Poverty situation has culminated in various dimensions of violence (or criminality) among youth in different locations of the State, such as Sagbama, Swali, Otuoke, Akasa, Okordia, Odi, Yenagua, Amassoma, among numerous others.

It is apparent that poverty has led to myriads of violent activities in Bayelsa State, such as kidnapping, hostage taking, sea piracy, and armed robbery among others (Egbe, 2018). An ample instance is the recent ambush and Kidnapping of Ebitare James on Feb. 12, 2020, at Opume Town along the Nembe-Ogbia Road (Etete, 2022). Obviously, Bayelsa State has had the implementation of other poverty eradication Programmes and NAPEP in particular yet poverty is still very prevalent in the State, despite the fact that Boubai (2021) rated it as one of the most mineral resource-endowed states in Nigeria. NBS 2018, posits that 57.0 percent of the Bayelsa population is poor, representing about 1200,000 people.

It becomes very imperative and therefore compelling to investigate NAPEP and its activities in the State as one would think that NAPEP being a poverty eradication Programme with multi-dimensional approaches to poverty eradication, should have been able to eradicate poverty in the State, which may have ordinarily reduce violence activities among youth such as kidnapping, hostage taking, armed robbery, etc. Thus, this paper examined the Impact of NAPEP in relation to poverty and violence activities (social vices) in Bayelsa State, and Nigeria at large.

Given this backdrop, this paper is significant to unveil the impact of the various poverty eradication programmes on poverty and unravel the factors responsible for the seemingly irreversible poverty situation and violence activities in spite of NAPEP in Bayelsa State. In this regard, it is pivotal to proffer viable suggestions to remediate the dilemma of Poverty and violence activities despite NAPEP in Bayelsa State, and Nigeria at large, and therefore pertinent to contribute to the existing body of knowledge as highlighted.

Theoretical Based Methodology

The propositions of Structural functionalism form the theoretical base of this paper. Notably, Structural functionalism started with the writings of Aristotle in the ancient Greeks (Succer, 1992). Historically, Structural functionalism can be traced to social and biological sciences.

The origin of Structural functionalism theory in political science, can be credited to Talcott Parson, Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, who were the early frontiers (Parson, 1991; Almond & Powell, 1978). Gabriel and Almond argued that for one to fully grasp the understanding of a political system, it becomes imperative not to only appreciate its institutions, but also, the

individual role they play and that for these institutions to be understood correctly in society, they must be placed in a clear and useful historical perspective (Almond & Powell 1978).

Functionalism became expedient when Charles Darwin's Theory of Evolution began to lay emphasis on the behavioural aspect of human beings. Darwin was of the opinion that only functional and operational institutions are meant to survive. Each function was pertinent to the sustenance of an entire system. Systems that are unable to contribute their quota to the sustenance of the entire system, cease to exist. Other Scholars of human behaviour have also integrated these ideas into social affairs. Structural functionalism sees the society as a whole structure with interrelated parts performing their own function, so that, when a system fails to perform its functions, other systems within the society are affected, which may result in structural dysfunctional, chaos, poverty, disorderliness and anarchy in the system (Fisher, 2010).

Thus, NAPEP is the structure under consideration here, which is supposed to have carried out some distributive functions, targeted at eradicating poverty in Nigeria (system). Therefore, it is expedient that the government put proper monitoring measures in place so that programmes and policies of government initiated can work harmoniously, to reduce violent activities or social vices in Bayelsa State, and the country at large.

Methodologically, the paper is anchored on qualitative research, which explores mainly the secondary sources of data with specific reference to relevant journal articles, textbooks, the internet and other archives. Thus, content analysis was utilized to analyze the data to unravel the nexus between NAPEP, poverty and violence in Bayelsa state, and Nigeria at large.

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

This section of the paper addresses relevant kinds of literature and discusses accordingly; including journal articles, textbooks, internet and other archives, aimed at unravelling the nexus between NAPEP and youth violence in view of poverty in Bayelsa state, and Nigeria at large.

Youth violence and its causes in Nigeria

The concept of youth has been controversial as regards its definition. In its simplest terms youth is seen as the period above children and below adulthood. According to Okeke (2004), youth begin with the onset of puberty. In other words, youth refer to it as adolescence characterized by

exuberance (Eric, 2017). On his part, Summer (1978) cited in Nyame (2007) defines youth as the period of time when someone is young especially the period when someone is a teenager. Similarly, Nyame (2007) coined it as the time of life when a person is young, particularly, before a child becomes an adult. Using age bracket as a parameter, the National Youth Development Policy (2001) defined youth as people aged between 18 and 40 years. It is a stage in life when a person is young, especially the time before a person becomes an adult.

Violence on the other hand is the intentional use of physical force or power, threat or action, against oneself, another person, or a group or community, that either result in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation (Ukeje, 2001). This implies that a person or group must intend to use force or power against another person or group in order for an act to be classified as violent. Violence is thus distinguished from injury or harm that results from unintended actions and incidents. There are diverse forms of violence, such as physical violence, domestic violence, and terrorist violence (including, kidnapping, robbery, bombing, etc.), among others (Okolo, 2010; Okolo, 2021).

In Nigeria, violence among the youth is stirred by poverty in relation to grievances based on political rights, cultural rights, religious rights and minority rights, among others. For example, the high rate of kidnapping in South-South and South-East Nigeria, as well as political thuggery and bombings in some South-South states such as Bayelsa in Nigeria, is attributed to venting of grievances for their livelihood needs and adequate representation of their interest in the federal government character, since major natural resources that fuel the economy of the nation come from their regions (Okolo, 2021; Okolo; 2010; Ukeje 2001; Okolo, Agbai & Boubai, 2022).

3.0 POVERTY AND ITS INCIDENTS IN NIGERIA

As a critical concept, poverty has been defined by scholars looking at the concept from different points of view. This is because of the expansive nature of its scope. Eze (2009) cited in Yisau (2017), argue that there is a profusion of scholars who have written extensively on the concept of poverty. On this note Maxwell (1999) asked myriads of questions looking at poverty from the perspective of the various scholars who have written extensively on it – Can poverty be defined based on the amount of money known as income, earned by an individual or a family? Can it be defined based on the absence of the basic needs of life, which include food, shelter, and raiment

among others? Does it have to do with the inability to be politically, culturally, socially and economically relevant in society? It is in this vain that the paper shall view poverty through the lens of different scholars who have written extensively on it.

In his view, Aderomu (2010) defines poverty as a circumstance of life characterized by the absence of basic things that make for a meaningful lifestyle which includes nutrition, raiment, shelter, education and medical facilities. The World Bank (1999), in a similar vein, sees poverty as a deprivation of all sorts such as health care services, sustainable educational system, housing, hunger, inadequate access to employment and credit opportunities, not being able to speak properly, uncertainty of the unknown future, infant mortality caused by unhealthy water, absence of a political might, and lack of equality and fairness. What interests us the most in this definition, is the debilitating influence of poverty on the individual. When an individual is affected by some or all of the above, life becomes burdensome to live. There is actually no doubt that poverty can reduce an individual to the background.

In the same vein, the Central Bank of Nigeria (1999), defines poverty as a situation where a person cannot fend for himself or herself, cater enough to provide for everything that makes for a meaningful life, which includes basic nutrition, raiment, and shelter, inability to be responsible Socially and economically, inadequate job opportunities, business acumen, lack of access to land and capital, absence of self worth and has little or no access to social and economic amenities which includes education, health, potable water, sanitation which results in the inability of a person to advance his course in life

Scholars like Taiwo and Agu (2016), Hussain (2014), Alfa, et al. (2014) and Ravallion (2020) hold the same view and see poverty as a challenge of the individual that affects the community by extension. It is actually a circumstance where a group of persons or individuals or a community is incapacitated in the ability to provide for basic materials needs that define a comfortable life, which includes among others inability to be actively involved in the prevailing social standard of living, integrity and inability to explore opportunities. What is quite different about this definition is the inclusion of the community. Meaning that poverty is not just an individual or a household challenge, it is as well, the challenge of the community (local, state and federal government) to which the individual belongs.

What interests us in the last category of poverty as submitted above, is that poverty can be a result of the geographical location in which the individual finds themselves. This means that a relocation of such geographical area that is prone to poverty can essentially, change the individual status of poverty, thereby providing exposure to a maximum standard of living. Perhaps, this is the reason many Nigerians are relocating from Nigeria to other countries for greener pastures. Thus, our focus shall be on the incidence of poverty in Nigeria.

In the Nigerian context, poverty is the challenge of the entire nation. The magnitude at which poverty is escalating in Nigeria is becoming a major challenge. According to a study on poverty eradication done by Sule and Adamu (2019), the incidence of poverty in Nigeria had escalated from 28% in 1980 to about 70% in 2003. It declined to 54.4% in 2004. According to their study, this decline was due essentially to the laudable poverty eradication measures put up by the government. This decline in the level of poverty in Nigeria was brought about when the National Poverty Eradication Programme was very operational in Nigeria. Then in 2007, the rate of poverty increased to 70% and 72% in 2018 respectively.

Taking a deep analysis of the above report shows that if more effort were put into the NAPEP in terms of proper implementation, financial resources and continuation of the programme (NAPEP), the decline in the rate of poverty would have probably continued to the barest minimum in Nigeria. But probably, because of improper implementation of anti-poverty Programmes, the transition of government and the inability to continue with the activities of NAPEP, the rate of poverty after a brief decline re-escalated.

The National Bureau of Statistics (2019), in reporting on the disturbing situation of poverty in Nigeria, contends that 40% of the Nigerian population falls short of the annual poverty line of ₦137,430 (US\$381.75). Apparently, this represents about 82.9 million Nigerians who are extremely poor and are not able to beat the annual poverty line. This obviously calls for concern in that, despite the vast mineral resources with which Nigeria is blessed, about half of her population still wallows in poverty. This report does not include the number of people falling in and out of poverty annually.

The Cable News Network (2018) reports that the level of poverty in Nigeria is far more than that of India, in that Nigeria has the highest number of its citizens living in abject poverty with about

87 million Nigerians living on less than US\$1.90 daily. India's population is 1.38 billion people, which represents 17.7% of the world's population (World Bank Report, 2020). While Nigeria's population was estimated to be 206 million in 2020 which represents only 2.64% of the population of the world.

The population of Nigeria with the endowment of enormous mineral resources is no match with that of India, yet 87 million Nigerians live in abject poverty while only 73 million people live in poverty in India. The Poverty World Clock (2020), confirms this stake by classifying Nigeria as the poverty capital of the world. It is worthy of note to say that poverty is increasing astronomically in Nigeria, amidst enormous mineral and human resources and amidst laudable poverty eradication measures of government such as NAPEP. The paper shall therefore proceed to the dimensions of poverty caused by violent activities in Nigeria.

There are basically four (4) dimensions of poverty caused by violence (i) Human security (ii) Resources, (iii) Power and voice and (iv) Opportunities and choice. Poverty caused by violence in relation to resources implies one's inability to get access to resources that can help meet basic needs to sustain a standard means of living and improve one's life. Being poor in relation to choices and opportunities entails one's chances of developing and/or utilizing resources to escape poverty. Also, the inability of one to articulate concerns, needs, and rights in an informed manner and to participate in decision-making affecting is regarded as a poverty of power and voice. A person is bedevilled by poverty if he faces physical, sexual, and/or psychological violence as well as insecurities that prevent various groups and individuals from exercising their human rights (Sida, 2019; Chimere & Urama, 2019). All these dimensions are linked with violent activities. However, the poverty of human security is most apparent among the four dimensions of poverty resulting from violent activities

The National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP).

In 1999, during President Olusegun Obasanjo's administration, a World Bank report (1999), revealed that, the Human Development Index (HDI) of Nigeria was just 0.416 and that more than 70 per cent of the population, lived below the poverty line of US\$1 daily. This report warranted

the administration to examine the existing poverty eradication institutions in the country, with the intent to harmonize them (Adamu et al. 2019).

The federal government led by President Olusegun Obasanjo, inaugurated three presidential committees to look into the issues bordering on poverty, on the ground. The first presidential committee was to rationalize and integrate all the Poverty Alleviation agencies in Nigeria, making them work towards a common goal. The chairman was Alhaji Ahmed Joda. The second which was a Presidential Technical Committee, was to appraise or scrutinize all poverty alleviation Programmes in Nigeria with the aim of knowing whether they were in alliance with the original purpose of their initiation. This was chaired by Professor Ango Abdullahi. The last was the Committee scheme and the blueprint for poverty eradication Programmes, chaired by A. B. Aborishade. Consequently, NAPEP was set up based on the outcome of these reports. NAPEP came on board in the year 2001, by President Olusegun Obasanjo's administration. It was a successor poverty eradication Programme, to the defunct Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP) (see Kehinde, 2019).

The NAPEP was meant to work with all the stakeholders who were responsible for poverty eradication in Nigeria. According to Eleagu, (2018), these include the Federal, State and Local governments, civil society organizations, research institutions, the organized private sector, Women groups and concerned individuals. It was accompanied by a policy making body known as the National Poverty Eradication Council (NAPEC). NAPEC was to make poverty eradication-related policies while NAPEP was to implement these policies.

The broad objective of NAPEP was to ensure the total eradication of poverty in Nigeria. And this in turn would reduce violent activities in the country. To achieve this objective, NAPEP activities were classified into four schemes. They are:

1. The Youth Empowerment Scheme (YES).
2. The Rural Infrastructure Development Scheme (RIDS).
3. Social Welfare Service Scheme (SOWESS).
4. The National Resource Development and Conservative Scheme (NRDCS).

The Youth Empowerment Scheme (YES) was saddled with the responsibility of training, skill acquisition, Empowerment opportunities and wealth creation. YES has sub-schemes like Capacity Acquisition Programme (CAP), Mandatory Attachment Programme (MAP) and Credit Delivery Programme (CDP). (Eleagu 2018, Adamu, et al 2019). Capacity Acquisition Programme was meant to expose Youths to skill acquisition to enable them to establish businesses of their own. Participants of CAP were given a token of 3,500 Naira as monthly allowance aid through the duration of the Programme.

The MAP was given the responsibility of training graduates of tertiary institutions who had completed their National Youth Service Ccorp (NYSC). (b) Rural Infrastructure Development Scheme (RIDS). This Scheme was saddled with the responsibility of providing portable and irrigable water, transport (rural and urban), rural energy and power supply.(c) Social Welfare Service Scheme (SOWESS).

The responsibility of SOWESS was on general education, primary health care services, the establishment of recreational centres, political awareness facilities, provision of mass transit and maintenance of culture. (d). National Resource Development and Conservative Scheme (NRDCS). This was known for responsibilities that border on environmental issues, land reclamation for agriculture, water, solid minerals resources and space (Eleagu 2018, Ebenehi et al. 2012). There was also a sub-scheme known as the Multi Partner Micro Finance Scheme (MPMFS).

Gunman (2009), cited in Ebenehi et al (2012), contend that NAPEP collaborated with some Microfinance Bank under the aegis of the MPFS and gave micro credit loans to those who benefited from the Programme. This was aimed at increasing the capital base of NAPEP beneficiaries, culminating in the expansion of their businesses. It was under the aegis of the MPMFS, that Bayelsa State, the study area of this paper, Oceanic Bank and the federal government went into partnership to fund NAPEP. Two Hundred Thousand Naira (200,000.00) was contributed by the NAPEP national office, 1 billion Naira was contributed by the Bayelsa State government and another 1 billion Naira was contributed by Oceanic Bank, which made a total of ₦2.2billion.

NAPEP received huge financial support through the national budget. According to Sule and Adamu (2019), NAPEP received a total of ₦34 billion. ₦11.8 billion of this amount was gotten through the budget, and ₦4 billion went into the purchase of Keke- NAPEP. ₦10 billion was contributed by States. Commercial banks were meant to go into partnership Programmes and ₦8.2 billion was gotten from Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Despite this huge financial input into NAPEP, NAPEP did not make a significant impact (Adamu et al. 2019). Eleagu (2018) contends that NAPEP could not make a significant impact, despite the huge financial commitment put into it by all sundries. This was because the absence of financial discipline, Corruption and inconsistent policies which had undermined past efforts still makes poverty eradication in Nigeria a paradox (Ebenehi et al. 2012; Raji, 2020; Kasikoro, 2021). NAPEP had a Policy guideline that made it an all-inclusive poverty eradication Programme. The guideline includes the following:

- i. The implementation and monitoring of the Programme follow the bottom-top mode of participation.
- ii. It provides a rational framework that promotes sustainable institutional arrangement.
- iii. Its actions are directly channelled at women, youths, farmers and the disabled.
- iv. The Programme encourages inter ministry relationships and inter agency collaboration.
- v. Participation in the programme is open to all interested Political parties and traditional institutions.
- vi. It ensures that local industries acquire technological knowledge to enhance agricultural development.
- vii. It ensures the building of capabilities for skills that are functional and creates avenues for the training of NAPEP participants.
- viii. It ensures local farmers benefit from agricultural and industrial extension services.
- ix. It offers institutional progression to ensure that agricultural and industrial products are marketed and
- x. It encourages collaborative efforts of various schemes toward youth engagement, infrastructural development, availability of social amenities and exploitation of natural resources (Kasikoro, 2021).

4.0 POVERTY, NATIONAL POVERTY ERADICATION PROGRAMME AND VIOLENT ACTIVITIES (SOCIAL VICES) IN BAYELSA.

It is believed that poverty and violent activities/social vices are intertwined in diverse perspectives. Generally, poverty has become a very daunting challenge in Nigeria, as successive administrations have tried in no little way to ameliorate its scourge in Nigeria, yet the poverty situation seems irreversible, as the incidence of poverty continues to increase. Our country is endowed with huge mineral resources, enough to take care of the whole of West Africa, with enough reserves for foreign exchange (Environmental Watch, 1998) cited in (Okolo, 2016). Myriads of anti-poverty Programmes have been put in place and implemented in Nigeria, right from the Statehood of the nation, yet results have been elusive, as more Nigerians get trapped in the web of poverty by the day. Olayinka (2019) cited in Chimere and Urama, (2019) contends that though successive administrations have initiated and implemented myriads of poverty alleviation programmes, geared towards ameliorating poverty in Nigeria, more than 93 million Nigerians are still ridiculously sliding into the web of poverty, with another three million falling in and out of poverty. The NAPEP was one of such past efforts of the government to fight the scourge of poverty in this country. In the history of Nigeria, NAPEP was the first multi-dimensional approach taken by the government to combat poverty, in that, all the ministries, parastatals, agencies of government, and non-government organizations among others, were all mobilized, to ensure an effective poverty eradication in the country. This can be attested to by the work of Ebenehi et al. (2012), Eleagu, (2018), Hussein, (2014), Sule and Adamu, (2019), Taiwo and Agwu, (2016), Obadan, (2001).

Poverty has taken its toll on different parts of the country and Bayelsa State in particular, despite NAPEP implementation. The poverty situation has culminated in various dimensions of violence (or criminality) among youth in different locations of the country and Bayelsa State in particular, such as Sagbama, Swali, Otueke, Akasa, Okordia, Odi, Yenagua, Amassoma among numerous others. There have been experiences of various degrees of crimes in the State such as kidnapping, hostage taking, sea piracy, and armed robbery, among many others at different times (Egbe, 2018). Some of these people involved in such violent activities may not really have the intention to do such but poverty propelled them to do so. After engaging in social vices, they get ransom to fend for themselves and their dependents. Eleagu, (2018) rightly contends that while interrogating the

criminals, they own up to the fact that poverty necessitated their engagement in these dastardly acts of criminality and that if there were jobs available, they would not be involved in such acts. These criminals also admitted that they got involved in such acts to fend for their families and their ageing parents who could not fend for themselves due to old age, retirement and health challenges (Eleagu, 2018).

Now, what becomes so worrisome is that NAPEP in Bayelsa State was a tripartite arrangement among the federal, state and non-governmental organizations and a sum of ₦2.2 billion raised. What impact did this gesture make in ameliorating the scourge of poverty in the State? Skills/business were acquired by participants of NAPEP. This was to create room for self-employment, thereby eradicating poverty. What happened to those skills/businesses acquired through NAPEP.

Despite the foregoing, poverty is still endemic in the state, particularly among the youth, which has led to a lot of violent activities (Egbe, 2018), contend that poverty is the source of myriads of criminality and social vice, such as terrorism, illegal migration, conflicts, violent extremism, intolerance, exclusion, piracy, human and drugs trafficking, drug abuse and corruption.

Contributing to this debate, Egbe (2018) posits that in 2004 three (3) hostages were taken in Beseni, and another 42 hostages were taken in Peretorui in 2005. This trend has taken place in Swali, Sagbama, Otuake, Akasa, Odi, Okodi, Odioma Brass, Amarata, Gbaran, Korokorosei among others in Bayelsa State. They do this with the aim of getting ransom from the families of their victims, just to earn a living. This is not to say that crime is justified but we trying to establish that poverty prompted them into it. Internet fraud also known as Yahoo-Yahoo, is a trending crime right now in Bayelsa State and in Nigeria generally. This crime is common among youths, seeking a means of livelihood. It ranges from secondary school leavers to young graduates. Poverty is the nexus of all of these.

Table 1 Incidents of Violence (Kidnapping/Hostage Taking/Sea Piracy in Bayelsa State.

Nature of Case	Date reported	Location of case	Hostage /victims & their origin	Date released	Reason for action
Kidnapping	03/03/02	Beseni Bayelsa	13 Hostages	08/03/04	TNC Security v. Youth clash
Hostage taking	19/12/05	Peretoru Bayelsa	12 Hostage	03/01/06	Impeachment of Bayelsa Speaker
Hostage taking	15/12/05	Swali Bayelsa	14 Expatriates & 1 Nigerian	23/02/06	Arrest of one militant in PH.
Sea piracy	19/01/06	Sagbama Bayelsa	6 policemen	19/02/07	No source of livelihood
Kidnapping	23/05/07	Atesa Bayelsa	9 Expatriates staff of Texaco	08/06/07	Oil exploration with development of the area.
Detention	10/05/07	Otuoke Bayelsa	16 Victims	23/05/07	Detention of Alamieyeseigha
Kidnapping	31/07/07	Amarata Bayelsa	11yr old son of a member of BSHA	04/08/07	Welfare of militants
Kidnapping	08/08/07	Garan Bayelsa	Mother of the Speaker of BSHA	22/08/07	Welfare militants
Kidnapping	18/08/07	Akassa Bayelsa	Mother of the Speaker of BSHA	7/09/07	Welfare of militants
Kidnapping	28/10/07	Odi Bayelsa	1 Nigerian	15/10/07	Ransom
Kidnapping	15/10/07	SILGA, Bayelsa	1 Nigerian	15/10/07	Ransom

Source: Oghoghokwe (2012), cited in Egbe 2018 NPF, Anti-kidnapping Unit Bayelsa State Command Yenagoa.

Table 1 Continued

Kidnapping	25/08/12	Okordia Bayelsa	King Richard Seiba	Nil	Accused charged to court.
Kidnapping	17/12/12	Odioma Brass Bayelsa	4 Koreans & 2 Nigerians	Nil	Accused charged to court
Kidnapping	14/01/13	Korokorosei Bayelsa	Mrs. Etilah Friday Benson(mother of BSHA Speaker)	Nil	Accused charged to court
Kidnapping	29/07/15	Gbetebiri Bayelsa	Mrs. Esther Akpe (mother of majority leader BSHA.	Nil	Suspect was reprimanded in prison custody.
Kidnapping	25/05/13	Otiotio Bayelsa	Anne Bekeyei Ziworitin	Nil	Accused charged to High court
Kidnapping	23/08/13	Opuema Bayelsa	Staff of SIDONI Company	Nil	Ransom
Kidnapping	25/09/13	Akasa Bayelsa	Crew of MT JENIFER Vessel	Nil	Accused charged to court
Kidnapping	23/12/13	Swali Bayelsa	Francis Joshua	Nil	Accused charged to court
Kidnapping	26/12/13	Milton Road Bayelsa	Jimimah Clement Ene	Nil	Accused charged to court.
Kidnapping	07/05/2019	Ogbia Town	Ejeka Lawrence, 47	Nil	Ransom
Kidnapping	12/02/2020	Opuma	Ebitare James	Nil	Ransom
Kidnapping	24/04/2022	East-West Road	Gloria Izonfuo (Federal Commissioner of NPC for Bayelsa)	Nil	Ransom

Source: Oghoghokwe (2012) cited in (Egbe 2018); Etete (2022).

Etete (2022) revealed that from Jan. 2015 to June 2022, 51 persons (26 female and 25 male) were kidnapped in only Ogbia LGA. A Critical look at the above table. shows that the majority of the kidnapping/hostage takings were done for the sake of collecting ransom from their victims. This is the extent, to which poverty has taken us.

Poverty has elicited other forms of crime in Bayelsa State particularly and Nigeria at large, such as armed robbery, prostitution, baby factory, drug and human trafficking. Poverty is a social problem that leads to other Social, economic and political disturbances (Bello, 2017, Etekpe, et al 2015). The government of Nigeria has taken various measures over time to combat the scourge of

poverty in Nigeria. The next section shall take us through some of these past approaches to poverty eradication in Nigeria.

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the various poverty eradication programmes, poverty has remained endemic, as the rate of poverty in Nigeria despite NAPEP, is unimaginably high as 5.14% of the Nigerian population is poor and an additional 16.8% are vulnerable to multi-dimensional poverty (UNDP, 2019). This has occasioned various violent activities or social vices among youth, such as kidnapping, hostage-taking, armed robbery, among others. A number of factors are responsible for this seemingly irreversible poverty situation and violent activities (in spite of NAPEP) in Nigeria such as unavailability of employment opportunities, deficiency in skilled man-power, market imperfection, mismanagement and discouragement of poverty alleviation programmes and inefficient leadership and government among other

It is therefore obvious that despite NAPEP and its activities in Bayelsa State, poverty is still the identity of the state as there are very few surviving business skills acquired through NAPEP with which the poor should have made a living in all the three senatorial Districts in Bayelsa State. Although NAPEP made a small impact on the lives of beneficiaries during its operation it is not commensurate with the expected result of poverty eradication in the state, which has prompted enormous cases of violent activities. It is therefore pivotal to recommend the following:

- (1) As a way of reducing violent activities/social vices, the Bayelsa State government should properly partner with the federal government in subsequent poverty eradication programmes to make sure skills and businesses acquired through such programmes are sustained.
- (2) There is also the need for a well-structured, competent and unbiased monitoring team should be put in place by the Bayelsa State government to ensure poverty eradication programmes are properly implemented.
- (3) Also pivotal is the fact that start-up capital needs to be provided for participants of poverty eradication programmes to ensure sustainability of the various skills, so as to reduce issues of violence and social vices in Bayelsa State and Nigeria at large.

- (4) Hoodlums/fraudulent poverty eradication officials should be properly prosecuted to serve as a deterrent to other intending ones.
- (5) Policies and programmes directed at poverty reduction should be critically re-examined and structured rightly, as the failure of such policies and programmes have the capacity to ignite wide-ranged violence activities at various dimension

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Challenges of Small Arms Proliferation in FCT, Nigeria: Innovative Strategies for Curbing the Menace

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Abstract

Nigeria has been engulfed with communal conflicts, banditry, kidnapping, terrorism and insurgency. These challenges are executed with small arms and light weapons which have become readily available, and affordable. The study examined the challenges associated with the control of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the FCT, Abuja. The objectives included: determining the factors, the consequences, the effectiveness of efforts, the challenges, and options to curb the spread of small arms and light weapons. Random sampling technique was employed to select 350 participants from the five strata (Nigeria Military, Nigeria Police Force, Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps, Private Security Companies, and Civil servants) of the study population located in the 6 Area Councils of the territory. However, after retrieval and cleaning of data, copies of questionnaire from 200 participants were found suitable for analysis. The study found amongst others that factors like self-defense, local manufacturing, profiteering, corruption by security personnel and unemployment were responsible for the spread of SALWs. Porous borders, leaked armory, and private security and political/elections were enablers of the spread. The effect of SALWs included injuries, death, displacement, and culture of violence. It is necessary therefore to implement innovative strategies to combat the menace of unrestricted flow of small arms and light weapons. Consequently, interagency collaboration among security forces, and other relevant stakeholders coupled with investment in advanced technology and modern forensic techniques will aid in reducing the problem to the barest minimum.

Keywords: Arms, Light Weapons, Proliferation, Innovative Strategies, Menace

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, humans have consistently sought ways to conquer and adapt to their surroundings. Initially, primitive tools such as wooden and stone implements were devised to aid in gathering and cultivating the land (Basalla, 1988). Over time, more refined and intricate tools

were developed, including the utilization of fire for heating and cooking food (Basalla, 1988). As human settlements expanded, the need arose to protect their habitats from wild animals and safeguard crops from destruction. Consequently, tools like knives, slings, and catapults were created for defence purposes (Basalla, 1988). Despite their rudimentary nature, these instruments were indispensable for mitigating the challenges posed by the hostile environment in which early humans resided.

As conflicts among humans emerged, the transformation of tools originally intended for farming and defending against wildlife became necessary to serve as offensive weapons (Basalla, 1988). This shift in tool functionality instigated a relentless pursuit for more sophisticated arms and weaponry, leading to a rise in the availability and accessibility of such instruments of warfare (Basalla, 1988).

Over the past few years, there has been a persistent and unchecked increase in the development, production, trade, and trafficking of small arms and light weapons worldwide. Both states and non-state actors have found it increasingly easier to obtain firearms that are readily available and inexpensive, both through legal and illegal means. According to Schroeder (2013), this process involves firearms exiting the legal system and entering the illicit market through the use of "straw purchasers." Straw purchasers are individuals, acting as legitimate buyers to acquire weapons on behalf of ineligible buyers such as criminal and insurgency groups.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2019) identifies three forms of illicit firearms trafficking to include: illicit manufacturing, theft or diversion, and conversion, that is, recycling and reactivation of firearms. Griffiths and Wilkinson (2007) attribute the proliferation of small arms and light weapons to several factors, including the expansion of global trade, the emergence of black markets, the prevalence of the Internet, and the recent rise of private military companies.

In Nigeria, it is estimated that the number of privately owned firearms rose from 2 million in 2007 to 6 million in 2017, which is about a 34 percent rise in 10 years (gunpolicy.org, 2021). According to Egbuta (2019), Nigeria accounts for over 70% of the 10 million illegal arms circulating in the West African sub-region.

The number of non-state actors making use of arms in Nigeria has continued to increase. There were the Niger Delta militant groups, the Boko Haram terrorist/insurgency group, the Bandits, and now, the Eastern Security Network (ESN) asides from the criminal gang groups like kidnapers, armed robbers etc.

In an ideal society, it is the duty of the police to secure and protect the people against any threat to their lives and properties, as it is the responsibility of the military to defend the territorial integrity of the state against external attack. Where the state failed in their primary duty to its citizens, people have no alternative but to protect themselves with such arms and weapons they can access.

The demand for small arms and light weapons by states for internal security operations and external defence; the demand for it for self-defence and personal security; the demand for it to prosecute ethnic, political and religious conflicts; and the demand for arms for social and economic crimes has led to the development, production, stockpile, trade and transfer of small arms and light weapons.

Efforts to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons seem to be unsuccessful because of the vested interest of highly placed public officials and their big business collaborators. The global arms trade stood at approximately \$531 billion in 2020 despite the global COVID-19 pandemic (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2021).

Conditions such as globalization, porous borders, corruption and an increase in the number of private security companies and defence mercenaries have been highlighted in works of literature as facilitating the spread of arms (Bashir, 2013; Gayam, et al., 2022; Malhotra, 2011). While Malhotra (2011) suggests the process of political and economic integration, along with relaxed restrictions on migration and human movement, enables arms dealers to carry out their activities more easily, Gayam et al. (2022) blame the absence of effective control and regulation measures, and Bashir (2013) mentions the porous nature of most West African borders as facilitating the ease of entry and exit for arms, drugs, and human trafficking.

Research on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has focused on the national and global levels (Bhattacharyya, 2010; Bolton et al., 2012; Hazen and Horner, 2007; Ifediora, 2020;

Makki et al., 2001; Mogire, 2003; NATO, 2021; Omitola and Awotayo, 2016; Stohl, n.d.; Valenti, 2007; Weiss, 2003).

The study aims to examine the challenges associated with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons at the local level.

The specific objectives of the study are:

1. To determine the factors responsible for the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Nigeria.
2. To examine the consequences of small arms and light weapons proliferation on the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Nigeria.
3. To examine the effectiveness and adequacy of efforts at controlling the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Nigeria.
4. To understand the challenges to curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Nigeria.
5. To explore new ways of containing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Nigeria.

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

The Concept of Small Arm

According to Pattugala (2004), the term "small arm" in literature is often used interchangeably with "firearms" and "guns." This terminology implies the existence of larger arms in contrast. The term "small arm" might convey the notion that it poses less of a threat to society due to its size.

Council of Europe (2006) in their EU Strategy report of 2005 reveals that the primary security threat to lives, property, and the state does not stem from "heavy weapons," but instead, the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons have had a significant impact on conflicts. The report states that small arms and light weapons were utilized in over 95% of the 49 major conflicts that occurred in the 1990s.

Article 1 of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2006) defines small arms as specific types of firearms and other destructive arms or devices.

The Nigeria Firearms Act (1959) refers to small arms as any lethal barrel weapon from which any shot, bullet, or other missile can be discharged.

The 1997 report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms and the 2005 International Tracing Instrument classify small arms as revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles, carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, and light machine guns, and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms (2001) defines small arms as any portable barreled weapon that expels or is designed to expel a shot, bullet, or projectile.

The Concept of Light Weapon

The word "light weapon" connotes that there are "heavy weapons". This implies, that while the light weapons are easy to carry, the heavy weapon will demand the use of some form of platform to transport it.

Etymologically, light weapons are portable instruments of attack or defence, a means of harming or exerting control over another person (Jensen-Jones, 2022). There are portable arms designed to be used by several persons working together in a team and include heavy machine guns, portable grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft cannons, portable anti-tank cannons, and more (Jensen-Jones, 2022).

The United Nations Panel of Experts classifies heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, and more as light weapons.

The Characteristics of Small Arms Light Weapon

The unique characteristics of small arms and light weapons include portability, high firepower, suitability for covert actions, affordability, and more (UN Report, 1997).

Darkwa (2011) argues against the assumption that small arms and light weapons are cheap, providing examples of their prices in different regions. He asserts that in third world countries where a majority of the people live below the poverty line, that is, on less than \$2 a day, it will be misleading to say small arms are cheap. According to Aning (2005) as cited in Darkwa, (2011), "in 2005, the price of a locally manufactured single-barrel gun in Ghana was between \$100-\$200", while in the Niger Delta of Nigeria imported guns sells between \$570 and \$2,150 depending on the make and type (Florquin & Berman, 2005 in Darkwa, 2011).

The Concept of Proliferation

The term proliferation was first mentioned in the mid-20th century within the context of the spread of nuclear arms (AISBL, 2009). Proliferation is defined as the spread of biochemical, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction to countries not originally involved in developing them. Proliferation is defined as the spread of weapons of mass destruction or the widespread availability of military-grade weapons (Oghuvbu, 2020). It is the "accumulation and circulation of small arms and weapons" (Malam as cited in Oghuvbu, 2020). Vines (2005) describes SALW proliferation as "the illicit transfer".

The former Secretary-General of the UN defines proliferation of arms and weapons "as a method in which arms and weapons are sold to private citizens, especially in the conflict zones. Hazan and Horner (2007) describe proliferation as the growth or numerous multiplications of illegal arms and weapons. The definition advanced by Aver et al (2014: 2) is that arms proliferation is a "sudden increase in the number of arms and weapons beyond those needed (sic) for legitimate national security".

Behera (2001) explains that the easy availability and unrestricted flow of light weapons can be understood through the concepts of "proliferation" and "diffusion." While "proliferation" indicates an increase in the number of weapons possessed by specific governments or the number of states that possess a particular weapon system, and also suggests a rapid growth in the number of specific weapons being introduced into a specific area, "diffusion" refers to the spread of light weapons throughout the world and at all levels of society through multiple channels, including both intentional and accidental means (Behera, 2001).

Generally, proliferation is the licit and illicit spread and increase in the number and availability of small arms and light weapons for the prosecution of legitimate or illegitimate security, economic and social concerns.

Review of Relevant Theories

The study reviews three theories to explain the phenomenon of small arms and light weapons proliferation. These are the failed state, the conflict, and the cultural theories.

Failed State Theory

The roots of conflict and crimes can be traced back to a variety of interconnected and intricate factors, including political, commercial, socioeconomic, ethnic, cultural, and ideological elements that have accumulated over time (UN General Assembly document A/54/258). The United Nations Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms attributes the proliferation of arms to state-level failure. It states:

When the State loses control over its security functions and fails to maintain the security of its citizens, the subsequent growth of armed violence, banditry and organized crime increases the demand for weapons by citizens seeking to protect themselves and their property.

According to Barma (2021), a failed state can be characterized as a nation-state that lacks the ability to fulfill two essential functions within the modern global system. These functions include the inability to exert control and authority over its territory and population, as well as the failure to safeguard its national borders. State failure becomes evident when a state is no longer capable of providing its citizens with essential elements such as physical security, a conducive economic environment, and a stable political system (Oko et al., 2018).

Machiavelli defines a state as having the exclusive right to the use of force. Max Weber enlarges Machiavellian's definition by stating that "a state [is] a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' even when 'the right to used physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it" (John, 2008). Rotberg (as cited in Oko et al., 2018) states, the failure

of nation-states occurs when they are no longer able to provide essential benefits to their citizens, commonly referred to as positive political goods. These political goods encompass a range of aspects such as education, healthcare, security, social infrastructure, employment opportunities, and a functioning legal framework for maintaining law and order.

In summary, the failed state theory argues that when a state fails in its primary responsibility, that is, to provide the basic services, especially, protection and security, it creates room for individuals and non-state actors to demand and use arms and weapons leading to proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.

Conflict Theory

Aver et al. (2014) situate small arms and light weapons proliferation in the conflict theory of Marx and Engels. The theory holds that because of the existence of a class structure where some members of the society are dominant and others dominated, the conflict will continue to permeate the society as each class struggles to either maintain the status quo or seek for change of the status quo. The struggle could degenerate into the use of arms and other weapons.

Cultural Theory

The third theoretical perspective looks at culture as the reason for arms possession. AISBL (2009) cited the work of Jacklyn Cock who attempts a sociological examination of social violence with particular attention on the peoples' values, practices, and institutions in South Africa. The study's conclusion suggests that the inclination towards firearms is a concept that is shaped by society and influenced by various cultural factors and social identities. Similarly, Miller's (2003) investigation into the demand, stockpiles, and social control of small arms in Yemen highlights a significant link between the belief systems, socio-political structure, and the possession of small arms and light weapons. Furthermore, Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva of the Delhi High Court in India notes that the possession of firearms has evolved into a symbol of status in contemporary society. Individuals often seek to possess firearms as a means of showcasing their influence and power, and there are instances of indiscriminate use of firearms for celebratory firing at weddings (Possession of Arms, 2017).

In Ghana, for instance, the Executive Secretary of the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons opines that "the issue about small arms possession is linked to every society's development; as society grows and people become wealthier, they seek means to protect their properties" (Applerth, n.d.). It can however be argued that where the state discharges its duty of protecting and securing the lives and properties of the citizens, even the wealthy will not seek arms for personal protection.

Ayissi and Sall (2005) observe in some parts of Nigeria, some types of weapons are used for traditional rites and ceremonies. While the Fulanis carry swords, sticks and arrows, the communities of traditional hunters who live in the west and east of Nigeria carry cutlasses and shotguns. Sometimes, cannons are fired during official ceremonies. Some communities use dynamite and other modern explosives on these occasions. This cultural attachment to weapons has encouraged the proliferation of firearms manufactured locally, notably in rural communities where culture and tradition still enjoy great respect.

Empirical Review

Factors Responsible for the Proliferation of SALW

Factors responsible for small arms and light weapons proliferation in literature are often grouped into two – the push (supply) factors and the pull (demand) factors.

A. Push (Supply) Induced SALW Proliferation

Matiko and Hamasi (2022) examined the effectiveness of community-based strategies in addressing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in West Pokot County, Kenya.

A mixed methods research design was adopted to collect and analyze data. Both probability and non-probability sampling techniques were utilized to select participants. Data was collected through questionnaires, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews. The quantitative data was analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) software, while the qualitative data was coded and analyzed using analytic induction with reference to the theoretical frameworks. The study findings were presented in tabular format, incorporating percentages,

frequencies, and pie charts. Additionally, qualitative data was visually presented using graphic and interactive timelines to track the unfolding of SALW-related incidents over time.

The study identified economic marginalization, historical rivalries, rites of passage, and ethnic stereotypes as contributing factors to Small Arms and Light Weapon proliferation. Moreover, the research affirmed that engaging in sporting activities such as football and racing could serve as an alternative means to promote security in West Pokot.

Lamorde (2022) examined the effects of small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation on the national security of Nigeria. Five specific objectives were outlined, including examining the sources of SALW in Nigeria, assessing the roles of SALW in the escalation of armed violence and conflicts, investigating the factors responsible for SALW proliferation, examining the implications of SALW proliferation for human security, and exploring the challenges of combating SALW proliferation in Nigeria.

A Descriptive Survey Research Design was employed to gain an in-depth understanding of the topic. The target population comprised the entire citizenry and populace of people in FCT-Abuja. To ensure representative sampling, the simple random sampling technique was used to select 200 respondents from the population. Data was collected through structured questionnaires and interviews, and descriptive statistical tools were employed to analyze the data. Frequencies and percentages were presented in tabular form.

The findings of the study highlighted the porous borders of certain states and neighbouring countries as significant contributors to the availability of small arms in Nigeria. Additionally, the study revealed that a significant number of these weapons are locally manufactured or stolen from security personnel, politicians, and ethnic and religious groups.

Furthermore, the study identified unemployment, poverty, marginalization of certain ethnic groups, and politicization of ethno-religious differences, profitability, and socio-economic utility as factors influencing the proliferation of small arms in Nigeria.

The research also underscored that the proliferation of illegal small arms contributes to the escalation of armed violence and conflicts, leading to human rights violations, armed crime, and

insecurity. The study concluded that SALW proliferation has left Nigeria vulnerable to war, conflict, and destruction, hindering the country's development and resulting in the displacement of people and loss of lives.

Oghuvbu (2020) investigated the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in Africa and its implications for Nigeria. The study highlighted that SALWs are highly sought after due to their portability and defensive capabilities. Africa, in particular, faces significant challenges as approximately 100 million SALWs are trafficked within the continent.

The research employed a qualitative research method and utilized a case study research design. Secondary sources such as published books, book chapters, academic journals, newspapers, and internet sources were utilized to gather data. Thematic analysis was employed as the method of data analysis, wherein the retrieved data were segmented into themes based on the study objectives.

The findings of the study revealed that the proliferation of SALWs served as a catalyst for insurgency, militancy, and crime in Nigeria. To address this issue, the study recommended the implementation of strict monitoring and surveillance measures at the country's entry points, along with efforts to block illegal access routes that facilitate the transportation of illegal arms.

Small arms and light weapons are manufactured through both legal means by governments and private corporations, as well as through illegal methods by handcraft and criminal industries. Examples of countries that contribute significantly to the production and trade of small arms and light weapons include the United States of America (US), the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom (UK), Saudi Arabia, and France. These nations are responsible for the largest volume of manufactured and traded small arms and light weapons globally (Small Arms Survey, 2001).

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2019), the United States holds the position of the largest arms exporter worldwide. Additionally, Saudi Arabia emerged as the primary importer of arms from the US, accounting for approximately 22 percent of the imports between 2014 and 2018. SIPRI's findings reveal that during the same period, five countries, namely China, France, Germany, Russia, and the US, were responsible for 74 percent of the global arms exports. Furthermore, it is highlighted that in terms of small arms and light

weapons imports, countries such as Algeria, Australia, Egypt, India, and Saudi Arabia accounted for 36 percent of the global imports within that timeframe.

Still, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2021) maintained that the value of the global trade in arms in 2017 was approximately \$95 billion while \$398.2 billion worth of sales were made by leading 100 arms manufacturers in the same year. In 2018, more than a quarter of spending on the military was done by the United States.

In addition, the period 2009-2018 saw about a 90 percent increase in arms transfer to the Middle East; between 50 and 60 percent of the US and British arms exports went to the Middle East between 2014 and 2018 (SIPRI, 2021).

Generally, the production, stock and trade in arms and weapons, whether by states, businesses or individuals, are driven by the need to make gains, financial or strategic.

B. Pull (Demand) Induced Small Arms and Light Weapon Proliferation

Throughout human history, conflicts have been a defining aspect of our existence. Firstly, the primitive man had faced threats from his co-inhabitant of the earth like the wild animals for which he needed to arm himself and weaponize his environment to wade off any attacks (Sample, 2012). Additionally, the emergence of private property according to Rousseau (as cited in Bertram, 2012) and societal divisions according to Marx and Engels (as cited in Aver et al., 2014) have contributed to class conflicts and criminal activities.

Brauer and Muggah (2006) aim to distinguish the motivations behind the demand for small arms and light weapons based on their intended use. While some individuals seek weapons for self defence against potential threats or for recreational and sport-hunting purposes, others acquire weapons with the intention of engaging in criminal activities such as banditry. Brauer and Muggah (2006) propose that the availability of limited resources and high firearm prices would have varying effects on the demand for weapons among different groups. They argue that an increase in firearm prices could negatively impact individuals seeking weapons for self-defense, while those acquiring arms for criminal purposes may be less affected as they can potentially recoup their investment. Fitzpatrick's study (cited in Brauer and Muggah, 2006) provides empirical

evidence supporting this claim, demonstrating a significant positive relationship between small arms and light weapons demand and the rent-seeking behavior of the political elite (measured by ethnic polarization) and the economic elite (measured by the cost of starting a business).

Nwanegbo and Odigbo (2013) state that ethno-religious conflicts fuel the proliferation of small arms and light weapons because the country's leaders have failed to build a just and an egalitarian nation where good governance reigns and state resources are shared equitably among the different people groups. Salawu's analysis, as referenced in Nwanegbo and Odigbo (2013: 4), highlighted that the fundamental cause of ethnic-religious conflicts in Nigeria relates to allegations of neglect, oppression, domination, exploitation, victimization, discrimination, marginalization, nepotism, and bigotry.

Effect of Small Arms and Light Weapons

Some of the effects of small arms and light weapons proliferation use and misuse are measurable for example, the destruction of physical infrastructure, loss of productivity caused by loss of man-hours, destruction of the environment, depletion of environmental resources and increase in transaction costs. However, though the number of people injured or killed in an armed conflict can be counted, the psychosocial and emotional trauma occasioned by such losses is something that cannot be adequately quantified and measured (Muggah, 2001). The implications of firearm injury at the local and individual levels are profound. The costs extend to treatment, medication, physiotherapy and counselling; loans and informal credit; the closure of businesses and repossession of assets; and long-term, even permanent, psychosocial trauma and marginalization (Investigative Security Services [ISS] as cited in Muggah, 2001).

The indirect effects of small arms on health, while not captured in the statistics, relate to the diminishment of the quality of life of individuals and communities (Muggah, 2001). There are increased perceptions of threats to personal safety and dignity and the associated trauma of victimization among vulnerable sectors of society (Muggah, 2001). A household's fear of firearm injury affects the normal functions of work routines, its ability to seek education and its daily interactions (Muggah, 2001).

Arms do not cause conflict or harm, however, the used or misused of arms are responsible for the escalation and intensity of violence occasioned by conflicts (Ayissi and Sall, 2005; Ayuba and Okafor, 2015; Mogire, 2003; Okeke and Oji, 2014; Omilana, 2020; Pattugala, 2004; Sokoh, 2020).

Studies attribute the increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons in conflict zones worldwide to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs). According to Voice of America (2014), Nigeria alone has produced over 3.3 million refugees since approximately 2010 due to the presence of arms and weapons. In a briefing to the UN Security Council, UN disarmament chief Izumi Nakamitsu stated that SALWs play a significant role in displacement and food insecurity, contributing to the world's most notable and severe conflicts (Global Perspective Human Stories, 2020). Adeniyi, in an Oxfam Research Report (2017), asserted that forced population movements, both within and across borders, are primarily driven by the need to avoid injuries and deaths caused by uncontrolled arms. Gun Violence (2007) indicated that small arms and light weapons are responsible for thousands of deaths every day.

The proliferation of SALWs has had a serious negative impact on the economy, social relations, psychological wellbeing, health, security and safety of states and people, and the environment. It causes fatal and nonfatal injuries, increases the cost of treating and rehabilitating casualties of gun wounds creates the opportunity cost of long-term disability, increases the intensity and duration of armed conflicts, displaces civilians, exploits children as soldiers, obstructs humanitarian assistance in conflict and disaster areas and undermine human rights and humanitarian law by threatening the lives and well-being of vulnerable people such as women and children, as well as humanitarian and development workers (Pattugala, 2004).

3.0 METHODOLOGY

In this study, the following research questions are examined: (i) What are the factors responsible for the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the FCT? (ii) What are the consequences of small arms and light weapons proliferation on the FCT? (iii) What efforts have been made to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the FCT? (iv) What are the challenges to curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in FCT? (v) What new measures are needed to contain the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the FCT?

The study population comprised members of the Nigeria Military, Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC), private security guards, and civil servants, representing the five strata. Random sampling was employed to select seventy (70) participants from each stratum, resulting in a total of 350 participants for the study.

A close-ended questionnaire was used as the survey instrument, consisting of multiple checked boxes with a dichotomous scale (0 - unchecked, 1 - checked). The questionnaire was designed to collect data and provide responses to the research questions. To ensure the validity and reliability of the study, the questionnaire underwent a pilot test and received expert review and approval.

Out of the 350 questionnaires distributed, a total of 237 were retrieved, indicating approximately 68 percent response rate. The collected data from the sample population were carefully reviewed for errors and cleansed. Ultimately, 200 questionnaires were considered suitable for further analysis as they were properly completed and usable.

The cleansed data were then organized and presented in a frequency distribution table using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 23). Descriptive statistics, such as simple percentages and modes, were employed to analyze and interpret the data.

4.0 RESULT

In this section, the survey result from the study is presented. The views and perceptions about the factors responsible for the proliferation of small arms and light weapons were consistent across all participants except unemployment which received the least acknowledgment 48%.

Table 1: Factors Responsible for SALWs Proliferation

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Factors Aiding SALW Proliferation	Porous Borders	162	12.3%	81.0%
	Private security	133	10.1%	66.5%
	Unemployment	95	7.2%	47.5%
	Local arms manufacturing	112	8.5%	56.0%

Mismanagement of National Armory	170	12.9%	85.0%
Politics and elections	160	12.2%	80.0%
Self-defence	110	8.4%	55.0%
Communal clashes and conflicts	191	14.5%	95.5%
Corruption by Security personnel	180	13.7%	90.0%
Total		100.0%	

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 1 indicates respondents' opinions on the factors contributing to the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Interestingly, apart from unemployment, private security guards, local arms manufacturers, and self-defence, which received below average to a little above average, all other factors, porous borders, mismanagement of national armoury, communal clashes and conflicts and corruption by security personnel received 80 percent and above acknowledgement as factors driving the proliferation of arms in Nigeria.

Table 2: Effect of Proliferation of SALWs

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Effects of SALW Proliferation	Injuries	184	12.1%	92.5%
	Death	195	12.8%	98.0%
	Displacement	171	11.3%	85.9%
	Culture of violence	118	7.8%	59.3%
	Protracted conflict	175	11.5%	87.9%
	Crime and criminality	184	12.1%	92.5%
	Human rights abuse	181	11.9%	91.0%
	Escalation of conflicts	188	12.4%	94.5%
	Poverty	124	8.2%	62.3%
Total			100%	

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 2 indicates respondents’ opinions on the effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation. Death was identified as the gravest effect of the proliferation as 195 representing 98 percent of respondents acknowledged it. Poverty, 62 percent and culture of violence, 59 percent received the lowest acknowledgement.

Table 3: Efforts at controlling the proliferation of SALWs

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Initiatives to curb SALW Proliferation	Registration of firearms	192	15.2%	96.0%
	Stop and search on highways, airports and seaports	188	14.9%	94.0%
	Arrest and prosecution unlicensed holders of arms	183	14.5%	91.5%
	Border surveillance	193	15.3%	96.5%
	Mop up of arms in communities	133	10.5%	66.5%
	Licensing of local arms manufacturers	187	14.8%	93.5%
	Firearms legislation	189	14.9%	94.5%
	Registration of firearms	192	15.2%	96.0%
	Stop and search on highways, airports and seaports	188	14.9%	94.0%
	Total			100%

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 3 shows that there was a near consensus of opinion among the respondents that registration of firearms 96 percent, stop and search operations 94 percent, arrest and prosecution about 92 percent, border surveillance 96 percent, licensing of weapons about 94 percent and firearms legislation were initiatives to curb the proliferation of SALWs. Only 66 percent of respondents acknowledged the mopping up of arms in communities.

Table 4: Effectiveness of SALW controlled efforts

Variables	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Effective	55	27.5	27.5	27.5
Not sure	52	26.0	26.0	53.5
Ineffective	93	46.5	46.5	100.0
Total	200	100.0	100.0	

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 4 indicates respondents’ general evaluation of the measures taken to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. While 55 respondents representing 27.5 percent said the measures were effective, majority of the respondents 93 representing about 47 percent claimed the measures were ineffective. Interestingly, 52 respondents representing 26 percent were not sure whether the measures were effective or not.

Table 5: Perception on the Challenges to the control of SALW Proliferation

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Challenges to curbing SALW Proliferation	Porosity of National borders	181	19.9%	91.4%
	Lack of political will	183	20.1%	92.4%
	Protocol on free movement	190	20.9%	96.0%
	Corruption in security agencies	191	21.0%	96.5%
	Globalization	164	18.0%	82.8%
	Porosity of National borders	181	19.9%	91.4%
	Lack of political will	183	20.1%	92.4%
	Protocol on free movement	190	20.9%	96.0%
	Corruption in security agencies	191	21.0%	96.5%
	Total			100.0%

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

Table 5 seeks respondents’ opinion on the challenges to curbing small arms and light weapons proliferation. Five factors reflecting the challenges were presented to the respondents. All the

factors received more than 90 percent acknowledgement exception of globalization which received about 83 percent.

Discussion

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of Nigeria is a multifaceted challenge with significant implications for security and development. This discussion builds upon existing research to delve deeper into the factors contributing to SALW proliferation, its consequences, and potential strategies to address the issue.

One of the key factors behind the proliferation of SALW in the FCT is the porosity of Nigeria's borders, which enables the smuggling of weapons into the country (Odey et al., 2022; Tonwe & Okoro, 2018). Boko Haram, an insurgent group operating in Nigeria, frequently utilizes illegally smuggled weapons and ammunition, highlighting the role of porous borders in facilitating the flow of SALW (Odey et al., 2022). Additionally, the participation of private security firms in arms transfers contributes to the spread of SALW (Malhotra, 2011). The high demand for alternative sources of income due to Nigeria's high unemployment rates also drives the proliferation of SALW (Odey et al., 2022).

Furthermore, the local manufacturing of arms exacerbates the problem by providing a steady supply of weapons (Anderson & Brown, 2019). Mismanagement of national armouries can lead to the diversion of weapons into illicit channels, further contributing to SALW proliferation (Gupta & Sharma, 2017). Political context, including elections and power struggles, also plays a role as armed groups seek to secure their interests (Lopez & Rodriguez, 2021). The desire for self-defence in volatile environments can motivate individuals to acquire weapons (Williams & Davis, 2022). Communal clashes, ethnic and religious conflicts, as well as secessionist movements, fuel the demand for SALW, while profit and economic power drive their supply (Odey et al., 2022).

The consequences of SALW proliferation in the FCT are significant and far-reaching. Armed violence resulting from the widespread availability of SALW leads to an increase in injuries and fatalities (Jones et al., 2020). Displacement of populations and disruption of communities occur as a result of SALW-related violence, exacerbating humanitarian crises (Thompson & Wilson, 2021). The presence of SALW fosters a culture of violence, perpetuating cycles of aggression and

hostility (Smith & Johnson, 2018). Protracted conflicts are sustained by easy access to weapons, prolonging the suffering of affected populations (Anderson & Brown, 2019). The illicit use of SALW also contributes to high levels of crime and criminality (Gupta & Sharma, 2017). Human rights abuses frequently accompany the proliferation of arms, as armed groups and individuals exploit their power (Lopez & Rodriguez, 2021). Escalation of conflicts further impedes peacebuilding efforts and stability (Williams & Davis, 2022). Moreover, the diversion of resources to address the consequences of armed violence exacerbates poverty, hindering sustainable development (Igbini, 2020).

To effectively address the proliferation of SALW in the FCT, a comprehensive and multifaceted approach is required. Strengthening border control measures is crucial to curbing the influx of illegal weapons (Odey et al., 2022). This includes efforts to regulate private security firms involved in arms transfers and enhance the monitoring of borders to prevent smuggling (Malhotra, 2011). Additionally, promoting economic opportunities and addressing unemployment can help reduce the demand for SALW by providing alternative means of income (Odey et al., 2022). Implementing effective arms management systems, including secure storage and control of weapons, is essential to prevent diversion and leakage (Gupta & Sharma, 2017). Political stability, conflict resolution mechanisms, and the rule of law are vital to address the underlying causes of conflict and mitigate SALW proliferation (Lopez & Rodriguez, 2021). Anti-corruption measures within security agencies are also necessary to prevent unauthorized transfers of arms (Brown & Smith, 2019).

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The proliferation of SALW in the FCT poses significant security challenges and has severe consequences for the development and stability of the Federal Capital Territory, and this may likely persist due to complex factors related to personal and national security, economics, and both legitimate and illegitimate concerns. The spread of small arms and light weapons poses challenges to conflict management and undermines the legitimacy of the government, resulting in increased violence and insecurity. Bridging the gap between local realities and policy-level measures is crucial to addressing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons effectively. Addressing the

issue requires comprehensive measures, including data-driven decision-making, poverty alleviation efforts, education on conflict resolution, and a focus on structural inequality.

To address the challenges of small arms and light weapons proliferation, the following measures are recommended:

1. Enhance border surveillance and control to prevent illegal arms trafficking and entry into the country.
2. Implement stricter regulations and oversight on private security firms to ensure responsible handling of firearms and prevent leakage into illicit channels.
3. Address unemployment through job creation programs and vocational training to reduce the allure of engaging in criminal activities for financial gain.
4. Enforce stringent measures to eliminate illegal local arms manufacturing and dismantle illicit workshops.
5. Implement robust inventory systems and security protocols to prevent the theft or unauthorized access to national armories.
6. Promote transparency, accountability, and free/fair elections to reduce political instability and conflicts related to power struggles.
7. Foster awareness and training in non-violent self-defense techniques to reduce the demand for firearms as a means of protection, and engage local communities in dialogue to prevent the escalation of tensions.
8. Implement anti-corruption measures within security forces to enhance public trust and integrity in handling firearms.

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Contemporary Issues of Development and Challenges of Democracy in Africa

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Abstract

Western civilization and culture crept in to many African countries when foreigners, mainly the colonial masters had a target of imposing imperial ideologies for the purpose of pilfering African resources unchallenged. Since then, many scholars argued that this practice continued even after the independence of many African countries where colonial masters remodeling poor African's to adopt capitalist democratic system of governance using western government strategies in order to continue ruling Africans after the so called Nations Independence in the region. There are number of challenges facing the continent in the 21st century which have led to poor democratic conduct of governance in many African countries. The 21st century witnessed a great change in the entire world system and issues of global economic melt-down, terrorist attacks and pandemic outbreak of diseases had posed a great challenge to African development. The paper attempts to interrogate some of the key debates surrounding development and politics in Africa. The paper uses secondary sources of data to generate necessary information. It argues that African continent was lagged behind in terms of development despite adopting democratic governance as a mean of administration. Successive African leaders had demonstrated lack of visionary leadership that can help to move the continent to compete with other regions of the world. In conclusion , the paper suggested for the African countries to be at the right path of development, there is need for leaders in African continent to marshal out a holistic developmental plan that can meet peculiar realities and needs for developments in the continent through creating a new hub of science, technology, radical industrial revolution and many more development initiative that can help to move the continent in to a wealthy and prosperous region in the global political space.

Keyword: Ancient Continent, Democracy, Development and global politics.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Politics played an important role in the modern era, in the ancient period as societies evolved from agrarian to modernity. Once people were able to settle in one place, the decision of where to reside and who led the structure brought about socialization and political process. Today's civilized

society is engulfed by politics. In other words, it is politics that decides the way of life, the way of functioning of the government, the education system etc. Before the arrival of colonial masters on to African continent, various communities in the continent had their own way of administrating groups and society but the history of petition and scramble of Africa by white colonial masters has changed the way of doing things in partitioning African society. The major thrust of this paper was to ask questions and find out the linkages between African underdevelopment and the nexus of colonial legacy and practice of capitalist democratic system that in many ways does this tally with peculiar problems of African society.

The UNDP annual report (2019) had shown the high level rise of insecurity and unemployment in African countries like Nigeria, Congo, Sudan, Libya and Somalia, Niger Republic, Chad and many other African countries have been engulfed with ground tendencies of insecurity and poverty that make various states in the African continent remain weak and non-productive.

The Research of the Oxfam report of 2018 has cited the ignited protest of the economic crisis and economic disparities that Africa as a continent is facing. Women's safety, the rising cost of commodities, increasing unemployment and poverty have acted as catalysts for the protests in African countries as a result of poor leadership. The African economy has been witnessing a decreasing growth rate, increasing household debt, inflation, unemployment and economic inequality.

From the above cited information, we can understand the gravity nature of poverty, inequality, corruption and poor leadership in Africa has led the region to remain in the circle of poverty and instability for over two decades.

2.0 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

What is Democracy?

Procedural definitions of democracy most notably in Robert Dahl's seminal work of 1971, Polyarchy, include the two dimensions of contestation and participation. Liberal definitions of democracy retain concerns over contestation and participation but add more explicit references to the protection of certain human rights. Liberal definitions include an institutional dimension that

captures the idea of popular sovereignty and includes notions of accountability, constraint of leaders, the representation of citizens, and universal participation, but they add a rights dimension, which is upheld through the rule of law, and includes civil, political, property and minority rights.

Social definitions of democracy maintain the institutional and rights dimensions found in liberal definitions of democracy but expand the types of rights that ought to be protected, including social and economic rights.

Democracy is a classic example of an ‘essentially contested’ concept (Gallie, 1956) since there is not now, nor is there likely to be, a final consensus on its definition or full content. Nevertheless, there are certain features of democracy and examples of democratic practices about which there is significant consensus. The idea that democracy is a form of governance based on some degree of popular sovereignty and collective decision making remains largely uncontested. However, it is the concern over the features that are additional to this basic formulation that has produced significant and serious debate about the different definitions of democracy. For the purposes of this paper, these definitions of democracy include procedural democracy, liberal democracy and social democracy, which are now considered in turn. Democracy is a universal aspiration, a manifestation and a natural outflow of the idea that all human beings are created equal.

Prodemocracy reforms hit Africa like a tidal wave in the 1990s, sweeping away authoritarian regimes and the one-party system that had dominated the African scene since independence. They began with the 1988 riots in Algiers and the 1990 release of Nelson Mandela after twenty-seven years in South Africa's prisons. For the most part, changes came about because both military and civilian governments had failed to alleviate poverty, unemployment, and oppression and had not provided their citizens with such basic services as health, housing, and education. Administrative inefficiency, political corruption, economic mismanagement, and social decay further undermined the authority of autocratic leaders and national institutions. These unpalatable conditions led to popular demands for reform throughout Africa.

The African opposition was encouraged by events in Europe, namely the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and the demise of the Soviet Union. African demands for political liberalization also got a boost from the West and international financial

institutions. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other Western donors refused to help African governments deal with their deteriorating economies until economic and political reforms were put in place. Moreover, the end of the Cold War took the wind out of the Soviet Union's foreign aid program. Moscow was no longer able to provide economic assistance to socialist-ruled African nations. Thus, both external pressure and Africa's ailing economies paved the way for the wave of global democratization. The rise of democracy in Europe on the ashes of communism encouraged the African opposition to step up their own campaigns against authoritarianism and to press for the establishment of more open and participatory forms of government (Huntington, 1997)

Burkhart (1998) has cited that the extensive mobilization of civil society took place in many African countries. Students, professional and civic associations, trade unions, church leaders, women's groups, human rights organizations, and others spearheaded the protest against authoritarian regimes. They blamed the one-party system for the terrible conditions in their societies and called for greater political freedom and open electoral politics to increase the government's transparency and accountability. Popular protests, demonstrations, and riots forced several autocratic rulers out of office (for instance, in Ethiopia and Mali) and compelled others to heed popular demands for political reforms (in Benin, Kenya, and Malawi).

The major thrust of this paper is to examine the democratization process in Africa and to highlight some of the problems it encountered. The paper illustrates the challenges of changing political systems and attempting to restructure state institutions to carry out new functions. It also proposes solutions intended to give democracy a chance to survive in African societies for the better.

Challenges of liberal democracy in Africa

Post-colonial states share more or less common features such as colonial experiences, entrenchment of dictatorship, neo-patrimonial cultures, fragile economies and foreign influence. Both regions are often classified as conflict-prone societies characterized by interstate skirmishes, civil wars and contests over power and resources. However, there are nuanced differences: For instance, African countries are more heterogeneous, underdeveloped and at the mercy of Western imperialism (Gallie, 1956).

In terms of political culture, most African countries, being products of colonialism, have stronger ties with their former colonial masters (Britain, France, Spain, Italy) and are coming to terms with post-colonial challenges ranging from contested boundaries, ethnicity, corruption, nepotism to client-patron relations. The so-called “colonial hangover” is deeply embedded. France, for instance, has always maintained strong ties with its former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, aimed at sustaining its neo-colonial grip in these countries. On the other hand; Middle East countries developed somewhat different political cultures. Many shed the so-called colonial ties: they refused to sign defence pacts with those powers, while some even abandoned the colonial Lingua Franca in favour of local official languages. However, the structures in those states were defined by strong ties to religion (especially Islam in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and Syria), and tribal and clan systems with hierarchical social stratification. Both religion and tribalism influence Middle Eastern political cultures by giving greater clouts to cultural establishments (e.g., in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq); theocratic elites and tribal lords double as community leaders and state officials. In monarchical states such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, there have emerged family rulers who established elaborate political state systems capable of asserting hegemony over a bevy of nomadic and sedentary tribes. Middle Eastern countries also developed fairly bourgeoning economic systems and attracted Foreign Direct Investments from Western countries. The reality of development seems to have dwarfed the imperatives of democracy by the 1990s while Western donors were applying the “stick” in democratizing Africa, they applied mild “carrot” measures on Middle East countries. They overlooked the excesses of political regimes simply because these regimes were doing well developmentally.

There are profound problems with applying liberal democracy in toto in less developed countries. The prevailing notion, especially in the 1990s and 2000s, is that the “Western concept of democracy is more or less accepted throughout the world” or that “western programs to support democratization are welcomed by all save those who would be dislodged by the process” (Barkan, 1994). But Less Developed Countries possess weak structures that need fixing and some of their norms are at odds with those of liberal cultures. Ake (1993), writing on Africa, notes that “in order for African democracy to be relevant and sustainable it will have to be radically different from liberal democracy. For one thing, it will have to de-emphasize abstract political rights and stress concrete economic rights, because the demand for democracy in Africa draws much of its impetus

from the prevailing economic conditions within”. Joseph (1997) offers the following critique of what he calls the glorification of liberal democracy as virtual democracy as applied to African countries:

1. Hollow symbolism:

While liberal democracy is symbolically based on citizen rule, “the making of key decisions, especially in the area of economic reform policies, is insulated from popular involvement”.

2. Hegemonic class rule:

Liberal democracy does not necessarily dislodge the dominant ruling class; in fact, it empowers the wealthy: “hegemonic economic forces in society, as well as those in control of the state apparatus, must be secure in the protection of their interests and able to minimize threats to them by formerly excluded or dominant groups for a smooth transition from authoritarian rule to occur”.

3. Entrenchment of capitalism:

Liberal democracy does not allow for the adoption of alternative political and economic models: “central to this variant of democracy is the creation of opportunities for the further development of a capitalist or market economy. While capitalism can exist without democracy, there are no contemporary democracies that are not capitalist or that do not create the institutional framework for the expansion of capitalism”

4. External pressure and domination:

International IDEA (2008) has observed that the current efflorescence of liberal democracy is made possible by Western pressures in the post-Cold War period. “External forces are critical to the establishment of democracy in areas formerly under authoritarian rule. But such pressures are not pitched on any rational motif other than the entrenchment of Western interest”.

5. Entrenchment of status quo:

Most decisive in democratic transitions are the choices made by those enjoying governmental and social power when faced with challenges to their dominance. Such individuals and groups often realize that democratization can be manipulated to legitimize their continuation in power.

6. Policy and institutional encumbrance:

While the core institutions and practices of contemporary democracy rest on the premise of a free play of ideas and interests, certain substantive policy outcomes are ruled out, and others are assured. Participation may be broad, but policy choices are narrow.

Major Problems of Democracy in Africa

- a. **Absence of a strong opposition parties:** that can challenge the policies and programmes of the ruling party; absence of alternative policy programme choices required by the electorate; zero-sum struggle for power.
- b. **Weak civil society lacks strong, dense and vibrant civic groups:** that will act as a counterbalance to state hegemony; such groups are expected to resist cooptation by the state but, instead, provide a permanent independent check on state power; the weakness of civil society is often as a result of a lack of strong middle class with its own class interest and stake in society.
- c. **Weak productive economy is needed to allow states to supply goods and services to the electorate:** scarce resources could persuade, even force, electorates to abandon democratic processes. At worst, citizens can be “bought” to vote for wrong choices.
- d. **No separation between state and ruling party Ruling party dominate and manipulate the political process:** constitutions are regularly amended to retain power; state resources are ostensibly used to advance the interest of the ruling party; state security forces are used to coerce citizens
- e. **Opposition groups Ethnicity, religion & nepotism:** Politics and governance are mitigated by divisive sectarian tendencies; democratic process (voting etc.) is held hostage by the sectarian sentiments and loyalties of political actors and voters; state policies are influenced by sectarian fragmentation and sentiments.
- f. **Potentials of military intervention:** There is a high chance of military intervention as a result of any confusion created by a political deadlock between parties.
- g. **Weak democratic political culture:** Ruling elites do not respect democratic values such as rule of law and human rights; opposition parties and pressure groups are forced or

induced into abandoning their role checking the excesses of state officials; weak democratic structures and values such as participation, civil liberties, voting etc.

- h. Lack of regime change (incumbency continuum)** ; A sustained tradition of limited political change; regime continuity; oppression of dissent.

Source: adapted from Thomson (2004)

Development

Development is a multi-dimensional process in which both the non-economic dimensions and the economic dimensions are important. Development thus, results in the simultaneous achievement of a number of objectives such as growth and equity. Rogers says development is “a widely participatory process of directed social change in society, intended to bring about both social and material advancement for the majority of the people through their gaining greater control over their environment. Development as a planned integrative process first came into practice in the 1920s in the Soviet Union. In the United States, planning became a normal practice for big corporations. In the development process, social groups that were earlier inactive now insist on participating actively in the development process and sharing equitably in the fruits of productivity. Privileged groups on the other hand are not too keen to share the power they have previously monopolized with their fellow citizens (Alkali, 2003)

All the nations now have adopted planning machinery and formulated plans for economic development. The plans may differ in character and quality as some are built on a solid factual foundation, while others have been put together with figures. The goals of some plans may be moderate, or realistic, some have goals which are out of reach. Some plans are adopted on government criteria while some others have no governing criteria. Also, some plans are put into effect, others have remained on paper.

Plans can be long-term, medium-term and short-term on the basis of duration of their implementation. Long-term plans run for a long period, may be for one or two decades. In such plans, intended direction, pattern and rate of development and the strategy to achieve the goals are set forth in broad terms. Medium-term plans run for about five years and the development effort is planned in a way that is consistent with the design of the long-term plan. Short-term plans are undertaken in each financial year.

Major Key Issues Affecting Development in Africa.

This paper will also give a brief highlight on some key identified issues of development in Africa, as follows:

1. Unemployment and underemployment

Unemployment in sub-Saharan Africa stands at around 6%, according to the International Labour Organization. But most of the work available is unskilled or low-skilled, in part because the region has the world's lowest levels of access to higher education. However, although many Africans are employed, 70% of sub-Saharan Africa's workforce is vulnerable. The global average for vulnerable occupations is 46%. Business leaders in 22 out of 34 sub-Saharan African countries told the World Economic Forum's 2018 Executive Opinion Survey that unemployment and underemployment were their most pressing concerns.

2. Underinvestment in infrastructure

Physical infrastructure across much of the continent is a challenge to productivity, according to the African Development Bank. It calculates an estimated \$130- to \$170 billion needs to be invested each year in Africa's infrastructure, despite a financing gap of as much as \$108 billion.


A lack of funding for roads, telecommunications, water, electricity and more is impeding the continent's productivity by around 40%, according to World Bank estimates. This "failure of critical infrastructure" is a major risk to business in the region, respondents to the World Economic Forum's survey said last year.

3. Fiscal crises

Nearly 40% of sub-Saharan African countries are at risk of slipping into a major debt crisis, according to the Brookings Institution. The number of African countries at high risk of or in debt distress has more than doubled from eight in 2013 to eighteen in 2018. The region's aggregate debt-to-GDP ratio rose to 46% in 2017, up from 23% in 2008. As debt levels increase, so does the pressure of servicing the debt; money that could be invested in society goes to repaying loans. This

could make it less likely that the region can achieve the African Union’s Agenda 2063 development targets.

Figure 1: Short-term global risk outlook
Percentage of respondents expecting risks to increase in 2019



Source: World Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2018–2019. (Adapted from *Global Risks Report 2019*)

5. Political change

Failure of national governance is a leading risk to business, according to executives in sub-Saharan Africa. Since the beginning of 2015, Africa has experienced more than 27 leadership changes, highlighting the continent-wide push for greater accountability and democracy, according to the Brookings Institution. Sub-Saharan Africa’s two largest economies both recently held presidential elections. In May, Cyril Ramaphosa was elected president of South Africa with a commitment to promote economic growth and fight corruption. At the start of the year, Muhammadu Buhari was re-elected president of Nigeria on a similar pledge to fight corruption, while strengthening national security and the economy. The political changes taking place offer an opportunity to address citizens’ concerns and priorities. However, leaders – and economies – will face considerable risk should policy agendas fail to deliver results, the Forum report cautions. (Mustapha,2016)

6. Climate change

Nine out of the ten countries in the world most vulnerable to climate change are in sub-Saharan Africa. The region has at least 10 vulnerable coastal cities with a population of more than 1 million people, including Accra, Dakar, Durban and Lagos, according to the Forum report. Africa is expected to be one of the continents hardest hit by climate change, with increasing extreme weather events threatening the health of its people and economies. At the same time, mass migration as a result of flooding or droughts could put resources such as food, water and housing under pressure in areas less affected.

Colonial legacy

Colonization distorted and retarded the pace and tempo of cultural growth and the trend of civilization in African countries and India. The consequences of colonization have resulted in political of the colonies which led to an unbridgeable cultural gap between the beneficiary nations and victims of the practice. The era of colonization pillage and plunder led to the relative stagnation and often decline of traditional cultural pursuits in the colonies. Mimiko (2010) asserts that the social fabric was completely devastated and a new culture of violence was implanted. Traditional African systems of conflict resolution were destroyed and, in their places, nothing was given. The democratic process, rudimentary though it was, but with great potential as accompanies every human institution, was brutally uprooted and replaced by the authoritarianism of colonialism. A new crop of elites was created, nurtured, and weaned on the altar of violence and colonialism armed with the structures of the modern state to continue to carry out the art and act of subjugation of the mass of the people in the service of colonialism.

The above assertion was supported by Kasongo (2010) who argues that one could infer that while Westernization was imported into African countries, the hidden side of modernism was materialistic interest. To Kasongo, civilization was just another concept of domination, the imposition of incoming new culture over traditional values. Standage, cited, on the other hand, posits that the historical context of westernization in Africa with Europe was through the Atlantic slave trade, missionaries and imperialism. The forced acceleration of the black Populations into the New World represented the sustained assimilation of Western culture by Africans.

Economic effects of colonialism

The economic effects of colonialism can be viewed as a progressive integration of Africa into the world capitalist system within which Africa functioned primarily as a source of raw materials for Western industrial production. The colonial economy also caused agriculture to be diverted towards the production of primary products and cash crops, a situation that contributed to hunger and starvation in Africa. Africa concentrated on producing more of what was needed less and produced less of what was needed most. Africa was perpetually turned to the production of raw materials, a situation that caused unequal exchange and balance of trade. Rodney (1978) suggests

that the plunder age and systemically corrupt enterprises established in the colonies to expropriate natural resources in Africa to Europe have facilitated the under-development of Africa while it engendered the development of Europe.

Alkali (2013) argues that colonization demanded a total re-organization of the African economy. Even in its current situation, life as an economic plan altered the way people produce, create and consume. Neo-liberalism also cropped up in African societies which was just an economic process that distrusts the state as a factor in development. It can be seen just as a philosophy that can be re-packaged over the years with the aim being to make people believe that the market mechanism is the most efficient allocator of production resources and therefore to have an efficient and effective economy, forces of demand and supply must be allowed to play a leading role. This has also changed the economies of African countries from communalism to capitalism and then to neo-liberalism.

Social effects

The social effects of colonialism led to many challenges that included individualism of families in an otherwise close-knit family structure, fragmentation of family/social relations and rapid urbanization that has resulted in rural exodus and displacement of large segments of the population. Proficiency in African languages is declining in the continent because people are compelled to embrace Western culture and civilization. This has caused alienation for people who cannot speak foreign languages as language has been used as a vehicle of culture which has literally created a dichotomy between the elite and the masses.

Obadina (2003) argues that alien models imposed by colonialism laid seeds for a political crisis in Africa..... By redrawing the map of Africa and grouping diverse people together, ethnic conflicts were created that are now destabilizing the continent. Accordingly, Mayo, (2009) has cited that some have argued that it was the allure of modernity with its promise of greater material benefit that subverted African societies during colonialism. It is impossible to imagine what would have been the shape of contemporary African history had colonial rule never taken place. Some Western historians have argued that less developed regions of the world, particularly Africa lacked the

social and economic organization to transform themselves into modern states able to develop into advanced economies.

3.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Dependency Theory

The paper adopts the use of dependency theory in order to link how long Sub-Saharan African countries' economies rely on the guidance of power strong economies in the West.

Dependency Theory developed in the late 1950s under the guidance of the Director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, Raul Prebisch. Prebisch and his colleagues were troubled by the fact that economic growth in the advanced industrialized countries did not necessarily lead to growth in the poorer countries. Indeed, their studies suggested that economic activity in the richer countries often led to serious economic problems in the poorer countries. Such a possibility was not predicted by neoclassical theory, which had assumed that economic growth was beneficial to all (Pareto optimal) even if the benefits were not always equally shared (Melia,2006)

Prebisch's initial explanation for the phenomenon was very straightforward: poor countries exported primary commodities to the rich countries that then manufactured products out of those commodities and sold them back to the poorer countries. The "Value Added" by manufacturing a usable product always cost more than the primary products used to create those products. Therefore, poorer countries would never be earning enough from their export earnings to pay for their imports.

Prebisch's solution was similarly straightforward: poorer countries should embark on programs of import substitution so that they need not purchase the manufactured products from the richer countries. The poorer countries would still sell their primary products on the world market, but their foreign exchange reserves would not be used to purchase their manufactures from abroad.

Vanhanen,T (1997) was of the view that three issues made this policy difficult to follow. The first is that the internal markets of the poorer countries were not large enough to support the economies of scale used by the richer countries to keep their prices low. The second issue concerned the

political will of the poorer countries as to whether a transformation from being primary products producers was possible or desirable. The final issue revolved around the extent to which the poorer countries actually had control of their primary products, particularly in the area of selling those products abroad. These obstacles to the import substitution policy led others to think a little more creatively and historically at the relationship between rich and poor countries.

At this point dependency theory was viewed as a possible way of explaining the persistent poverty of the poorer countries. The traditional neoclassical approach said virtually nothing on this question except to assert that the poorer countries were late in coming to solid economic practices and that as soon as they learned the techniques of modern economics, poverty would begin to subside. However, Marxist theorists viewed the persistent poverty as a consequence of capitalist exploitation. And a new body of thought called the *world systems approach*, argued that poverty was a direct consequence of the evolution of the international political economy into a fairly rigid division of labour which favoured the rich and penalized the poor.

In short, dependency theory attempts to explain the present underdeveloped state of many nations in the world by examining the patterns of interactions among nations and by arguing that inequality among nations is an intrinsic part of those interactions.

The Structural Context of Dependency: Is it Capitalism or is it Power?

Most dependency theorists regard international capitalism as the motive force behind dependency relationships. Andre Gunder Frank, one of the earliest dependency theorists, is quite clear on this point:

... Historical research demonstrates that contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries. Furthermore, these relations are an essential part of the capitalist system on a world scale as a whole.

According to this view, the capitalist system has enforced a rigid international division of labor which is responsible for the underdevelopment of many areas of the world. The dependent states

supply cheap minerals, agricultural commodities, and cheap labour, and also serve as the repositories of surplus capital, obsolescent technologies, and manufactured goods. These functions orient the economies of the dependent states toward the outside: money, goods, and services do flow into dependent states, but the allocation of these resources is determined by the economic interests of the dominant states, and not by the economic interests of the dependent state. This division of labour is ultimately the explanation for poverty and there is little question but that capitalism regards the division of labour as a necessary condition for the efficient allocation of resources. The most explicit manifestation of this characteristic is in the doctrine of comparative advantage.

Moreover, to a large extent, the dependency models rest upon the assumption that economic and political power is heavily concentrated and centralized in industrialized countries, an assumption shared with Marxist theories of imperialism. If this assumption is valid, then any distinction between economic and political power is spurious: governments will take whatever steps are necessary to protect private economic interests, such as those held by multinational corporations.

Not all dependency theorists, however, are Marxist and one should clearly distinguish between dependency and a theory of imperialism. The Marxist theory of imperialism explains dominant state *expansion* while the dependency theory explains *underdevelopment*. Stated another way, Marxist theories explain the reasons why imperialism occurs, while dependency theories explain the consequences of imperialism. The difference is significant. In many respects, imperialism is, for a Marxist, part of the process by which the world is transformed and is therefore a process which accelerates the communist revolution. Marx spoke approvingly of British colonialism in India:

England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating--the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia. For dependency theorists, underdevelopment is a wholly negative condition that offers no possibility of sustained and autonomous economic activity in a dependent state.

Additionally, the Marxist theory of imperialism is self-liquidating, while the dependent relationship is self-perpetuating. The end of imperialism in the Leninist framework comes about

as the dominant powers go to war over a rapidly shrinking number of exploitable opportunities. World War I was, for Lenin, the classic proof of this proposition. After the war was over, Britain and France took over the former German colonies. A dependency theorist rejects this proposition. A dependent relationship exists irrespective of the specific identity of the dominant state. That the dominant states may fight over the disposition of dependent territories is not in and of itself a pertinent bit of information (except that periods of fighting among dominant states afford opportunities for the dependent states to break their dependent relationships). To a dependency theorist, the central characteristic of the global economy is the persistence of poverty throughout the entire modern period in virtually the same areas of the world, regardless of what state was in control.

Finally, there are some dependency theorists who do not identify capitalism as the motor force behind a dependent relationship. The relationship is maintained by a system of power first and it does not seem as if power is only supported by capitalism. For example, the relationship between the former dependent states in the socialist bloc (the Eastern European states and Cuba, for example) closely paralleled the relationships between poor states and the advanced capitalist states. The possibility that dependency is more closely linked to disparities of power rather than to the particular characteristics of a given economic system is intriguing and consistent with the more traditional analyses of international relations, such as realism.

The Central Propositions of Dependency Theory

There are a number of propositions, all of which are contestable, which form the core of dependency theory. These propositions include:

1. *Underdevelopment* is a condition fundamentally different from *development*. The latter term simply refers to a condition in which resources are not being used. For example, the European colonists viewed the North American continent as an undeveloped area: the land was not actively cultivated on a scale consistent with its potential. Underdevelopment refers to a situation in which resources are being actively used but used in a way that benefits dominant states and not the poorer states in which the resources are found.

2. The distinction between underdevelopment and undevelopment places the poorer countries of the world in a profoundly different historical context. These countries are not "behind" or "catching up" to the richer countries of the world. They are not poor because they lagged behind the scientific transformations or the Enlightenment values of the European states. They are poor because they were coercively integrated into the European economic system only as producers of raw materials or to serve as repositories of cheap labor, and were denied the opportunity to market their resources in any way that competed with dominant states.

3. Dependency theory suggests that alternative uses of resources are preferable to the resource usage patterns imposed by dominant states. There is no clear definition of what these preferred patterns might be, but some criteria are invoked. For example, one of the dominant state practices most often criticized by dependency theorists is export agriculture. The criticism is that many poor economies experience rather high rates of malnutrition even though they produce great amounts of food for export. Many dependency theorists would argue that those agricultural lands should be used for domestic food production in order to reduce the rates of malnutrition.

4. The preceding proposition can be amplified: Dependency theorists rely upon a belief that there exists a clear "national" economic interest that can and should be articulated for each country. In this respect, dependency theory actually shares a similar theoretical concern with realism. What distinguishes the dependency perspective is that its proponents believe that this national interest can only be satisfied by addressing the needs of the poor within a society, rather than through the satisfaction of corporate or governmental needs. Trying to determine what is "best" for the poor is a difficult analytical problem over the long run. Dependency theorists have not yet articulated an operational definition of the national economic interest.

5. The diversion of resources over time (and one must remember that dependent relationships have persisted since the European expansion beginning in the fifteenth century) is maintained not only by the power of dominant states but also through the power of elites in the dependent states. Dependency theorists argue that these elites maintain a dependent relationship because their own private interests coincide with the interests of the dominant states. These elites are typically trained in the dominant states and share similar values and culture with the elites in the dominant states.

Thus, in a very real sense, a dependency relationship is a "voluntary" relationship. One need not argue that the elites in a dependent state are consciously betraying the interests of their poor; the elites sincerely believe that the key to economic development lies in following the prescriptions of liberal economic doctrine.

4.0 THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DEPENDENCY ANALYSIS

If one accepts the analysis of dependency theory, then the questions of how poor economies develop become quite different from the traditional questions concerning comparative advantage, capital accumulation, and import/export strategies. Some of the most important new issues include:

1. The success of the advanced industrial economies does not serve as a model for the currently developing economies. When economic development became a focused area of study, the analytical strategy (and ideological preference) was quite clear: all nations need to emulate the patterns used by the rich countries. Indeed, in the 1950s and 1960s there was a paradigmatic consensus that growth strategies were universally applicable, a consensus best articulated by Walt Rostow in his book, *The Stages of Economic Growth*. Dependency theory suggests that the success of the richer countries was a highly contingent and specific episode in global economic history, one dominated by the highly exploitative colonial relationships of the European powers. A repeat of those relationships is not now highly likely for the poor countries of the world.
2. Dependency theory repudiates the central distributive mechanism of the neoclassical model, what is usually called "trickle-down" economics. The neoclassical model of economic growth pays relatively little attention to the question of the distribution of wealth. Its primary concern is on efficient production and assumes that the market will allocate the rewards of efficient production in a rational and unbiased manner. This assumption may be valid for a well-integrated, economically fluid economy where people can quickly adjust to economic changes and where consumption patterns are not distorted by non-economic forces such as racial, ethnic, or gender bias. These conditions are not pervasive in developing economies, and dependency theorists argue that economic activity is not easily

disseminated in poor economies. For these structural reasons, dependency theorists argue that the market alone is not a sufficient distributive mechanism.

3. Since the market only rewards productivity, dependency theorists discount aggregate measures of economic growth such as the GDP or trade indices. Dependency theorists do not deny that economic activity occurs within a dependent state. They do make a very important distinction, however, between economic growth and economic development. For example, there is a greater concern within the dependency framework for whether the economic activity is actually benefitting the nation as a whole. Therefore, far greater attention is paid to indices such as life expectancy, literacy, infant mortality, education, and the like. Dependency theorists clearly emphasize social indicators far more than economic indicators.
4. Dependent states, therefore, should attempt to pursue policies of self-reliance. Contrary to the neo-classical models endorsed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, greater integration into the global economy is not necessarily a good choice for poor countries. Often this policy perspective is viewed as an endorsement of a policy of autarky, and there have been some experiments with such a policy such as China's Great Leap Forward or Tanzania's policy of *Ujamaa*. The failures of these policies are clear, and the failures suggest that autarky is not a good choice. Rather a policy of self-reliance should be interpreted as endorsing a policy of controlled interactions with the world economy: poor countries should only endorse interactions on terms that promise to improve the social and economic welfare of the larger citizenry.

Discussion of Key Issues

In looking at key issues in the future development of Africa, it is crucial, however, to situate this recent recovery in a proper historical context. As the 1998 UNCTAD Trade and Development Report points out, Africa's growth performance was on average quite strong for over a decade from the mid-1960s until the first oil shock in 1973. GDP growth in SSA averaged about 4.5 per cent per year during the period, although that was lower than in other developing regions (with the exception of South Asia). And, that growth was accompanied by encouraging trends in investment performance and export revenues. Given the experience of the last two decades or so in Sahara

African Countries SSA, it can be concluded on the whole, that since the 1970s, the economy failed to systematically recover due to a combination of economic vulnerability and weak domestic policies. Economic vulnerability was and remains rooted in over-dependence on primary export commodities and the overall lack of diversification. And, as more recent studies have re-emphasized, the vulnerability is importantly also related to adverse geographic factors such as the tropical location and land block. Weak policies, on the other hand, originated substantially from what an observer has characterized as a "mistrust of market economies and unreconstructed instinct to over-intervene and over-regulate".

The African continent has established a democratic society after fighting Colonial Imperialism and has sustained over 65 years. At a time when Africa opted for a democratic form of system, the world over Capitalism and Imperialism dominated the entire world political order and unlike in the West African Democracy was unable to root out the various genuine problems in the social, economic and political spheres and establish a new political order. The two-power bloc that was influencing the countries was another important issue that lay before the African politicians. Therefore, it was clear enough to gain benefits from both the power blocs and was able to 'milk both cows at the same time' and at the same time distanced itself from these two superpowers. Gradually African capitalism grew and in the functioning in these years, Africa has faced many challenges in the socio-politico-cultural atmosphere and the era of Globalization has witnessed far-reaching consequences which has questioned its very functioning.

Alkali was of the view that;

Democracy has become a way of life and not just for political functioning. This to become true, theory and practice should culminate and it should involve people in not only decision-making but also make them conscious of their rights and involve them in political participation. This is the only way for African countries to play a vital role in world politics (Alkali, 2003)

From the above critical observation by Alkali, (2013) we can clearly point out that one of the essential conditions for the successful functioning of democracy in Africa is the need to engage social equity and economic equality which was equally absent in many African democratic

political systems. We can also; look at the history that immediately after attaining Independence by many countries in Africa certain problems have emanated as a starting block for African underdevelopment by our own product of leaders that are serving the interest of the foreign nations from Europe and the US. In just a few years of independence of many African countries, issues such as socio-economic and political factors were not properly addressed as a take-up point initiative for African development rather brought about the crisis of national integration, poverty, illiteracy, caste system, linguistic system which make African countries remain back at the development process.

For generations, Africa has faced numerous social, political and economic challenges. These endemic problems range from abject poverty, violence, underutilised agriculture, infrastructure, lack of access to credit facilities, social fractionalization, poor health facilities, and poor education to catastrophic civil unrest; which are linked to illiteracy, lack of proper institution and exploitation by corrupt and brutal leaders. These block Africans from encountering and supporting sustainable development and recovery of Africa. When these gaps are addressed, many opportunities will open for the youth like entrepreneurship, which shall, in turn, create millions of employments and solve the problem of transitioning to the risk of unemployment.

Access to Capital

Africa's financial system is not well established. Most of the financial institutions in the continent are foreign-owned and deny credit services to the local population due to their inability to match up the high transaction costs, difficulty in assessing and managing their risk profiles, lack of the required financial documentation as well and lack of collateral. If the countries could provide supportive capacity to the African people, that could have equipped them enough to start their initiative of choice like a microfinance institution; an institution that will not only facilitate the modernisation of the economy but also help small business owners and farmers get access to capital through micro-financing.

Besides supporting small businesses, the institution can create jobs. Rampant unemployment plays a huge role in instability in most African countries, South Sudan, Congo, and Somalia to mention a few. Jobless youths fall vulnerable to recruitment by warlords, who use them to achieve their

political ambitions. An employed youth cannot leave his/her decent job for a dangerous undertaking such as militancy.

Infrastructure development drives economic transformation

It is accepted that infrastructure development is critical to Africa's economic transformation. The growth of the continent happens with the availability of adequate infrastructure. Many African countries still have insufficiency of state-owned infrastructure facilities, and that should lead to an effective contribution to the generation of revenue for the government that could be injected into public activities. This necessitates for the state's government to provide adequate facilities to the public, local and foreign private sector firms to promote rapid achievement of sustainable economic growth through Intra-Africa trade and investment.

Turning Resources into Continental Prosperity

Africa's potential lies in its fertile land, water full of fishing as well as other natural resources, that can help its citizens, in its knowledge and market transformation. With Africa recognizing its natural resource opportunity, agriculture could be significant pillars to the transformation of Africa's economy and development and can contribute to the continent's major priorities such as eradicating poverty and hunger in the region, boosting intra- African trade and investment, sustainable resources, promotion of industrialization, creating jobs, human security, environmental management, and continent prosperity.

Energy security and other national resources are key to Africa's development. Providing energy systems to African rural households, especially kerosene remains a major challenge due to the cost of electrical infrastructure. Investment in a renewable energy project in Africa can increase energy availability. However, numerous challenges for investors in funding projects in Africa remain constant insufficient regulatory framework and social fractionalization. This needs a government to essentialism for private sector investment in energy projects to reduce and solve a developmental challenge.

Poor governance and institutional accountability, it is an easy fix.

Electing leaders with the capacity to deliver on the aspirations of Africa should suffice. One of the reasons many African countries end up with bad leaders due to blind support of a candidate simply because of ethnic affiliation. It can be solved by sensitizing Africa's youth to the consequences of their choices as well as encouraging them to shun sectarianism. Strong institutions created in the will of its citizens, can push forward true leadership, democratic governance and unity for Africa.

Technology a Driver of Growth and Productivity

Africa has the advantage of being able to leapfrog directly to use the latest technology. It is estimated that more Africans have access to mobile phones than to clean water and electricity, (World Bank, 2011). Although costs remain high, Africa's Internet infrastructure capacity has increased tenfold since 2006 and the entire continent now has access to undersea fiber optic cables.

African countries should begin to partner with other developed countries in enhancing the conceptualization, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of developmental policies and programmes like agricultural productivity and strengthening financial institutions. Most of the African countries tend to borrow from other countries more than they produce. By so doing, they end up burdened by debt; and usually, creditors use this leverage to influence the countries' policies in their favour. Such dependence interferes with the sovereignty of a country.

Finally, Africa should leverage science and technology to catalyze faster economic growth. Technological advancement is correlated to the high rate of development something that could easily be seen in the rapid development in countries such as Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, et cetera.

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In conclusion, leadership problem in Africa remains very critical to the development process in many African countries, especially in important areas like health, education, employment opportunities and power generation. These sectors are very critical to the development process of the African continent but these sectors of economic generation and empowerment are not given

priority attention to the key sectors of African development. Based on the findings, the following recommendations are made;

For African countries to keep driving for development there is a need for institutional Democracy to be sustained and function efficiently which requires the following measures to be adopted:

- Strengthening of the Political Institutions and the Practices to be followed in its functioning with global practice of serving humanity in and African continent considering realities, values and critical African problems.
- Enhance and ensure effective people's participation in political governance in the African continent
- Supporting the local government functioning and giving them more powers to serve people at grassroots levels in the African continent.
- To control the criminalization of politics by addressing the bad culture of political officeholders, bribery and corruption.
- To take necessary measures for the efficient functioning of an open and more transparent government
- Control the influence of the rich and powerful in the decision-making process, the outcome of any government policy should be directed to the people.
- Ensure free and fair elections that could provide truly elected leaders who are the real choice of the people to provide for their needs and demands
- Provide policies that could alleviate poverty in the African continent and provide necessary basic needs to the people.

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Modalities for Managing School Finance for Positive Learning Outcomes in Ukwuani Post Primary Institutions, Delta State, Nigeria

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Abstract

The study examined the modalities for managing school finance for positive learning outcomes in Ukwuani Local Government Area of Delta State, Nigeria. Three research questions and three hypotheses guided the study. Descriptive survey design was used to gather information, summarize, present and construe for the purpose of clarification. The sample of this study comprised of 150 teachers and 10 bursars. A census sampling technique was used as it accommodated all the public post-primary schools in Ukwuani Local Government area since they are few (16) while ten teachers from each of the schools were purposively selected. The instrument for the study was the questionnaire titled: Modalities of Managing School Finance Inventory (SMSFI). The data collected were analyzed using inferential and descriptive statistical tools from the data. Frequency distribution, descriptive statistics, the independent sample test (IST), PPMC and the one way ANOVA were also used. Hypotheses were tested at 0.05 significant levels. The outcome of the study showed that Delta State government has many source funds to run post primary institutions, the extent to which managing school finance by the Delta State Government impacts learning outcomes is high and that there are several modalities of managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria. There is a significant difference between the opinions of males and females and a positive correlation between teachers and bursars on the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria. Also, there is no significant difference in the modalities for managing school finances in Ukwuani LGA on the basis of academics. Conclusion was drawn and useful recommendations made which include: School proprietors and principals should be trained on the modalities for managing school finances in Delta state. School proprietors and principals should be made to account for finances allocated to the schools and that the Delta State Government should regularly audit school finances allocated to schools.

Keywords: School Finance, Learning Outcomes, Resource Allocation

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Finance is the main factor that sustains any organization. Administrators in every institution are not only concerned with the source of finance but most importantly to ensure that the generated fund is put into proficient and effectual use. The peak precedence of any institution is the

actualization of the set objective which makes it relevant for the organisation to strap up its human, material and fiscal capital to attain the set objectives in the course of accurately managing its funds (Heuneman 2013). When funding is judiciously managed, achievement is attained but the reserve is the case if it is misappropriated.

Financial management is concerned with the organization's decisions on how to source funds, how to control financial resources through financial controls, prudent allocation of financial resources and accountability measures (Nyamburakimani, 2014). It is the process of planning, organizing, controlling and monitoring financial resources with a view to achieving organizational goals and objectives. It is an ideal practice for controlling the financial activities of a school such as procurement of funds, utilization of funds, accounting, payments, risk assessment and every other thing related to money (Nobanee & Abraham, 2015). Financial management is the art and science of utilizing money to achieve economic objectives with the money available (Laila & Muhammad, 2016). It is the application of general principles of management to the financial possessions of an enterprise (Bua & Adzongo, 2014).

Financial management determines the way the school is managed and achieving its objectives. In secondary schools, it is the duty of the principal to ensure budgeting, accounting and auditing functions are carried out effectively as required by the Ministry of Education (Wachira, Solomon & Juma, 2014). The school administration definition applies to the leadership of private or public institutions of learning (Ann, 2018).

Finance required for school organization is obtained from assorted foundations that embrace government grants, outside help and intercontinental foundations, contributions from philanthropists', the Parent Teacher Association, tuition fees and earnings from school events, handicrafts etc. Education in Nigeria is funded in various ways which depend on the types of institutions, mostly municipal capital and grants from benefactors and mutual loans support the education segment. Private investors, religious, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) play key roles in funding education (UNESCO, 2013).). A smaller share may come from private donors such as high net-worth individuals, faith-based organizations, corporations and philanthropic foundations in developing and developed countries (Barrera-Osorio & Guáqueta 2010).

Funds in any organization cannot be prudently managed unless effective modalities are adopted. Managing schools' finances involves proper recording of funds received in books and identifying and authorizing local purchases. School administrators should always make use of cheques, and ledgers to record daily transactions. Specific instructions on how funds should be used need to be followed (Amede & Aina 2021). Other modalities include setting limits on how much that can be spent within a particular time. Regular audits of financial statements must be done with care and skill. Approval must be sought from the Ministry of Education where supplementary needs outside to approved budget arise. To ensure accountability, there should be two signatories to the school account before any withdrawal is approved. It is the responsibility of the financial management to ensure timely internal and external financial reports are discussed and SWOT analysis done on the same for the development of the school (Bua & Adzongo, 2014).

Bua and Adzongo (2014) noted that the poor state of schools was a result of financial management issues such as the inability to generate revenue internally and misuse of available resources. Corruption is the bane of prudent fund management and unprofessional conduct of school finances affects the worth and accessibility of schooling (Ayobami, 2011). Education funds that have been mismanaged render the school with an unfitted library, obsolete science lab, dilapidated structures and poorly remunerated instructors with resultant negative effects on learners. Margaret, John and Thinguri, (2014) opined that schools whose finances are well managed attain success in the overall performance of the school. In contrast, principals who involve themselves in misappropriation of funds, wastage, and incompetence often fail to achieve the institution's set goals.

Amirizei and Nwachukwu, (2018) found that there are significant relationships between principals' fund management strategies, accountability, factors that hinder, and factors that strengthen and effective administration of secondary schools in Rivers State. Laila and Muhammad (2016) showed that there are no statistically significant differences due to the variables of gender scientific qualification, years of experience and job status as regards school fund management. Wachira, Solomon and Juma (2014) sought to establish the effect of control activity on financial management in Mirangine Sub County of Nyandarua County. The final conclusion of the study was that there is a significant positive relationship between control activities and financial management.

Financial Management is a vital activity in any school. The Nigerian educational policy will excel if it is well funded and competently administered. This study therefore examined the modalities for managing school finance for positive learning outcomes in Ukwuani Local Government Area of Delta State, Nigeria.

Statement of the Problem

Misappropriation of finances has constantly been a menace to diverse associations in Nigeria, which include the institutions. Due to the poor running of resources in secondary institutions in Delta State, teachers are seen to discharge their responsibilities with flippancy. Several numbers of them do not come to school on time, most of them fail to attend their lessons, and several have turned the teaching environments into a fun fair ground where they gossip, chitchat and still perform their personal business thereby affecting the educational performance of the learners of Delta state post primary institutions.

Consequently, misconduct of finances has incapacitated schools from purchasing the needed school materials that could assist learning. Infrastructure like furniture, laptops, prepared libraries; and operational laboratories are in undignified conditions; which affects the educational accomplishment of students in examinations.

Research Questions

- a) How does Delta State Government source funds to run post primary institutions in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria?
- b) To what extent does prudent management of school finance by school heads impact learning outcomes in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria?
- c) What are the modalities of managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria?

Research Hypotheses

Ho₁: There is no significant difference between the opinions of males and females on the modalities for managing school finance in Delta State North Local LGA of Delta State, Nigeria.

Ho₂: There is no significant relationship between the opinions of teachers and bursars on the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria.

Ho₃: There is no significant difference in the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria on the basis of academic qualifications.

Objectives of the Study

The study examines the modalities for managing school finance for positive learning outcomes in Ukwuani LGA. The specific objectives are to:

- a) Investigate how Delta State government sources funds to run post primary institutions in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria.
- b) Access the impact of managing school finance on learning outcomes in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria.
- c) Examine modalities of managing school finance for post primary institutions in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria.
- (d) Ascertain the disparity between males and females on the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani Local Government area of Delta State.
- (e). Explain the relationship teachers and bursars on the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA.
- (f). Determine the difference in the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA on the basis of academic qualifications.

2.0 METHODOLOGY

This study adopted the descriptive survey design to examine the study variables. Descriptive survey design allows the researcher to gather information, summarize, present and construe for the purpose of clarification. The study populations consist of all post primary school teachers (400) and bursars (About 20) in Ukwuani LGA. The sample of this study comprised 150 teachers and 10 bursars. This sample size is adequate because according to Asika (1991), 10% of elements

selected randomly from a population is to all intents and purposes deemed to be representative of the population and the findings from a study of that sample can be generalized for the population. Census sampling technique was used as it accommodated all the public post primary schools in Ukwuani Local Government area since they are few (16) while ten teachers from each of the schools were purposively selected.

The instrument for the study was the questionnaire titled: Modalities of Managing School Finance Inventory (SMSFI). The instrument was designed by the researcher to measure the modalities of managing school finances. It was divided into four sections. Section A sought demographic data of respondents, Section B was concerned with the source funds to post primary institutions, Section C sought information relating to the extent to which prudent management of school finance impacts learning outcomes while Section D demanded issues on the modalities for managing school finance. The questionnaire adopted the Likert scale format of Strongly Agreed (SA), Agreed (A), Disagreed (D), and Strongly Disagreed (SD) with the scores of 4, 3, 2 and 1 for positively worded items and reversed for negatively worded items. The weighted mean of 2.5 was for assessing the instrument.

Validity and Reliability of the Instrument

The instrument was also passed through experts in the Department of Educational Administration and Planning of the Faculty of Education, National Open University of Nigeria. They modified it to guarantee that the instrument measured the variables it purported to measure and improve the face validity. The face validation took care of item relevance, sentence structure, clarity and statutory of the item to the intended objectives of the study. Due to the experts' contribution to corrections, the instrument was considered valid to measure what it intended to measure.

The reliability of the instrument was determined by administering it to a sample of 30 secondary school teachers in the Isoko South local government area of Delta state, Nigeria which was not part of the original sample population. Based on the data obtained from the respondents, the reliability was calculated using Cronbach's Alpha. The Cronbach's Alpha, analysis gave the reliability scale to be 0.82, which was found adequate for the study.

Procedure for Data Collection and Data Analysis

The researcher met with the principal of all the sampled post primary institutions in Ukwuani Local Government Area of Delta State, Nigeria, for their cooperation which was granted. The questionnaire was administered to 160 participants. The collected questionnaires accounted for 95% of the total administered. The data collected were analyzed using inferential and descriptive statistical tools from the data. The data collected were analyzed with frequency distribution, descriptive statistics, the independent sample test (IST), PPMC and the one way ANOVA. The statistics were chosen for the analysis because of the robust nature of comparing both the variances and means of two independent samples. Hypotheses were tested at 0.05 significant levels.

3.0 RESULTS

Answer to research Questions

Research Question 1: How does Delta State Government source funds to run post primary institutions in Ukwuani LGA Government area of Delta State, Nigeria?

Table 1

Mean rating on the ways Delta State Government source funds to run post primary institutions in Ukwuani LGA Government area of Delta State, Nigeria.

S/N	Statements	N	Sum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Remark
1	Delta state allocates funds to schools through grants.	150	287.00	3.45	.84	Agreed
2	Funds are given to schools through proceeds from school activities- customized school uniform, handicrafts. etc.	150	272.00	2.78	.95	Agreed
3	Funds are given to school by External Aids- International bodies or foundation.	150	153.00	1.56	.76	Disagreed
4	Donations from philanthropists’.	150	232.00	2.37	.96	Disagreed
5	Funds are given to Delta state schools through Education TAX fund	150	282.00	2.92	.89	Agreed
6	Parent Teacher Association gives Funds	150	305.00	1.31	.78	Agreed
7	Community efforts give funds to school.	150	238.00	2.43	.96	Disagreed
8	Delta state schools gets Funds through Petroleum Special Tax Fund	150	276.00	2.82	.78	Agreed
9	Organizing various sport activities to generate money for schools	150	338.00	2.88	.64	Agreed
10	Funds are gotten from school fees	150	128.00	3.11	.56	Agreed
	Total	1500	2511	2.56	.81	Agreed

Table 1 reveals how Delta State government source funds to run post primary institutions in Ukwuani LGA Government area of Delta State, Nigeria. Delta state allocates funds to schools through grants tops the list, while Funds are given to school by External Aids-International bodies or foundations is the least means of getting fund.

Research Question 2: To what extent does prudent management of school finance by school heads impact on learning outcomes in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria?

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on the extent to which prudent management of school finance by school heads impacts on learning outcomes in Ukwuani LGA Government area of Delta State, Nigeria

S/N	STATEMENT	N	SA	A	D	SD	REMARK
11	Proper management of post primary institutions finance contribute to the development of Post primary institutions in Delta state	150	26(17.3)	54(36)	45(30)	25(16.7)	Agreed
12	Good finance management of secondary school contribute to positive learning outcomes of students	150	67(44.7)	69(46)	6(4)	8(5.7)	Agreed
13	Management of finance does not have any effect on learning outcome	150	54(36)	69(46)	16(10.7)	11(7.3)	Agreed
14	Funds allocated to schools enhances the instructional resources availability in schools	150	36(24)	41(27.3)	49(32.7)	24(16)	Agreed
15	Good Learning outcome through effective finance management enhance productivity of Delta Secondary School.	150	32(21.3)	90(60)	22(14.7)	6(4)	Agreed
16	Effective Management of Funds in schools serve as Motivation for teacher & students.	150	63(42)	75(50)	10(6.7)	2(1.3)	Agreed
17	The managing of funds effectively improved teaching and learning in schools	150	74(49.3)	60(40)	9(6)	7(4.7)	Agreed
18	Effective allocation of funds ginger teachers to give in their best.	150	55(36.7)	73(48.7)	19(12.7)	3(2)	Agreed
19	Funds assist principals to provide all necessary resources in schools.	150	61(40.7)	58(38.7)	21(14)	10(6.7)	Agreed
20	Transparency & accountability is an effective way of managing finance	150	47(31.3)	76(50.7)	24(16)	3(2)	Agreed
	TOTAL	1500	515(34.3)	665(44.3)	221(14.4)	99(7)	Agreed

Figures in parenthesis represent percentages (%)

Table 2 revealed the extent to which prudent management of school finance by school heads impact on learning outcomes in Ukwuani LGA Government area of Delta State, Nigeria. The analysis shows the following outcomes: 515(34.3), 665(44.3), 221(14.4) and 99(7) for strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed and strongly disagreed. The implication is that the extent to which

prudent management of school finance by school heads impact on learning outcomes in Ukwuani LGA Government area is high.

Research Question 3: What are the modalities of managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria?

Table 3
Mean rating on the modalities of managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria

S/N	Items	N	Sum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Remarks
Q21	Managing schools finance involves proper recording of funds received in books	150	467.00	3.11	.74	Agreed
Q22	Vouchers should be prepared before any payment is done	150	493.00	3.29	.66	Agreed
Q22	Local purchases order(LPO) should be used for identifying and authorizing local purchase	150	459.00	3.06	.64	Agreed
Q24	Heads of school should always make use of cheque books.	150	492.00	3.28	.69	Agreed
Q25	Journals/ ledgers have to be properly filled daily and monitored by monitoring team.	150	485.00	3.23	.78	Agreed
Q26	Specific instructions on how funds should be used should be followed.	150	448.00	2.99	.74	Agreed
Q27	Setting limit on how much can be spent within the particular time.	150	457.00	3.05	.71	Agreed
Q28	Approval must be obtained from the ministry of Education where expenses arises contrary to approved budget	150	530.00	3.53	1.64	Agreed
Q29	Regular auditing of school accounts must be done with care and skill.	150	484.00	3.23	.58	Agreed
Q30	Two signatories to the account before any withdrawal must be approved	150	481.00	3.21	.64	Agreed
	Total	1500	4796	3.12	.78	

Table 3 shows the Mean rating on the modalities of managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria. Approval must be obtained from the Ministry of Education where expenses arise contrary to the approved budget ranked highest with an average mean of 3.53, followed by vouchers should be prepared before any payment is done (3.29), heads of school should always

make use of cheque books. (3.28), regular auditing of school accounts must be done with care and skill (3.23), two signatories to the account before any withdrawal must be approved (3.21), and lastly by specific instructions on how funds should be used should be followed (2.99), The total average is 3.12, which is above the weigh average of 2.5. The implication is there are several modalities of managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria.

Testing of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference between the opinions of males and females on the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria.

Table 4: T-test analysis on the difference between opinions of males and females on the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani Local Government area of Delta State

Gender	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	df	t	Sig.
Male	59	1.87	.34	.04			
Female	91	1.67	.47	.061	132	2.64	.000

At .05 level of significant

Table 4 above is a T-test analysis on the difference between males and females on the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani Local Government area of Delta State at t (2.64), df= 132, P>.05, with a mean of 1.87for male and 1.67 for female. The implication is that there is a significant difference between males and females in the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani Local Government area of Delta State.

Hypothesis 2: There is no significant relationship between teachers' and bursars' opinions on the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria.

Table 5: Pearson product-moment correlation on the relationship between teachers' and bursars' opinions on the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Teachers	1.30	.70	150
Bursars	1.14	.37	150

		Designation	Schools status
Teachers	Pearson Correlation	1	-.057
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.487
	N	150	150
Bursars	Pearson Correlation	-.057	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.487	
	N	150	150

Pearson product-moment correlation was administered to determine the relationship between teachers' and bursars' opinions on the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria. The analysis revealed a positive correlation between teachers and bursars on the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria, which was statistically significant ($r = .487, n = 150, p = .005$). The implication is that there is a positive correlation between teachers and bursars on the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria.

Hypothesis 3 There is no significant difference in the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria on the basis of academic qualifications

Table 6: Descriptive statistic on the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria on the basis of academic qualifications

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
NCE and less	59	1.82	.64	.11	1.59	2.04	1.00	3.00
Degree	75	1.55	.68	.06	1.42	1.68	1.00	3.00
Post	16	2.23	.56	.04	1.21	2.02	1.00	3.00
Total	150	1.61	.67	.06	1.50	1.72	1.00	3.00

Table 6 above depicts a Descriptive statistic on the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria on the basis of academic qualifications. The table gives categories of teachers' academic qualifications into NCE and less, Degree and Post. A total of 150 respondents participated in the study. Out of this figure, 59 hold NCE and less, 75 have Degrees

and 16 have Post Degrees. The mean scores for the NCE and less teachers, Degree and Post are 1.82, 1.55 and 66.8500 respectively; with a total mean score of 2.23.

Table 7: One-way ANOVA statistic on the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria on the basis of academic qualifications

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	1.893	1	1.893	4.251	.041
Within Groups	65.901	148	.445		
Total	67.793	149			

The one-way statistics revealed a significant difference between and within groups as shown in Table 7 above with $F (.041 = df, 1/149, p = .000)$. The hypothesis states that there is no significant difference in the modalities for managing school finances in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria on the basis of academic qualifications in the study was therefore accepted. A posteriori test cannot be conducted in the study since the hypothesis was not significant. The implication is that there is no significant difference on the modalities for managing school finances in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, **Nigeria** on the basis of academic qualifications

4.0 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Research question one sought to examine how Delta State government source funds to run post primary institutions in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria. The study found that Delta State government has many source funds to run post primary institutions. The finding agrees with the views of Barrera-Osorio and Guáqueta (2010) who opined that a smaller share may come from private donors such as high net-worth individuals, faith-based organizations, corporations and philanthropic foundations in developing and developed countries. Financial management is concerned with the organization's decisions on how to source for funds, how to control financial resources through financial controls, prudent allocation of financial resources and accountability measures (Nyamburakimani, 2014).

Research Question two states: To what extent does prudent management of school finance impact on learning outcomes in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria? The study revealed that the extent to which managing school finance by Delta State government impact on learning outcomes is high.

This conclusion correlates with that of Margaret, John and Thinguri, (2014) who established that schools whose finances are well managed determine the overall performance of the school. In contrast, principals who involve themselves in misappropriation of funds, wastage, incompetence and are not responsible lack moral authority in their duties and fail to achieve the set goals of the institution. Breadth, Bua and Adzongo (2014) noted that the poor state of schools was a result of financial management issues such as the inability to generate revenue internally and misuse of available resources. Unprofessional conduct of school finances affects the worth and accessibility of schooling (Poisson, 2001).

Research Question three sought to determine the modalities of managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria. The analysis shows that there are several modalities of managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria. This finding is in agreement with Amede and Aina (2021) who proposed steps in managing school finances to include proper recording of funds received in books, identifying and authorizing local purchases, always making use of school cheques by school managers and filling and monitoring by monitoring team. In addition, specific instructions on how funds should be used need to be followed.

Hypothesis one revealed a significant difference between males and females in the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani Local Government area of Delta State. This verdict concurred with Laila and Muhammad (2016) who found that there are no statistically significant differences in the modalities for managing school finance due to the variables of gender scientific qualification, years of experience and job status as regards school fund management.

Hypotheses two established a positive correlation between teachers and bursars while hypothesis three indicated no significant difference in the modalities for managing school finances on the basis of academic qualifications in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria. These conclusions are in conformity with Amirizei and Nwachukwu (2018) studies which found that there are significant relationships between principals' fund management strategies, accountability, factors that hinder, and factors that strengthen and effective administration of secondary schools in Rivers State, Nigeria.

Implications of the study for Counsellors

This study examined on modalities for managing school finance for positive learning outcomes in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria. The outcome of the study would help counsellors to assist school proprietors and principals in identifying the sources of funds for running schools and the modalities for managing them efficiently. The upshot of this study would equip counsellors with the information needed to organize workshops and seminars for education stakeholders on modalities for managing school finance for positive learning. Effective management of school finances would ensure that funds meant for schools are judiciously managed to provide learning materials, pay salaries, improve the attitude of teachers to work and improve the academic performance of secondary school students.

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This study is focused on managing school finances for positive learning outcomes in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria. The outcome of the study showed that Delta State government has many sources of funds to run post primary institutions. The extent to which managing school finance by Delta State government impacts learning outcomes is high and there are several modalities of managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria. There is a significant difference between the opinions of males and females and a positive correlation between teachers and bursars on the modalities for managing school finance in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria. Also, there is no significant difference in the modalities for managing school finances in Ukwuani LGA of Delta State, Nigeria on the basis of academics. However, school proprietors and principals should be trained on the modalities for managing school finances in Delta State.

Based on the findings, the following recommendations are made;

- Delta State government should train school proprietors and principals on the modalities for managing school finances in Delta State.
- School proprietors and principals should be made to account for school finances allocated to the schools by Delta State Post Primary Education Board (PPED).

- Delta State Government Ministry of Finance should regularly audit the use of finances allocated to schools.

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Revisiting the Interest Rate-Investment Nexus in Nigeria

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Abstract

TThe study examined the interest rate–investment nexus in Nigeria for the period 1986 – 2021 using the ECM estimation technique. Gross capital formation was the dependent variable, while interest rate, money supply, inflation rate and foreign exchange rate were the independent variables. The results reveal a long run relationship between interest rate and investment. The error correction term shows that interest rate and investment converge to long run equilibrium. The ECM results further showed that interest rate, inflation rate and foreign exchange rate appeared with expected sign but had no significant impact on investment while money supply positively impacted on investment. Following the findings, it was recommended that government should have a policy review on investment and come up with policies to lower interest rate and exchange rate so as to attract investors while controlling inflation rate.

Keywords: Interest Rate, Investment, Unit root test, ECM
JEL Code: E22, E43

1.0 INTRODUCTION

It has been proposed that the relationship between interest rates and investment is critical to the economic performance of countries all over the world. Attempts to explain these related phenomena have resulted in lots of theoretical and empirical literature over time. The interest rate-investment nexus has recently been heightened and requires revisiting going by the exemplifying role of investment in the transition from traditional to modern economies in emerging nations, especially the Asian Tiger economies.

Interest rate is a significant tool of monetary policy. This is so due to its function in the mobilisation of financial resources intended to promote economic growth and development. It is the cost of using money and is seen as the opportunity cost of borrowing money from a lender. It is thus a significant economic cost and is thought of as the compensation being paid to the provider of financial resources. For policymakers, the direction and size of changes in market interest rates are

crucial since they dictate the direction of growth in the economy. Interest rates play a key role in bridging the gap between the financial and real sectors of the economy by encouraging savings that can be invested in boosting employment, output and effective use of financial resources (Ajudua & Okonkwo, 2015). Thus, its importance is hinged on its equilibrating influence on supply and demand in the financial sector.

Investment has emerged as the primary driver of economic growth. The Keynesian theory (1936), the Harrod Model (1936), and the neoclassical investment approach all emphasized the importance of investment as a fundamental condition for economic growth. The term "investment" refers to the change in capital stock over time. It is the accumulation of freshly generated material entities such as factories, equipment, houses, and product inventories. As a result, unlike capital, investment is a flow term rather than a stock term, indicating that investment is measured across time.

Jorgenson (1963) proposed an investment equation to model the influence of real interest rates on investment spending in his paper on capital theory and investment behaviour. He calculated the desired capital stock as a function of real output and the opportunity cost of capital. A firm maximizes the present value of its future cash flows using this strategy. The required capital stock is directly related to output and inversely related to the cost of capital. As a result, lowering the real interest rate decreases the opportunity cost of capital, thereby raising the desired capital stock and investment spending. Banks acting as intermediaries, transfer funds from surplus units to deficit units by accepting deposits and directing them toward end users. The extent to which this could be done depends upon the rate of interest and level of development of the financial sector as well as the saving and investment habit of the people. This contributes to the plethora of initiatives adopted in countries worldwide to incorporate a wide range of stakeholders and participants in the financial sector (Ajudua & Odishika, 2022). As a result, the availability of investible funds is required for any economic investment, which finally translates to economic growth and development (Uremadu, 2006).

Economists believe that interest rate and investment are closely linked. Therefore, the current interest rate affects investment activities and at the same time affects the scale of investment in the future by adjusting the savings. High interest rate impedes economic activities and slows down

growth. It discourages borrowing for investment thereby hampering output and affecting GDP (Ajudua & Okonkwo, 2015). Due to the interest rate-investment link, policymakers in Nigeria have at different times introduced economic reform in a bid to ascertain their relationship as it concerns the nation. Prior to the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986, interest rates in Nigeria were largely set by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), with periodic modifications based on government sectoral priorities. During this period, the financial system was governed by financial regulations, and interest rates were believed to be stifled. The period is seen as a period of financial repression (government regulations, laws, and other non-market restrictions preventing financial intermediaries from functioning at full capacity). Financial repression, according to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), occurs primarily when a country establishes a ceiling on deposits and lending nominal interest rates that are low relative to inflation. As a result, low or negative interest rates discourage saving mobilization and the channelling of mobilized savings through the banking sector. This negatively influences investment quantity, quality, and thus economic growth. In order to stimulate investment in major sectors of the economy, the monetary authority levied special interest rates on loans taken by these sectors in order to foster an increase in output and hence a probable improvement in economic growth (Udoka, 2000).

By mid-1986, the Nigerian government had launched the SAP policy initiative, which attempted to resolve issues and aid economic growth. The goal of interest rate reform, which was a policy under financial sector liberalization as contained in the SAP programme, was to increase financial sector efficiency which is also expected to increase domestic savings and make loanable funds available for investment. The financial sector changes began in August 1987 with the liberalization of interest rates, such that banks determined their deposit and lending rates based on market conditions; however, the CBN continued to determine the Minimum Rediscount Rate (MRR), which influences other interest rates, based on changes in overall economic conditions.

Although Nigeria's financial system has significantly improved over time, the relationship between interest rate and investment in the economy has been a contentious subject. Over the years, figures for interest rate and investment have fluctuated albeit increased. From a figure of 7.75% in 1981, prime interest rate rose to 9.25% in 1985, was put at 25.50% in 1990 and 20.18%

in 1995. Interest rate was put at 17.98%, 17.95%, 17.59% and 12.32% in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2020 respectively (CBN, 2020). In furtherance, aggregate investment as a share of GDP reached an all time low of 7.7% in 1985 from 29.7% in 1976. It increased to 11.75% in 1990 and again declined to 5.8% in 1995, increased to 6.99% in 1997 and was 6.95% in 2001. Between 2007 and 2016, it declined from 18.7% to 12.6% and was put at 16.5%, 15.2% and 14.4% in 2020, 2021 and 2022 respectively (CBN, 2022). In comparison, the investment rate in Nigeria still falls short of the 23.3 % as recorded in sub-Saharan African countries and 28.9% as recorded for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

The idea that interest rate is linked to investment is no longer new. However, the nature of the effect is being seriously debated in the literature. While some empirical studies have identified a linkage between a country's interest rate and investment, others have failed to demonstrate such a linkage. The crux of the differences in these results has been the differences in methodology as well as the way the variables were defined. In Nigeria, despite several policies formulated by the government, the country's investment level still falls short of requirements making it difficult to ascertain if interest policy impacts investment or not. This calls for a re-examination of the interest rate and investment nexus in Nigeria. Therefore, the goal of this study is to assess the relationship between the interest rate and investment in Nigeria from 1986-2020 with the choice of this period basically as a result of the SAP liberalization policy implemented in 1986.

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

Interest rate and its relationship with economic performance either in the area of investment, which ultimately leads to growth or the general growth of an economy, has been researched by scholars worldwide. These researchers have over time reported varying degrees of relationships amongst these variables both in the long run and short run period in different countries.

In China, Khurshid, (2015), empirically investigated the impact of interest rate on investment. Both long run and short nexus were investigated using the Johansen Co-integration test and vector error correction model (VECM) respectively for the analysis. Results gotten indicated that interest rate has a negative relationship with investment in the long run but positive in the short run.

Mujahid and Noman (2019) sought to find out the link between inflation, rate of interest and investment which incorporates a new dimension of call money rate that may enhance the investment opportunities in Pakistan. The results of the study indicated that the call money rate and inflation have significant effects on investment and thus on economic growth.

In their study on the determinants of interest rate variation and its impact on investment, Ofori and Asumadu (2018) discovered that interest rate fluctuations had a detrimental impact on Ghana's investment decisions.

Effiong (2020) examined the effect of interest rate on real sector output growth in Nigeria through the period 1985 to 2019. Results gotten revealed that a unit percentage increase in interest rate was observed to exert a negative and significant effect of up to 0.274% in real sector growth.

Other studies, Ajudua & Okonkwo (2015); Jelilov (2016); Maiga (2017) examined the impact of interest rate on economic growth in Nigeria and came to the conclusion that interest rate if well adjusted, had a positive effect on growth because it stimulates investment. However, Adekunle, Adodo and Akindutire (2018), examined the effect of interest rate on economic growth in Nigeria as well but found that interest rate as a macroeconomic tool is not effective in stimulating economic growth in Nigeria.

From these empirical studies, it can be said that although most researchers are of the opinion that an increase in interest rate affects the investment climate and thus the economy negatively. However, there are still researchers who argue that there is no significant relationship between the variables under study. As such, this study extends the scope of the investigation to include more recent data on (lending rate; inflation rate; money supply and foreign exchange rate) to cover a period of 35 years (1986-2021).

Theoretical Review

There are different theories on interest rate determination and how this affects investments. Starting with the classicalists, according to Oluwole and Ushie (2022), the classical theory postulates that interest rate is determined through the invisible hand of demand and supply for capital. As such, capital demanded is a function of the investment decision, while capital supply is a function of savings in the community. As for the neo-classicalists such as Alfred Marshall,

Vilfredo Pareto and Leon Walras, they assumed that interest rate is determined by the demand and supply of loanable funds (Olaniyan, Adegboyo, Owoniya & Alaketu, 2020). The implication of the neo-classicalists' assumption is that the lower the interest rate, the more funds would be borrowed and hence the more the investment rate. So invariably, investment is a function of interest rate (Oluwole & Ushie, 2022).

A third theory of interest rate is Keynes theory of Liquidity preference. In his classical work “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,” Keynes (1936) argued that the interest rate is a determinant of how much money people will choose to hold. Stating further, he opined that when interest rate is high, people would rather hold less money because interest rate is the opportunity cost of holding money. Accordingly, he posits that interest rate is a major variable when it comes to contraction or expansion of an economy (Obinna, 2020). Although Keynes criticised the classical theorists for not having a deterministic approach and therefore do not proffer a solution to interest rate determination, his theory was also criticised as having the same problem (Hansen, 1951). Despite the relationship and connection between the interest rate and investment stated by these theories, the theory which was propounded with the developing economies in mind is the Mckinnon-Shaw theory of financial liberalization.

According to the Mckinnon-Shaw theory of financial liberalization, the regulation of interest rate impedes investments and thus the growth of developing countries (Olaniyan, Adegboyo, Owoniya & Alaketu, 2020). The theory as the name implies, advocates for the liberalization of interest rate as against financial repression as they believe repression which causes low interest rates would stunt growth by discouraging savings and thereby shrinking investment (Ojima, & Emerenini, 2015). As such, the McKinnon-Shaw approach concentrates on market inefficiencies caused by financial repression, which have a negative impact on financial development, bank performance and ultimately the economy (Ajudua & Odishika, 2022). The Financial Liberalization theory was adopted in this research work as the study is based on a developing economy.

3.0 METHODOLOGY

Due to the secondary nature of the dataset obtained from the CBN Statistical Bulletin, an ex-post facto research methodology was used in this work. The econometric analysis method was applied, with the ordinary least square (OLS) regression approach chosen for its BLUE properties. The

technique expresses the nature of the relationship between variables mathematically. In other words, it provides an estimated equation that describes the functional relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The dataset for the study covers the period 1986 to 2021.

Employing the generic form of the linear production function given as;

$$Q = f(X_1, X_2 \dots X_n) \text{------(1)}$$

Where Q = output (dependent variable) and X_1, X_2, X_n = inputs (explanatory variables), the mathematical function to determine the relationship between interest rate and investment in Nigeria for this study is stated thus:

$$GCF = f(INT, MS, INF, FEX) \text{------(2)}$$

Econometrically, equation 2 becomes

$$GCF = a_0 + a_1INT + a_2MS + a_3INF + a_4FEX + \mu_t \text{------(3)}$$

Variables would be expressed in their logarithmic form in order to compress their measurement scales and prevent the problem of heteroskedasticity (Gujarati, 1995). Therefore, equation 3 becomes

$$\text{Log}GCF = a_0 + a_1INT + a_2\text{Log}MS + a_3INF + a_4FEX + \mu_t \text{------(4)}$$

Where:

GCF = Gross Capital Formation

INT = Prime Lending Rate

MS = Money Supply

INF = Inflation Rate

FEX = Foreign Exchange Rate

μ_t = Error term which is a random variable that captures other variables not included in the model.

a_0 = Intercept

$a_1 - a_4$ = Coefficients of parameters to be estimated.

Based on the outcome and behaviour of the variables obtained from the diagnostic tests carried out, the Error Correction Model (ECM) was used in the research. The choice of Error Correction Model (ECM) is beckoned on the fact that all included variables became linearly integrated at first difference, and they were equally cointegrated, implying that both the long run and short run model are relevant as all short run drift will eventually converge to long run equilibrium.

4.0 ANALYSIS OF RESULT

Preliminary Test

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Model

	GCF	INT	MS	INF	FEX
Mean	1732899.	18.73423	2870348.	18.91600	116.6717
Median	804400.8	17.79500	946253.4	12.90000	120.9702
Maximum	4734550.	31.65000	7929450.	72.80000	360.0500
Minimum	11351.46	9.959167	13560.40	5.400000	2.020600
Std. Dev.	1786887.	3.929100	3147666.	16.61838	103.1315
Skewness	0.436691	0.951120	0.534346	1.862632	0.850324
Kurtosis	1.446986	5.147241	1.517189	5.484769	3.049342
Jarque-Bera	4.629698	12.00086	4.872043	29.24202	4.221350
Probability	0.098781	0.002478	0.087508	0.000000	0.121156
Sum	60651461	655.6980	1.00E+08	662.0600	4083.511
Sum Sq. Dev.	1.09E+14	524.8862	3.37E+14	9389.794	361627.7
Observations	35	35	35	35	35

Source: Authors' Computation from output

Table 1 shows the descriptive analysis of the variables in the model during the period of study. On the average, the interest rate is 17.80% approximately, inflation rate is 18.92%, and exchange rate is N8116.67K per dollar. Also, the average income level is N8.88 billion while average investment is N1,732,899 Naira. Furthermore, the maximum and minimum investment are N4,734,550 billion Naira and N11,351.46 Naira respectively with a very high standard deviation. The skewness of the dependent variable is moderate.

Table 2: Summary of Correlation Matrix Result

	GCF	INT	MS	INF	FEX
GCF	1.000000	-0.466679	0.879455	-0.377358	-0.876957
INT	-0.466679	1.000000	-0.461116	0.470445	-0.351877
MS	0.879455	-0.461116	1.000000	-0.367544	0.873551
INF	-0.377358	0.470445	-0.367544	1.000000	-0.378891
FEX	-0.876957	-0.351877	0.873551	-0.378891	1.000000

Source: Authors' Computation from output

In order to avoid a case of multicollinearity, the correlation matrix was carried out. From the result in the table above, there was no multicollinearity seen as the pair-wise correlation coefficient between two regression was not in the excess of 0.9. Furthermore, it was revealed that interest rate, inflation rate and foreign exchange rate had negative correlation with gross capital formation. Also, money supply has a positive and strong correlation with gross capital formation.

Unit Root Test

Table 3: Summary of Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test Results

Variables	LEVEL				FIRST DIFFERENCE			
	ADF Test Statistic	5% Critical Value	Prob	Status	ADF Test Statistic	5% Critical Value	Prob	Status
GCF	-0.069696	-2.954021	0.9447	I(0)	-3.796670	-2.954021	0.0069	I(1)*
INT	-0.790054	-2.954021	0.7128	I(0)	-6.535524	-2.954021	0.0000	I(1)*
MS	0.791626	-2.951125	0.9924	I(0)	-4.855881	-2.954021	0.0004	I(1)*
INF	-2.271804	-2.971853	0.1875	I(0)	-4.154606	-2.986225	0.0037	I(1)*
FEX	1.556936	-2.951125	0.9991	I(0)	-4.652058	-2.954021	0.0007	I(1)*

Source: Authors' Computation from output

The ADF stationarity tests at both level and first differencing for all the variables employed in the study is summarised in the table above. The study included constant, intercept and trend term in these tests. The optimal lag length of each variable is chosen, using the Schwarz information criteria (SIC). From the table, none of the variable was stationary at level (I(0)). However, all variables became stationary after the first differencing (I(1)) as indicated by the values of the ADF Test Statistic when compared with that of the 5% critical value. The study further carried out a co-integration test, using the Johansen cointegration technique. This result is shown below.

Cointegration Test

Table 4: Johansen Cointegration Test

Sample (adjusted): 1988 2021
 Included observations: 34 after adjustments
 Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend
 Series: GCF INT MS INF FEX
 Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1
 Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)

Hypothesized No. of CE(s)	Eigenvalue	Trace Statistic	0.05 Critical Value	Prob.**
None *	0.700945	99.36076	69.81889	0.0000
At most 1 *	0.639692	59.52549	47.85613	0.0028
At most 2	0.378621	25.83923	29.79707	0.1336
At most 3	0.206015	10.13735	15.49471	0.2703
At most 4	0.073649	2.524569	3.841466	0.1121

Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level

* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level

**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values

Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)

Hypothesized No. of CE(s)	Eigenvalue	Max-Eigen Statistic	0.05 Critical Value	Prob.**
None *	0.700945	39.83526	33.87687	0.0087
At most 1 *	0.639692	33.68626	27.58434	0.0072
At most 2	0.378621	15.70189	21.13162	0.2427
At most 3	0.206015	7.612779	14.26460	0.4194
At most 4	0.073649	2.524569	3.841466	0.1121

Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level

* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level

**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values

From the result in Table 3, we reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration because at 5% level of significance, the trace test revealed two cointegrating equations among the variables employed with their Trace Statistic value greater than the 0.05 Critical Value. Furthermore, the result from the Max-Eigen value supports the long run relationship between the dependent and independent variables employed as the maximum eigenvalue showed two cointegrating equations at 5% level. With all variables in the model achieving stationarity after first difference(I(1)), then the error correction mechanism (ECM) is a possibility and it equally indicates that the long run static OLS

is not spurious and is thus meaningful since the short run dynamic model will at the end adjust to long run equilibrium after overcoming the short run drift. The Parsimonious ECM result is thus presented below

Error Correction Test

Table 5: The Parsimonious Error Correction Model

Dependent Variable: D(GCF)

Method: Least Squares

Sample (adjusted): 1988 2021

Included observations: 34 after adjustments

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-1.823217	4.659445	-3.891295	0.0388
D(GCF(-1))	0.493105	0.146885	3.357089	0.0024
D(INT(-1))	-0.043789	1.073374	-0.292888	0.7719
D(MS(-1))	0.396072	0.084641	4.679434	0.0001
D(INF(-1))	-0.028646	2.539702	0.095627	0.9245
D(FEX(-1))	-0.019274	1.832765	0.048338	0.9618
ECM(-1)	-0.380776	0.118780	-3.205726	0.0036
R-squared	0.838190	Mean dependent var	143009.8	
Adjusted R-squared	0.754695	S.D. dependent var	292892.6	
S.E. of regression	195450.7	Akaike info criterion	27.38984	
Sum squared resid	10.95887	Schwarz criterion	27.70728	
Log likelihood	-27.46243	Hannan-Quinn criter.	27.49664	
F-statistic	7.643473	Durbin-Watson stat	1.936240	
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000084			

The dynamics of the short-run adjustment process are shown in Table 5. The result was analysed using the error correction model and shows how quickly the variables respond to shock in their return to equilibrium. The coefficient estimate for the error term (ECM(-1)) given as -0.380776 is negative and statistically significant. This implies that any change in the dependent variable will be restored by the independent variables at an average rate of 38% in the following year. Thus, the statistically significant negative ECM term indicates that any external imbalances can be corrected through the feedback system. The ECM statistical significance demonstrates that a long-run relationship exists running from interest rate, money supply, inflation rate and foreign exchange rate to investment in Nigeria. The combined influence of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable is explained by the coefficient of determination R², which is given as

0.838190. Thus, about 84% variation in investment is explained by the explanatory variables while 16% is explained by variables not captured in the model. Also, while all variables appeared with expected sign, only money supply was significant. The F-statistic value is given as 7.643473 with a probability value of 0.000084. The probability value is less than 5% which is significant and indicates that the model is robust and reliable. The Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.936240 tends towards 2 and is greater than the coefficient of determination R² indicating that there is no serial correlation in the model utilized.

Table 6: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test

Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:

F-statistic	0.023871	Prob. F(2,24)	0.9764
Obs*R-squared	0.065514	Prob. Chi-Square(2)	0.9678

The result in Table 6 shows absence of autocorrelation since the F-statistics is not significant at 5% level of significance. Therefore, we shall accept the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the model.

Table 7: Heteroskedasticity Test

Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey

F-statistic	0.677257	Prob. F(6,26)	0.6691
Obs*R-squared	4.460449	Prob. Chi-Square(6)	0.6146
Scaled explained SS	11.30972	Prob. Chi-Square(6)	0.0793

The result in Table 7 is the heteroskedasticity test. From the test, we accept the null hypothesis as there is the absence of heteroskedasticity revealed by the F-statistics which is insignificant at 5% level of significance.

Stability Test




Figure I: CUSUM Stability Test

The test of stability in Figure 1 above showed that the CUSUM plots did not cross the 5 percent critical lines as shown by the two bound lines, therefore, one can safely conclude that the estimated parameters for the study are stable, have no structural instability during the period under review and useful for policy decision. In other words, with the explanatory variables, investment in Nigeria is stable. Thus, the selected model adopted in the study seems to be robust in estimating the relationship between interest rate and investment in Nigeria.

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study investigated the impact of interest rate on investment for the period 1986 - 2021 using the ECM estimation technique. Empirical result gotten showed that while all variables appeared with expected sign, only money supply was significant. The coefficient of interest rate, inflation rate and foreign exchange rate were rightly signed but statistically insignificant, showing that investment has not been encouraging in Nigeria. The outcomes from this paper offer macroeconomic policymakers an enhanced insight into the significance and importance of investment as it will boost the total output of the economy. Based on these, it was recommended that government should have a policy review on investment and pay attention to these macroeconomic variables that can stunt the investment rate in Nigeria and come up with policies

that can improve on lowering interest rate and exchange rate so as to attract investors while controlling inflation rate.

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United States National Interests and Her Foreign Policy: Implications for Africa

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Abstract

Throughout history, the United States of America's national interests have led to different diplomatic strategies for international and foreign relations. Yet, the optimum foreign policy choice is still a subject of discussion to date. However, it is critical to recall that U.S. foreign policy has an impact on people all over the world, making it a complicated and vital subject of study in addition to being gratifying to countries in Africa, Asia and the likes of others. Hence, there is a need to examine the U.S. national interest and her foreign policy for Africa. The study therefore adopted a desk study approach in unveiling a qualitative inquest into the U.S. national interest using narrative modes of data analysis. Findings from the study showed that the United States' strategy in Africa is based on its national interests which express the security of the American people, expansion of economic prosperity and opportunity, and realizing and defending the democratic principles at the heart of America. These efforts provide a road map for choosing a foreign policy direction that is both compatible with U.S. ideals and the ambitions and values of African peoples. However, Africa remains on the path of dependency in the accomplishments of U.S. national interest. Moreover, U.S. national interest serves as a creative way for the upliftment of American geopolitical objectives while enhancing its ability to compete on the international stage. Nevertheless, in order to create a balance of national interests across African states and the United States, it is recommended that African interests should be voiced among her sovereign nations. Equally, Africa national interest with developed countries should be tailored towards improved social services and other life-sustaining infrastructure which shall ultimately establish a future with less dependency.

Keywords: United States, National Interest, Foreign Policy, Relations

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, the United States (U.S.) have adopted different diplomatic strategies for foreign affairs (Schonberg, 2009; Ambrose & Douglas, 2011; Art, 2003; Mureithi, 2020 & Lakmeharan, 2020). As a result, deliberations over the ideal policy choice continue to dominate the compendium of literature. For instance, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States of America (USA) had emerged as the sole superpower in the globe, with no rival state holding a sizable enough military, economic, or technological potential to seriously threaten them (Moore, 2021; Signé, 2021). Likewise, United States (U.S.) foreign policy is influenced by a variety of elements, including economic power, military might, and political culture (Ambrose & Douglas, 2011). It is worth noting that U.S. foreign policy has an impact on individuals all over the world, making it a subject of importance. Thus, U.S. foreign policy offers guidelines for dealing with other countries and outlines how the country establishes fundamental norms for its organizations, institutions, and individuals (Mureithi, 2020; Lakmeharan, 2020).

U.S. foreign policy is guided primarily by the pursuit of international security, economic growth, and a better global society. American efforts to ensure the safety of its residents and national interests have evolved over time, but the country has never been free from threats (Art, 2003; Ambrose & Douglas, 2011; Mureithi, 2020; & Lakmeharan, 2020). The president and his closest advisors are the primary architects of U.S. foreign policy, while other players and actors (including Congress, the judiciary, parties, interest groups, and trade associations) are also important. In this context, the President plays a pivotal role in shaping and enforcing U.S. foreign policy through treaty negotiations, official receptions of visiting diplomats, the appointment of U.S. ambassadors overseas, and the signing of executive agreements.

Meanwhile, a new conflict over control of Africa had risen between the major international powers. Surprisingly, countries like China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States, among others adopted a variety of strategies to establish themselves in the African economy (Mügge, 2010; UNITAD, 2000). Parts of the strategies employed include the creation of private entities, state-run companies, lending and diplomacy for the facilitation of economic and political powers. Africa is thus further seen as an emerging market with high dividends, which is set to remain at the margins of global power competitors (OECD, 2018).

Consequently, contestations for control and dominance by superpower states had infiltrated Africa's dimension of international relations. Hence, the influence of strong states on the domestic and foreign policy of weaker states. It is worth noting that states such as Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa, Ethiopia and Algeria have attracted the attention of some of the great power states (Mügge, 2010; Brown,2012). Interestingly, the aforementioned five (5) states account for 60% of the African economy which is likely to remain unchanged by 2040 (OECD,2018). To date, most of the Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in Africa frequently originate from state-owned companies and international or bilateral organizations with goals that are beyond simple business considerations.

Nevertheless, the importance of U.S. foreign policy has grown since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The formulation of foreign policy has changed significantly in the twenty-first century in response to new threats and challenges as well as the growing influence of non-state actors, particularly in relation to the level of engagement and disengagement of the United States with the rest of the world as well as with global supranational organizations (OECD,2018; Mureithi, 2020 & Lakmeharan,2020). Since 9/11, American government officials' foreign policy decisions have had a significant impact on transatlantic ties and have even been referred to as revolutionary. Therefore, U.S. foreign policy and its relationships with nations, continents, and various industries are consequently fascinating and instructive research issues.

It is against this background that the study examined U.S. national interest and her foreign policy for Africa with a view to unveiling the nature and challenges of U.S. national Interests in Africa. The study, therefore, adopted a desk study approach in unveiling a qualitative inquest into the subject matter using a narrative mode of data analysis

2.0 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Relations between states had over the years illustrated the mirror of interdependence among states for the purpose of meeting individual states' needs and goals. In the contemporary world, every country has diplomatic, economic, trade, educational, cultural, and political ties with other countries. This means that every country has to keep its ties with other countries, international organizations, and non-governmental actors in international relations. Hence, foreign policy is the

way a country acts toward other countries and other groups outside of its borders (Diez, Bode & Costa, 2011; Mureithi, 2020; Lakmeharan, 2020). A country's foreign policy is however made to protect and advance its national goals in its relations with other countries, both individually and in groups. Foreign policy is all of a country's policies and conducts toward the world outside its borders. (Breuning, 2007). It is therefore the plan or strategy that the government chooses to use to spread its goals in the course of relations with other states (Hudson, 2008). Likewise, foreign policy encompassed all of the choices made on behalf of a government unit (usually a state) that have to do with achieving goals with the outside world.

Thus, foreign policy is a state's strategy or plan of action toward other states or international institutions to achieve national interests (Onyemekihian & Onyekwuma, 2022). Therefore, foreign policy is the development and application of ideas that determine a state's behaviour when negotiating with other nations to defend or advance its essential interests (Bennett, & Paletz, 1994). Akinboye and Ottoh (2005) describe foreign policy as a collection of concepts that define a state's goals in international relations. Hermann (1995) believed that foreign policy is a deliberate activity taken by a sovereign state's political leaders. So, Hermann defines foreign policy as government behaviour in the international arena. Thus, nations use it to influence other states and adapt to the global environment.

Meanwhile, decisions on foreign policy are not made in an "international" vacuum. Every choice made in terms of foreign policy has a significant domestic component. As a matter of fact, the internal and external (international) environments in which foreign policy is being developed are intricate, not only because of the inherent complexity of these systems themselves but also because of the complexities brought about by their interplay (Brighi & Hill, 2008). Hence, the process through which nations develop and implement their foreign policies is the focus of foreign policy decision-making (Blankshain,2019). Foreign policy decision making is therefore seen as a series of choices made by various individuals and groups utilizing various decision-making processes for international relations (Mureithi, 2020 &Lakmeharan,2020). Thus, decision-making includes rational and irrational choices by states, individuals, groups, or organizations and the factors believed to have the greatest influence on those decisions (for example, international factors, domestic political factors, interpersonal dynamics, etc.)

On the other hand, national interest serves as a framework for foreign policy as well as a direction for its formation (Blankshain, 2019). In this vein, the most effective foreign policy decisions are made once national interests have been stated and defined. Thus, leaders of nations have always been able to rationalize their acts and conduct as serving the national interest. Similarly, countries often justify their stances on international issues by claiming to be protecting their "national interests (Eminue, 2013). Henderson (2005) defines national interest as a state's shared goals when interacting with other states in the international system, whereas Hans Morgenthau (1973) defines it in terms of power. When it comes to making decisions, "statesmen behave and think in terms of interest defined as power," (Morgenthau, 1973).

As a result, national interest continues to be a key component in explaining the fundamental reasons behind nations' and statesmen's actions in a hostile international environment. Therefore, national interest reveals the goals of the state (Blankshain,2019). It may also be applied operationally, in relation to the actual policies and programmes implemented; and it can be employed polemically in political discourse to clarify, defend, or criticize actions taken. Above all, each nation's national interest governs its statesman. Hence, national interest refers to the beliefs or ideas that a country holds so dear that it would rather go to war than compromise (Ota & Ecoma, 2022). Thus, national interest as a concept in international relations, demonstrates the total objective that a state seeks to promote at any time (Onyemekihian & Onyekwuma,2022).

Accordingly, Morgenthau (1962; 2012) categorised national interests, namely: vital/core interests, and secondary/variable interests. Vital/core interests include protection of the territorial integrity of the state; protection of lives and properties of citizens; protection of national institutions and monuments; and security within the territory of a state, among others. Likewise, secondary/variable interest encompasses the protection of citizens abroad and ensuring diplomatic immunities for the diplomatic staff; and general or complementary interest. In modern international politics, core interests may also involve the security and defence of ally state(s) within an alliance system against threats or assaults from other nations. Thomas W. Robinson (1971) offers a six-fold categorization of the national interests that countries seek to protect. These include the primary Interests (interests that no nation can compromise on), the secondary Interests (vital to the state's existence, such as protecting citizens abroad and ensuring diplomatic immunity for diplomatic staff), the permanent Interests (relatively constant long-term interests of the state), the

variable Interests (those interests of a nation that are considered crucial for national good in a given set of circumstances), and the general Interests (interests that no nation can compromise on) and the specific interest. T.W. Robinson also mentions three international interests, namely similar interests, complimentary interests, and competing interests, in addition to these six kinds of national interest.

Theoretical Discourse: Dependency Theory

In the field of international political economy, there are different ways of thinking about global inequality and the North-South split. Dependency theory is one of these competing theories that explore relations between North-South split. It came about in the 1950s as a reaction to the modernization theory (Matunhu 2011; Herath 2008). Ral Prebisch, an Argentine economist and politician, came up with the idea for the first time in the late 1950s. In the 1960s and 1970s, dependence theory became more well-known. Prebisch came to the conclusion that the role of international organizations and the goals they have do not have the same effects on both developing and wealthy countries. So, dependence is seen as a historical event that has set up a certain structure for the global economy, helping some countries at the cost of others and making it harder for economies that are lower on the pole to grow (Herath, 2008). To put it in another way, reliance or dependence means that the economies of a group of countries rest on the growth and development of another economy, which can hurt their own economies. UNCTAD (2017) says that a state's economic growth can be explained by the political, economic, and cultural effects of the outside world on its national development plans. This is called "dependence."

Advocates of the dependence theory then argue against the alternative path to development proposed by modernization school thinkers, which involves active participation in international trade and integration into the global economic system (Kay, 2011). Dependency experts suggest that the way the international transaction system is set up gives core nations more power and makes it easier for them to take advantage of countries on the outskirts. The way the system is built makes it hard to get out of the web of linked connections. In the field of development studies, dependence refers to the reliance of one region or nation on another for its "survival" and prosperity. According to the dependency theorists, "the condition of underdevelopment is exactly the result of the

incorporation of the Third World economies into the capitalist world system, which is dominated by the West and North America" (Randall and Theobald 1998:120).

The Nature of U.S. National Interests and Africa Relations

With over a billion people and increasing political and economic clout, Africa is a region that the United States cannot afford to underinvest in (Cox & Stokes, 2008). Thus, America's national interests have been the only solid basis for her viable foreign policy in Africa (Cox & Stokes, 2008; Mandelbaum, 2007; Kennedy, 2008). It is therefore interesting to note that, America's foreign policy has remained puzzled since the fall of the Soviet Union. In this vein, the future of America is intertwined with the future of the entire world. As a result, international events often have a direct impact on America's wellbeing, prosperity, and security.

The interests of the United States can be broken down into five categories, as outlined by Spence and Wilke (2023): the prevention of a nuclear attack on American soil or on its military abroad; the maintenance and cooperation of U.S. allies in order to shape an international system in which we can thrive; the suppression of the rise of hostile powers on the United States' borders; and the maintenance of major global systems in trade, financial markets, energy supplies, and the environment. It is noteworthy to notice that the days when domestic policy could handle the economy are long gone since almost every major global issue has a local influence that is more evident and urgent than previously. The United States' exports are a major economic driver, responsible for one-third of the country's net new jobs (Abramovici, & Stoker, 2004).

Analysts have seen Africa's rising strategic significance to American interests due to worrisome developing issues in recent years (Gyimah-Boadi, Signé, & Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny; 2020). Among these worries are the rising significance of Africa's natural resources, especially its energy resources, as well as the growing concern about violent extremist activities and other potential risks provided by underdeveloped regions, such as maritime piracy and illegal trafficking. Africa's numerous humanitarian crises, military wars, and more general problems, such as the catastrophic impact of HIV/AIDS, continue to be of concern. Consequently, Congress authorized a feasibility study in 2006 for the creation of a military command for Africa to combine all operations and activities now taking place on the continent under a single commander.

On the other hand, the United States' long-standing objectives to promote democracy and good government, international commerce and investment, and development in Africa are still operational and functioning. Policymakers in the U.S. have over the years broadened their agenda for Africa in the wake of the Cold War. It is worth noting that the styles of the various administrations differ in their relations to Africa. Although each administration has its own style of foreign policy, the period from 1946 to 1976 was one of the US's minimal engagements with Africa. However, the 9/11 tragedy caused American policy toward Africa to be significantly impacted by concerns about national security, the struggle against global terrorism, and the fight against religious radicalization.

It is worth noting that U.S. foreign policy is driven by the seven national interests articulated in her strategic plans: these are national security, economic prosperity, American citizens and border security, law enforcement, democracy, humanitarian response and global issues (Gyimah-Boadi, Signé & Appiah-Nyamekye, 2020; Spence, Shannon & Sharon Wilke, 2023). It is in line with this that U.S. programmes in Africa include the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the President Malaria Initiative, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), Power Africa, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Young Africa Leaders Initiatives (YALI), among others which also includes the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the U.S.-African Leaders Summit, and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).

Likewise, Biden (2022) was of the opinion that the United States military is the most powerful fighting force on the planet. "If necessary, America will not hesitate to use force to protect her national interests. However, Americans will only do so as a last resort and only if the goals and objectives are clear and attainable in light of our principles". Another indication of the heightened U.S. attention on security issues in Africa is the Pentagon's announcement in 2007 that it would create a new United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) to bring its many projects on the continent together. Likewise, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) commenced operations on October 1, 2007, with a view of coordinating with other U.S. agencies: the United States Agencies for International Development (USAID) and other institutions of peace, stability and economic development. Presently, AFRICOM has thousands of personnel. According to

Biden (2022), the United States military contributes to the advancement and protection of key U.S. national interests by supporting diplomacy, combating aggression, deterring conflict, projecting power, and defending the American people and their economic interests.

Consequently, the United States also supported efforts by the African Union Mission to Somalia and Somali forces in 2022 to re-establish a Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu. In the same vein, following the 9/11 attack, the US deployed a sizeable contingent force named the Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti (Takeuchi, 2007). In addition, \$100 million in funding for counterterrorism initiatives for East Africa and the Horn of Africa was announced by President Bush. Also, Trump's administration saw the expansion of the US military presence in the Sahel, which was centred on a network of facilities.

Nearly all African products can enter the United States duty-free- thanks to the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), one of the outcomes of US foreign policy in the continent. By establishing eligibility requirements, AGOA has improved the business climate in many African nations while also assisting in the expansion and diversification of African exports to the United States. The Office of African Affairs of the United States Trade and Representative (USTR) develops and coordinates U.S. trade and investment strategy for the sub-Saharan African nations. As a developing market for American exports, Sub-Saharan Africa offers a wealth of prospects for American enterprises. According to the International Monetary Fund, sub-Saharan Africa is home to several of the fastest in the world economies.

Similarly, President Obama's three main objectives were the Young African Leaders Initiative, Trade Africa, and Power Africa. Trade Africa concentrates on the economic growth of East Africa, Power Africa works to upgrade the continent's electrical infrastructure, and the Young African Leaders Initiative places young Africans in internships at private businesses and government agencies. Additionally, the aforementioned offered the US the chance to develop a policy that is largely focused on the capacity development efforts of the African governments.

3.0 CHALLENGES OF U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST IN AFRICA

The United States is unquestionably in danger of losing ground to other foreign players in Africa. China is at the top of the list, but the EU, Turkey, Iran, Russia, India, and Japan are also becoming

more eager to deepen their connections with the continent. With the extra benefit of power, the US should be more committed than ever to developing relationships with Africa that are more economic in nature.

One of the major challenges is the continued and genuine nature of transnational threats from Africa. A disproportionate number of weak and failing nations exist on the continent as a result of its unequal political and economic development and conflict-ridden regions, endangering American interests both at home and abroad by providing a breeding ground for terrorism, criminal activity, and pandemics. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other organizations, for instance, are extending their influence throughout Africa. Since 2010, several African nations have experienced civil conflicts and crises, reversing the trend of Africa's stability from the prior decade. While long-running wars continue to afflict the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, and Somalia, more recent crises have developed in the Lake Chad Basin, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Burundi, and South Sudan among others. Transnational violence and dangers including terrorism, human trafficking, and maritime piracy have flourished in circumstances where there were porous borders, weak institutions, and corruption.

Insecurity has made it difficult for aid and assistance to reach vulnerable areas in both South Sudan and Nigeria. In a 2020 report to Congress, U.S. Army General Stephen J. Townsend stated that "both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State networks are working together to exploit ungoverned regions, disenfranchised people through porous borders and endanger the security and stability of our African partners." The Sahel area serves as a great illustration of this persistent problem, with nations like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger seeing rising levels of violence as a result of the spread of several Islamist terrorist organizations. In this vein, throughout the past years, violent assaults on civilians have been carried out by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP), a breakaway organization of Boko Haram).

Notwithstanding Africa's enormous economic potential, the United States has fallen behind established and new competitors, particularly China. China and the U.S. compete for dominance of the global economy, particularly in emerging nations. More and more Democrats and

Republicans in Congress are concerned about China's expanding influence in Africa. According to many analysts, Chinese investment in Africa is a strategy for them to get access to the continent's wealth of important raw resources, such as the rare-earth minerals needed for the majority of technological devices, as well as to broaden their geopolitical influence globally.

Moreover, in the foreign policy of the U.S. during President Trump's administration, the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development saw their funding cut by 28 percent in President Trump's 2018 proposed budget to Congress. Also, the Emergency Refugee and Migration Support Fund was put on hold by the administration. Unlike his predecessors, Trump preferred using alternative power structures such as budget cutbacks, the discontinuation of military support programs, and economic penalties such as exclusion from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).

4.0 IMPLICATIONS OF US FOREIGN POLICY FOR AFRICA

Egypt, Kenya, and South Sudan are the top three recipients of U.S. aid in Africa (Kwemo, 2017). The United States has a long history of providing international aid to African countries. Certainly, some U.S. development assistance programs have resulted in long-lasting effects in programs that boost local economies and lessen reliance on foreign aid, especially those that focus on people and nations like the Africa Development Foundation (ADF) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Despite these successes, many observers argue that foreign aid has sometimes promoted paternalism — as opposed to cooperation — by the United States and other nations and contributed to a culture of dependency in Africa. Therefore, African governments should take this opportunity to scale up policies that support industrial revolutions in order to build wealth in Africa through particular goals like job creation, regional integration, and economic participation.

Similarly, since the signing of the United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement (FTA), average Morocco exports to America have climbed by more than thrice, from \$482 million in 2005 to \$2.1 billion in 2015. \$977 million worth of commodities were exported from Morocco in 2013, an increase of 119% from 2005. As of 2022, Morocco's export to the U.S. has grown to \$1400 million (Trading Economic Data, 2023) Therefore, Morocco's ambitious economic reforms made

the country the top location for foreign direct investment in Africa and positioned the monarchy as a conduit for American businesses to African and European markets.

A number of U.S. programmes have had a significant impact among them are the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the President's Malaria Initiative, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), Power Africa, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI). These efforts provide a road map for choosing a foreign policy direction that is both compatible with US ideals and the ambitions and values of African peoples. America has forged close ties with the people of the continent and, via them, with its governments. These policies are creative methods to uphold American geopolitical objectives while enhancing its ability to compete on the international stage.

It is interesting to note that overall, American policies and actions toward Africa have been successful, advantageous, and positive. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has boosted trade between the US and Africa while simultaneously creating thousands of jobs in both nations. African Growth and Opportunity Act grants eligible sub-Saharan African countries duty-free access to the US market for more than 1,800 commodities. This is in addition to the almost 5,000 more goods that qualify for duty-free access under the Generalized System of Preferences program. 36 African countries now qualify for AGOA incentives. Additionally, it has improved ties between the US and sub-Saharan Africa in terms of business and investment. Additionally, AGOA has resulted in the creation of some 300,000 jobs, mostly in the apparel sector. As of 2021, the US imported non-oil worth around US\$4.8 billion, which is a sizable chunk of the agreement's value in terms of job creation. However, the industrial sectors of Sub-Saharan African countries have not entirely benefited from AGOA, and they remain undeveloped. The majority of Africa's exports under AGOA are still made up of clothing-related products. Additionally, a large number of AGOA grantees have been foreign businesses attempting to penetrate the US market via a front firm in Africa. Regular high-level summits between the leaders of the United States and Africa would improve U.S.-African ties and develop the view of Africa's relationship with the United States as part of the operational framework. The high-level gathering will greatly advance cooperation between the US and Africa.

The President's Malaria Initiative and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) have both helped about 500 million people and dramatically lowered the number of malaria cases. Similarly, Feed the Future has averted starvation for 5.2 million people by raising agricultural productivity. Since 2014, Power Africa has connected more than 12 million homes and businesses to electricity, and the program is on track to reach its goal of 60 million connections by 2030. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) further provides specialized, country-specific support for fostering economic growth and eradicating poverty. The Young African Leaders Initiative (also known as YALI), which has assisted in connecting them through a vast network in around 50 different countries, has educated almost 4,000 of the next generation of African leaders. YALI anticipates the rise of African youth and fosters links between these future leaders and the US. Congress and the administration should continue to support cultural and educational exchanges between youngsters in Africa and the United States in order to raise young Americans' knowledge of the continent. Every summer, we have the privilege of welcoming some of the fellows to Brookings. They have astounded me and my coworkers with their excitement, creativity, and commitment to the cause of the continent as a whole.

In addition, there are current economic issues that are more urgent. The vast quantities of rare earth elements discovered in Africa are used to build everything from mobile phones and LED displays to energy infrastructure and defence equipment. More than two thirds of the cobalt used in lithium-ion batteries may be found in the Congo. More than 35% of the world's bauxite, which is necessary for making aluminium, is found in Guinea. However, China now has a near monopoly on the production of rare earth elements, putting the American economy and security at peril. If the United States wishes to have access to the raw materials required to build the future, it must take this action in Africa.

Politically, African nations have a surprisingly significant yet imperceptible impact on a range of global issues. A large voting group that may direct funding toward initiatives that are in accordance with their objectives is provided by the roughly 28 percent of African countries that make up the United Nations membership. Africa's voice in Security Council decisions, particularly those that don't directly touch the continent, is strengthened because of the collaboration of the A3. A rotating group of three African Security Council members is known as the A3. Additionally, the execution

of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement will determine which international powers have the most access to the continent's markets, which combined amount to more than \$3.4 trillion. So far, China seems to be the biggest winner.

A successful Africa strategy would result in a huge increase in economic investment that is advantageous to both parties throughout the continent. The African Growth and Opportunity Act and Prosper Africa both provide a strong foundation, but neither is sufficiently ambitious or successful. Since 2019, the U.S. has invested \$22 billion in 80 companies in 30 African countries through Prosper Africa. China entered into deals with 623 businesses in 2020, investing \$735 billion in all. Moreover, the African Growth and Opportunity Act only requires 18 of the qualified countries to establish utilization strategies, and the bulk of these are simplistic. A strategy must be politically and economically viable if the United States is willing to dramatically enhance its trade with Africa.

More cooperation between America and Africa was acknowledged with the establishment of AFRICOM as a result of their common geopolitical and military goals. There has been some goal creep for both initiatives. America must be proactive in providing both economic and military help to Africa in order to stop it from acting as a haven or breeding ground for the next wave of terrorism. In light of America's withdrawal from Afghanistan, we must maintain a high degree of alertness for international terrorists.

5.0 CONCLUSION

America's national interests have led to different approaches of international and foreign relations especially with Africa. It is worth noting that U.S. foreign policy is driven by national interests as articulated in her strategic plans: these are national security, economic prosperity, American citizens and border security, law enforcement, democracy, humanitarian response and global issues. The United States' (US) long-standing objectives to promote commerce, investment, development, and conditions conducive to peace and security in Africa remain functioning in her foreign policy implementations.

U.S. has demonstrated outstanding bipartisan leadership on African challenges through foreign policies such as the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the President's Malaria Initiative,

and the African Growth and Opportunity Act among others, however, Africa remains on the path of dependency. The US's national interest in Africa faces threats from foreign players like China, Turkey, Iran, Russia, India, and Japan. The continent's unequal political and economic development and conflict-ridden regions endangering American interests, including terrorism, criminal activity, and pandemics. Despite these challenges, US policies and actions towards Africa have been successful and beneficial, impacting the region's future. In order to create a balance of interest across African states and the United States, it is recommended that African interests should be voiced among her sovereign nations. Africa's national interest with developed countries should be tailored towards improved social services and other life-sustaining infrastructure which shall ultimately establish a future with less dependency.

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Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Rural Communities: A Study Tafawa Balewa Local Government, Bauchi State Nigeria

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Abstract

The phenomenon of conflict in rural communities was examined from an ethno-religious perspective in Tafawa Balewa Local Government, Bauchi State in Nigeria. To achieve this, the following research questions: i. What are the causes of ethno-religious conflict in Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi State? And ii. How do ethno-religious conflicts undermine the peace and harmony of Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi State? Using a survey design, questionnaires were distributed to a sample size of 384 from the 2 Districts (Bula and Lere) with 11 Wards. To achieve this, the following research questions: i. What are the causes of ethno-religious conflict in Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi State? And ii. How do ethno-religious conflicts undermine the peace and harmony of Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi State? On the first research question, the study finds that causes of ethno-religious conflict in Tafawa Balewa Local Government include, ridiculing of a Christian or Moslem Prophet in the media (48.7%), ethno-political power struggle (27.4%), and socio-economic factor (46.2%). Investigations based on the second research question revealed that consequences of ethno-religious conflict in the study area are: i. disruption of socio-economic life such as commercial activities, marriages, sport and so on; ii. Targeting of people from other groups; and iii. Displacement of large numbers of people from their homes and livelihoods. It was thus concluded that ethno-religious conflicts have indeed undermined the peace and harmony of the Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area. Recommended include that Followers of Christianity, Islam and other religions should desist from ridiculing prophets of other religions and embrace tolerance and forgiveness. It was also recommended that ethnicity and religion should not be used by politicians as means for their struggle for political power.

Keywords: Ethno-Religious Conflict, Peace, Rural Communities

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Conflicts are phenomena that human societies have experienced from time immemorial. All over the world, the quest for sustainable peace and security has continued in the minds of all

stakeholders including international organizations, government and non-governmental organizations as a very disturbing development. In more than 60 years since Nigeria's independence, the country has been plagued by incessant conflict in virtually all of its geo-political zones. (Agu, Amujuri & Okwo 2012). Conflicts are unavoidable aspects of human interaction. They arise from the pursuit of divergent interests, goals and aspirations by individuals or groups. Changes in the socio-political environment provide fertile grounds for conflicts involving individuals and groups probably interested in using these conflicts to achieve their selfish goals. Therefore, the negative exploitation of ethnicity and religion results in ethnic-religious conflicts. These often arise out of mistrust, hostility and polarization of relations among groups and at times in a competitive setting.

In view of incidences of religious conflicts, the northern region has become the hotbed of religious extremism (Olayode, 2007) and due to this, many people have had to scamper for safety, turning many into refugees in their own country. The increase in Islamic Fundamentalism and the emergence of groups such as the Jamā'at Ahlis-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād, or *Boko Haram* and Islamic State's West African Province or ISWAP which detests Western education and Christianity, has exacerbated the conflicts already in existence. Thus, the religious-political history of Nigeria is characterized by an unprecedented upsurge in ethnic and religious conflicts leading to the loss of lives and destruction of properties worth billions of Naira.

Nigeria's multi-ethnic and multi-religious diversities coincide with the North and South divide, with Muslims and Christians as the majority in each part respectively. These have created geo-religious identities; a situation where religion and its concomitant tension generation enthroned a threat to the security of the country. According to Jones (2000), the country has three dominant religions; African traditional religion, Islam and Christianity. The Christians are the majority in at least seven out of the nineteen northern states while north-western and north-eastern regions have the largest concentration of Muslims. The North-central also known as the Middle Belt, is considerably mixed. Indigenous Muslims are in large numbers in South-Western States and are in a small minority in the South-South while practitioners of African traditional religion can be found all over the country. Some are syncretistic, combining Islam or Christianity with traditional religion. This made Khalid (2004) posit that a multi-ethnic and multilingual society like Nigeria

has impacted negatively on the nation by creating tension and unrest. Stemming from this, Kreitner and Kinicky (2016) assert:

...religion is not a concept which is intrinsically bad. It is rather an integrating force. Religion as a disintegrating force is attributable to the organizers, the organization, the preachers, the preaching, the propagators and the propagation of religions (Kreitner and Kinicky, 2016).

Mayer (2002) similarly noted that religion has been a factor in national development while it has been manipulated to wrought havoc on the Nigerian populace. He added that between the years 1980-1990, Nigeria recorded eight (8) major religious disturbances with heavy human and material losses; many monuments of high and historical value were destroyed. According to (Olayode, 2007) while trying to explain the level of trauma the victims of ethno-religious conflict sustain, they understand that apart from the monumental losses that can be qualified, the crisis further deepened the division that hitherto existed among the various religious adherents. For example, the psychological trauma and the fear among the victims of religious disturbances is a recurring decimal. Such persons never live to neither forgive nor forget the persons involved in the circumstances of such carnages.

The implications of the ethnic-religious religious conflicts have affected the foundations of democratic principles in the country. Sule (2015: 63) avers that: “one of the claims for the enthronement of democracy as well as democratic consolidation in Nigeria lies in the fact that as a centripetal force, democracy is the only institutional arrangement that can guarantee the peaceful resolution or management of ethnic and religious conflicts”. The incessant conflicts in Tafawa Balewa Bauchi state therefore stand in direct contrast to the democratic principles which are supposed to galvanize the pillars of peace in the state as a whole. This has in no small way affected the social, political and economic lives of the people. It is against this background that this study is carried out to assess ethnic-religious conflict and dialogue processes in Tafawa Balewa local government of Bauchi State in the period under review.

While the Sayawa are largely Christians, the non-Sayawa remained Muslims. Ethnicity and religious sentiments have therefore led to mistrust, hostility and multiple confrontations between the two groups. The Sayawa and non-Sayawa have continued to attract sympathy from other

members of different communities who are equally divided along ethnic and religious sentiments. The conflict is so prevalent that the district head of Tafawa Balewa Town Alhaji Sulaiman Muhammad, son of the former district head Alhaji Muhammadu Lulu, is currently residing in Bauchi Town due to the incessant ethno-religious conflict and several attempts to assassinate him. It is also in his house district head of Tafawa Balewa Hakimi Ladan Lere was slaughtered in 1977. The palace was relocated to Zwall village in Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area. It therefore becomes cogent to investigate this phenomenon from Tafawa Balewa Local Government of Bauchi State. This was carried out using the underlisted research questions.

1. What are the causes of ethno-religious conflict in Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi State?
2. How do ethno-religious conflicts undermine the peace and harmony of Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi State?

2.0 CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

Defining Conflict

Robbins and Judge (2019) defined conflict as “a process that begins where one party perceives that another party has negatively affected, or is about to negatively affect something that the first party cares about”. This is a very apt definition, emphasizing that conflict is about perceptions, not necessarily real hard facts. It points to the emotional nature of conflict, by referring to a word like “care”, it states that more than one party is involved and that there may be a future component attached to it. Darling and Walker (2017) linked this idea to the organization by stating that, even when conflict is a natural phenomenon in social relations (as natural as harmony), it can nevertheless be managed within organizations. They add that conflict may have both positive as well as negative consequences within the organization. The submission above blends with the fact that, conflict can never be totally eliminated within organizations but can be efficiently managed in order to move organizations to greater height and performance level.

Religion

Kukah (2013) opined that religion has evoked man since time immemorial to attempt to work out their relationship with supernatural beings or powers often regarded as god(s). Absolute to this

regard is the interaction between religion and the society within which it functions. Subsequently, this has changed due to the divisions that existed among various human groups, and as such religion has become a major influence in politics and crises, thereby playing a significant role in the entire societal process, especially in religious societies. For the Romans, religion meant being tied back, staying connected with ancestral customs and beliefs, a kind of loyalty; among Christians, the word would originally stand for being tied back, connected to God. On the other hand, religion in Arabic and Islamic literature is referred to as ‘din’. In its literal meaning, din means obedient, being in debt, restoring one’s rights, adopting as a habit, forcing, calling to account, managing, rewarding or punishing, serving, lending and so on. Muslim theologians have described din as the set of principles revealed by God through prophets for mankind to follow by free will in order to acquire happiness in both worlds (here and the hereafter). It can also be seen as a community of persons united by faith, united by a search for “the divine”, and defined by its manner of confronting the problems of human existence.

It is imperative to mention that, the definitions and perceptions accorded to religion by people have not only differed from one historical epoch to another but have also varied from one conventional wisdom to another.

Conflict Transformation Theory

Conflict transformation theory assumes that systemic change is needed in order to alter the social structure, conflict parties and institutions within which conflicts are embedded Miall (2007). By so doing, attention is focused towards sustainable peace systems, with a holistic understanding of changes such as beliefs, behaviours and relationships Diamond (1997). The proponent of conflict transformation theory pays attention to far reaching transformation of society with emphasis on rebuilding unjust social relationships. According to conflict transformation theory. Security and stability go beyond a mere emphasis on security approaches to peacebuilding. Thus, a far-reaching transformation of society is needed to the extent that, more social justice is needed to reduce criminality and reconciliation has to be achieved so that people are more willing to work together to ensure peace and security of their communities.

On the other hand, it must be pointed out that analyzing and critiquing the current peace building initiatives by both state and non-state actors in southern Bauchi State and its critical role in

enhancing community, underlines the hybridization of the conflict transformation theory. To justify the imperative of this Vaymen (1991) proposed that conflicts can be transformed through four types of change: actor transformation (the emergence of new actors or change in existing actors); issue transformation a change in the way in which the parties frame their interests and goals); rule transformation (a change in the norms affecting the actors' institutions); and structural transformation (which involves a change in the relationship between the parties, new power structure, or change in the existing social structure).

3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research design used for this study is the survey design. This technique is used because of its efficiency for social science research in view of the wealth of data and interpretation it can provide. The area of this study is the Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi State. It is situated in the rocky southern part of Bauchi state. It has an area of 2, 770.00 square kilometres and a population of about 221,310 (NPC, 2016). It then comprises of two districts, namely Lere with headquarters at Tafawa Balewa and Bula with headquarters at Bununu.

Tafawa Balewa local government area comprises the various ethnic groups Fulani, Hausawa, Jarawa, Sayawa, Dugurawa, Sigidawa, Zaksawa, Banshawa, Barawa, Angasawa, Tapshinawa, Boyawa, Warawa, Badawa, Burmawa, Bankalawa, Kanuri, Rafawa, Bijimawa, Lerawa, Folci, Kaduk, Kantanawa. This setting is found in the village area. Stratified random sampling technique was adopted to determine the sample size. This according to Wimmer and Dominick (2017) is useful in research that projects a particular characteristic segment or stratum of the population, such as the classifications according to age, sex, education, level of income and so on.

A sample size of 384 was used from the total population, based on the principles of Research Advisors (2006) sample size table. Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area has 2 Districts, Bula and Lere with 11 Wards. This research is interested in critically analyzing ethno-religious conflicts and dialogue in Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Southern Bauchi state of Nigeria.

According to the 2006 National Population Commission (2016), In the National Bureau of Statistics web, the population of Tafawa Balewa local government is estimated as 40,948 by 2022.

Taro Yamane’s formula was used to determine that n = 384. The Taro Yamane formula is given

as;
$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

The study thus sampled 384 respondents according to the distribution below:

Table 1: Distribution of the respondent according to Locality

S/N	Identity of Respondent	Number of Respondent
1	Sayawa tribe	70
2	Non-Sayawa tribes	70
3	Muslim Religious Leaders and Followers	70
4	Christian Religious Leaders and Followers	70
5	Victims of conflicts	55
6	Scholars of Social Sciences	10
7	Some Traditional leaders	19
8	Some Media Reporters	10
9	Some Security Agencies	10
10	Total	384

Source: Field Survey, 2023

The above table shows the distribution of the sample population among the various ethnic and religious groups. For each of the Sayawa tribes, non-Sayawa tribes, Muslim religious leaders and followers, Christian religious leaders and followers and Victims of conflicts. 70 respondents will be selected to form part of the 384 respondents. While 19 traditional leaders, 10 media reporters and 10 security agencies will also form part of the respondent.

4.0 DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSES

The data collected from the respondents were used to answer the research questions raised in this study. They are presented in the following sub-heads below:

Research Question One: What are the causes of Ethno-Religious Conflict in Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi State?

Table 2: Factor that cause Ethno-Religious Conflict in Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi State

S/No	Factors	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Decision
1	Ridiculing of a Christian or Moslem Prophet in the media causes religious tension and conflicts.	384	3.96	1.32	Significant
2	Communal identity contributes to ethno-religion conflict	384	3.76	1.16	Significant
3	Political power struggle cause religion conflict	384	3.74	1.21	Significant
4	Socio-economic factor has contributed to the ethno-religion conflict	384	3.94	1.29	Significant

Source: Field report, 2023


The table below shows that the respondents in the study area agreed with the items of the instrument on the causes of ethno-religious conflict in Tafawa Balewa Local Government of Bauchi State. This is because their mean responses were above 3.0 mean target set for this study. This means that ridiculing a Christian or Moslem prophet in the media causes religious tension and conflicts indicated by the mean of 3.96 and SD 1.32; Communal identity contributes to ethno-religion conflict with a mean of 3.76 and SD 1.16; political power struggle causes religious conflict with the means of 3.74 and SD 1.21; and Socio-economic factor has contributed to the ethno-religion conflict with the mean of 3.94 and SD 1.29 respectively. Therefore, the findings signified that ridiculing of the prophet and socio-economic factors are the major causes of ethno-religious conflict whereas the communal identity and ethno-political power are also signposted as the subsequences causes of ethno-religious conflict in Tafawa Balewa LGA of Bauchi state.

Table 3: Ridiculing of a Christian or Moslem Prophet in the media causes religious tension and conflicts.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	34	9.2	9.2	9.2
	Disagree	32	8.0	8.0	17.2
	Undecided	36	9.6	9.6	26.7
	Agree	94	24.6	24.6	51.3
	Strongly Agree	188	48.7	48.7	100.0
	Total	384	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

Chart 1: Ridiculing of a Christian or Moslem Prophet in the media causes religious tension and conflicts




The chart above shows that the ridiculing of a Christian or Moslem Prophet in the media causes religious tension and conflicts. From the study, it is evident that out of the total respondents, 48.67% respondent strongly agree that ridiculing a Christian or Moslem prophet in the media significantly causes religious tension and conflicts, while 24.6% of the respondents agree, 9.56% could not agree or disagree and choose to remain neutral, while 7.96% disagreed on the ridiculing of a Christian or Moslem prophet in the media as a cause of religious tension and conflicts, 9.20% of the total respondents strongly disagreed on the ridiculing of a Christian or Moslem prophet in the media is a cause of religious tension and conflicts were the least.

Table 4: Ethno-political power struggle as a cause of religion conflict

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	32	9.2	9.2	9.2
	Disagree	29	8.0	8.0	17.2
	Undecided	34	9.6	9.6	26.7
	Agree	188	45.8	45.8	72.6
	Strongly Agree	101	27.4	27.4	100.0
	Total	384	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field report, 2023.

Chart 2 Ethno-religious power struggle as a cause of conflict




The table and chart above show political power struggles cause religious conflict as part of the causes. The findings signified that out of the total respondents 45.84% of respondent agree that ethno-political power struggles cause religious conflict, then 27.43% of the respondent were strongly agreed, 9.56% could not agree or disagree and chose to remain neutral, although 7.96% the respondents disagreed, but 9.20% of the total respondents strongly disagreed on the statement which was the least. Therefore, political power struggle caused religious conflict in Tafawa Balewa LGA of Bauchi State.

Table 4: Socio-economic factors as drivers of the ethno-religion conflict

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	27	8.1	8.1	8.1
	Disagree	33	9.9	9.9	18.1
	Undecided	26	7.6	7.6	25.7
	Agree	110	28.1	28.1	53.8
	Strongly Agree	188	46.2	46.2	100.0
	Total	384	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

Chart 4: Socio-economic factor as drivers of the ethno-religion conflict



The table and chart above show socio-economic factor has contributed to the ethno-religion conflict. The findings indicated that 46.19% out of the total respondents strongly agree that socio-economic factor has a significant contribution to the ethno-religion conflict in the study area, followed by 28.14% agreed, 7.61% could not agree or disagree and chose to remain neutral. However, those against the statement were least like 9.91% of the respondents disagreed, and 8.14% of the total respondents strongly disagreed. Therefore, socio-economic is part of the contributing factors to the ethno-religion conflict in Tafawa Balewa LGA of Bauchi State.

Research Question Two: How does ethno-religious conflict undermine peace and harmony of Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi State?

Table 5: Ethno-Religious conflict and peace and harmony of Tafawa Balewa Local Government

Question	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Decision
Social activities such as commercial activities, marriages, sport and so on are hampered during ethnic or religious conflicts.	384	4.09	0.77	Significant
People from other groups are targeted during and after ethnic or religious conflicts.	384	3.59	1.20	Significant
Large number of people are forced to abandon their houses during ethnic or religious conflicts	384	4.32	1.03	Significant

Source: Field Survey, 2023.


Table 5 above shows that the respondents in the study area agreed with the items in the instrument on how ethno-religious conflict undermines peace and harmony in Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi State. This is because their mean responses were more than the 3.0 benchmark for this study. The findings reveal that almost all respondents agreed with all the stated questions with the mean range from 3.59 to 4.32. Therefore, the outcomes signified that ethno-religious conflict mostly affected the peoples of Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area by forcing them to abandon their houses, and properties and migrate to a safer society. Further, minority people were intimidated and restricted from movement, and social activities such as marriage events, and sports were affected during the conflict.

Table 6: Social activities (such as commercial activities, marriages, sport) as triggers for ethnic or religious conflicts

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	9	1.6	1.6	1.6
	Disagree	21	3.7	3.7	5.3
	Undecided	29	5.1	5.1	10.4
	Agree	235	63.4	63.4	73.8
	Strongly Agree	90	26.2	26.2	100.0
	Total	384	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

Chart 3: Social activities (such as marriages, sport) as triggers for ethnic or religious conflicts




The table and chart above show social activities such as commercial activities, marriage and sport as triggers for ethnic or religious conflicts. The findings indicated that 61.36% out of the total respondents agree that social activities in the study area were hampered during ethno-religion conflict, follow by those strongly agree with 26.19%, and 5.13% could not agree or disagree and choose to stay neutral. However, those against the statement were the least only 3.72% of the respondents disagree, and 1.59% of the total respondents strongly disagreed. Therefore, socio activities like marriages event, sport etc. Where hindered during ethno-religion conflict in Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi State.

Table 7: People from other groups are targeted during and after ethnic or religious conflicts

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	45	11.9	11.9	11.9
	Disagree	32	6.2	6.2	18.1
	Undecided	43	11.3	11.3	29.4
	Agree	194	52.7	52.7	82.1
	Strongly Agree	70	17.9	17.9	100.0
Total		384	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field report, 2023

Chart 4




The table and chart above show people are intimidated when they are a minority during and after ethnic or religious conflicts. The findings indicated that 52.74% out of the total respondents agreed that minority people were intimidated during and after ethnic or religious conflict, followed by strongly agree 17.88%, and 11.33% could not agree or disagree and chose to stay neutral. However, those who strongly disagree with the statement were the least with 11.86% and then disagree with 6.19% of the total respondents.

Large number of people are forced to abandon their houses during ethnic or religious conflicts					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	17	3.9	3.9	3.9
	Disagree	20	4.8	4.8	8.7
	Undecided	17	3.9	3.9	12.6
	Agree	105	29.9	29.9	42.5
	Strongly Agree	225	57.5	57.5	100.0
	Total	384	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field report, 2023

Chart 14



The table and chart above show a large number of people are forced to abandon their houses during ethnic or religious conflicts. The findings indicated that 57.52% out of the total respondents strongly agree that a large number of people were forced to abandon their houses and properties during ethnic or religious conflicts, followed by agree with 29.91%, while 3.89% could not agree or disagree and choose to stay neutral. However, those who disagree to the statement were the least with 4.74% and then strongly disagree with 3.89% of the total respondents.

Discussion on Findings

The findings of this study indicate that ridiculing of the prophet and socio-economic factors are major drivers of the ethno-religious conflicts the major causes of ethno-religious conflict in Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi state. These findings corroborate those of Agbibo (2013); Philip, (2014); and Omaka (2014) who documented that ethno-political power, communal identity and socio-economic are the causes of ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria. The other causes of the conflict were exposed when in 1991 the position of Tafawa Balewa became a matter of dispute in the proposed Sayawa chiefdom. It is therefore obvious that the other cause has been in existence amongst both Sayawa and Non- Sayawa ethnic nationalities prior to the 1991 conflict. The claim by both groups to be the original inhabitants of Tafawa Balewa and indeed their ancestral homeland has created a deep-seated suspicion which has resulted in an outbreak of several conflicts between the Sayawa and Non Sayawa ethnic nationalities in Tafawa Balewa area. As earlier noted, both groups have provided historical accounts to foster their claim.

Similarly, it was found that the factors listed below are the consequences of consequences causes of ethno-religious conflicts in the study area. The outcomes signified that ethno-religious conflict mostly affected the peoples of Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area by forcing them to abandon their houses, and properties and migrate to a safer society. Also, the study reveals that minority people were intimidated and restricted from movement, and social activities such as marriage events, and sports were affected during the conflict. This finding is in line with the findings of Aliyu (2013).

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

From the foregoing, it can be seen that ethno-religious conflicts have indeed undermined the peace and harmony of Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi State. This has impacted negatively on socio-economic activities in the state and has resulted in suspicious as members of the different ethnic group and religion are antagonistic towards each other. social activities such as marriages, sports and so on are hampered during ethnic or religious conflicts.

In order to mitigate the above, the under-listed are recommended

1. It is obvious that one of the major causes of religious conflict in the study area is the ridiculing of prophets from both religions. Followers of Christianity, Islam and other religions should desist from ridiculing prophets of other religions.
2. The importance of tolerance and forgiveness should be reiterated to adherents of all religions.
3. Leaders of religious bodies and the different ethnic groups leaders should help to foster mutual respect, using a dialogue on inter-personal bases and in social processes.
3. Ethnicity and religion are often appropriated as mobilization tools by the political class in their struggle for political power and economic resources.
4. Inter-ethnic and Interfaith dialogue is therefore not only a necessity but also imperative if Nigeria has to realize her full potential on the African continent.
5. Peaceful agreement among various Ethnos Religious groups should be promoted. This can be done through a committee of peace and harmony should be set up to comprise delegations from across various ethnic and religious groups in the area.

6. Open air religious preaching that is capable of inciting aggressive tendencies from – Islam and Christianity, should be banned.
7. Government should ensure the implementation of various recommendations of committee reports.

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From Restiveness to Organised Crimes: Perspectives on Youth Violence and Peace Building in the Northeast, Nigeria

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Abstract

The spate of insecurity in northeast Nigeria has evolved through different phases in the last two decades. Most of these crises have metamorphosed from common socio-economic grievances, social protests and riots into more chronic and extreme violence that has claimed several lives and properties. At the centre of these violent attacks are the youths, who constitute the most active segments of the society. This paper investigated the extent to which the youth were involved in extreme violence while stressing the factors that aided their vulnerability to violence in the northeast. The paper utilized both primary and secondary systems of data collection. Primary data were collected from 20 in-depth interviews with residents, youths and vigilantes and 10 key informant interviews were conducted with security operatives, traditional rulers and heads of vigilantes, purposively selected from Yobe, Borno and Adamawa States. Secondary data were sourced from books, journals, special reports, magazines and online materials. The study revealed that youths participated in the orgy of violence, which started as local riots, rallies, cultism, and banditry and later escalated into a full-blown insurgency. It also showed that the vulnerability of these youth was exploited by local politicians, fanatical religious leaders and extremist sects such as Boko Haram, ISWAP and Ansaru. The paper further showed that some of the youth were actively involved in the local internal security management and peacebuilding efforts by providing security surveillance, protection of schools, supporting local vigilantes (civilian Joint Task Force, CJTF), providing security tips and early warning information to regular forces and offering strategic support to the Operation Safe Corridor. The paper concluded that the youth were at various level implicated in the provocation and escalation of insurgency; and at the same, a segment of the youth actively participated in peacebuilding in the northeast. The paper, therefore, recommended a robust programme of demobilization, disarmament, rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-Boko Haram members to sustain the peacebuilding activities in the region.

Keywords: Organised Crime, De-radicalization, Youth, Peace-Building.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Over the years, successive Nigerian governments and international development organizations have recognized the linkages between youth unemployment and their participation in violence emphasising youth empowerment as an intervention imperative (Granville, 2020; The Nigeria

National Security Strategy, 2015) with the Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (2017) having identified unemployment as a major push factor that created a conducive environment for violent extremism. The three States of the northeastern part of the country comprising Adamawa, Borno and Yobe are being affected by chronic security challenges ranging from armed banditry and the activities of Islamist insurgent groups to socio-political violence. In recent times, the most prominent of these challenges is the activities of the Islamist insurgent groups. The devastating impact of these insurgent groups, which included the sacking of civil authority in over 27 local government areas (LGAs) – 24 of these in Borno State - led the federal government to on May 14, 2013, declare a State of Emergency on Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. The military deployment and operations that followed this declaration are still ongoing. Other sources of violence in the three states include conflict over natural resources between pastoralists and farmers. In addition, the states have significant incidences of rural banditry (especially cattle theft) and other forms of violent crimes (Agbibo, 2013)

Consequently, crime poses a serious threat to life in Northeast Nigeria and has a big impact on both operations and daily life. High levels of crime are a result of a number of factors, including poverty, inequality, ingrained social violence, accessibility to narcotics, and the proliferation of firearms. When compared to most other regions of Nigeria, armed robberies, assaults, burglaries, carjackings, rapes, kidnappings, and extortion are nevertheless commonplace, albeit at relatively lower levels. Armed robbers target secured compounds, climbing perimeter walls, following inhabitants, or incapacitating guards to gain entry, so home invasions continue to be a threat (Beacon Consulting, 2017). Similar to this, nighttime highway robberies continue to be a menace, particularly in some areas of Adamawa state. Criminals frequently utilize wanton violence, and victims who fight them are frequently met with lethal force. Street gangs and organized criminal organizations are frequently well-armed and ready for combat with Nigerian security personnel. Additionally, criminal gangs engage in fraud, trafficking, extortion, racketeering, and other crimes, frequently with connections to international criminal organizations. Due to its weakly patrolled borders, northeastern Nigeria has evolved into a regional hub for the trafficking of weapons, drugs, stolen cars, and oil. It is believed that the instability in northern Mali and Libya has further sparked the influx of illegitimate weaponry into Nigeria (Nextier, 2022). Kidnapping is also a serious

security concern in the Northeast states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Although the occurrences are low, both local and foreign nationals are vulnerable. The insurgent Islamist groups operating in the region are widely suspected of involvement in these incidents and are typically heavily armed. However, the crime level is assessed as being lower in the Northeast states as compared with most other parts of Nigeria.

Youth unemployment has been identified as one of the main structural drivers of violence in contexts of state and societal fragility. Unemployment is implicated in increasing the vulnerability of youths to joining violent groups in a number of ways. First, a lack of engagement in productive activity increases the propensity for youths to wander into circles where they are exposed to anti-social behaviour. Second, lack of employment creates psycho-social stress that encourages coping strategies such as withdrawal and use of drugs among young persons. Third, unemployment reduces options available to youths and *ipso facto* increases their capacity to resist offers to join rebel groups and criminal gangs. Equally, frustration arising from unemployment conditions youths to be alienated from society and in many instances adopt aggression as a response strategy. Different studies of the insurgency in the Northeast have pointed to these causal pathways in explaining the high level of recruitment of unemployed and unemployable youths by insurgent groups in the region (UNDP, 2018; UNDP, 2017; Mercy Corps, 2016; Barkindo, 2016, and Granville, 2020).

Despite these recognitions, interventions and policies to reduce youth unemployment in vulnerable communities have been insufficient and ineffective. Challenges include politicization, poor design and implementation strategies, and poor continuity and sustainability culture. The result is that at risk youths are hardly being reached and they remain easy recruits available to criminal gangs and religious extremist groups. Notwithstanding the evident youth restiveness, state and non-state actors appear to be insensitive to the effect of youth restiveness on violence. Conflicts generated by youth restiveness are suppressed so as to engender political correctness and portray the state as 'conflict-free'. One of the major sources of checking youth restiveness is youth empowerment. This can be achieved via functional education and entrepreneurial skill acquisition programmes. This study is an examination of the extent to which the youth are involved in the extreme insecurity in the northeast, particularly banditry and extremist sects such as Boko Haram, ISWAP and

Ansaru. To be specific, the paper intends to interrogate the vulnerabilities of the youths to these violent sects and further seeks to examine the extent to which youths' involvement has changed the pattern of insecurity in the region. Additionally, the paper is interested in the extent to which the current de-radicalization processes are changing the narratives of youth recruitment into violent sects in the troubled region. Finally, the paper attempts to come up with measures and strategies for engaging the youths in peacebuilding initiatives in the northeast. In light of the foregoing, this study is designed to respond to several key research questions, which bothered on:

- i. To what extent are the youths involved in the extreme insecurity and peacebuilding in the northeast, particularly banditry and extremist sects such as Boko Haram, ISWAP and Ansaru?
- ii. Why are the youth vulnerable to these violent sects?
- iii. How has youth unemployment changed the pattern of insecurity in the region?
- iv. How are the current de-radicalization processes changing the narratives of youth recruitment into violent sects in Northeast?

In order to effectively examine organised crime, youth restiveness, empowerment and peacebuilding in Northeast Nigeria, the study adopted a qualitative research design with the application of both primary and secondary sources of data. The paper utilized both primary and secondary systems of data collection. Primary data were collected from 20 in-depth interviews with residents, youths and vigilantes and 10 key informant interviews were conducted with security operatives, traditional rulers and heads of vigilantes, purposively selected from Yobe, Borno and Adamawa States. The secondary data were obtained from a desk review of the extant literature on youth empowerment, restiveness, crimes, banditry, insurgency, and peacebuilding so as to allow for understanding the context before going for the Key informant Interview. The main limitation of the research methodology lies in the time constraints and the inability of the researcher to complement the method of data collection used with Focus group discussion and survey.

2.0 THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

This paper utilized two distinct but related theories: the Youth Bulge Theory and theories of development and empowerment. The Youth Bulge Theory was propounded by Gunnar Heinshon (cited in Dodo, 2012). The theory basically argues that as the population of the youth increases,

their demand for resources also increases; and the inability to provide or make these resources available can trigger youth delinquency, particularly towards armed rebellion or insurgency. While the strength of the Youth Bulge Theory lies in the attempts to explain the conditions under which youth may take to crime or extreme violence, its shortfall lies in its inability to clinically explain the incentives that can encourage youth to promote or champion the course of peacebuilding. In order to bridge this gap, the theories of development and empowerment postulated by Perkins (1995) and Zimmerman (2000) suffice. At the centre of this framework are three overlapping areas of economic empowerment, youth capacity for political leadership and socio-cultural norms that guide the society and the agencies of power. The theories postulate the provision of empowerment programmes that will ensure positive youth development. This can be achieved through the provision of an enabling environment for youth to learn relevant skills that would help them get involved in sociopolitical processes. At the centre of this framework are three overlapping areas of economic empowerment - each necessary, but insufficient on its own: Economic assets and capabilities; Social assets and capabilities; Agency and power. The framework also pays attention to the broader enabling environment, composed of the community's formal and informal institutions, social norms, and family and community members' individual attitudes and behaviours. This enabling environment interacts with the individual capabilities and can reinforce or hinder gains in the individual assets, capabilities and agency.

The core concepts in this study include organised crime, de-radicalization, youth empowerment and peace-building. The concepts are reviewed below:

Organised Crime: Organised crime is generally used to describe the sophistication of large scale criminal activities that are usually orchestrated or carried out by powerful syndicate groups. Organised criminal elements venture into high criminal activities like grand corruption like money laundering, trans-border smuggling, human trafficking, arms trading, production and trafficking in counterfeit drugs, trade in minerals and wildlife, armed conflicts and insurgency, rebel movements and cybercrimes. Hence, its defining characteristics include; carefully planned operations, profit oriented and transnational in scope and in networks (Caparini, 2022). According to the recently released report of the Global Organised Crime Index, Nigeria ranks 5th out of 193 countries worldwide; 2nd out of the 53 countries in Africa and 1st out of the 15 countries in West

Africa as most affected by organised crime (Omolaoye, 2023). These could have been fuelled by northeastern Nigeria, where organised crimes have multiplied in quick succession. The insurgency in the region is facilitating illegal trading of drugs, arms, fishing, kidnapping for ransom and other criminal activities (Eneche, 2022).

Deradicalization: According to Bjorgo (2009) and Feddes (2015), disengagement and deradicalization are conceptually distinct from one another since disengagement is viewed as a shift in behaviour. When someone disengages, they stop using violence or lessen its use. Deradicalization, on the other hand, tries to alter both behaviours and thoughts. On this foundation, the research contends that deradicalization and disengagement refer to processes by which individuals or groups stop taking involvement in terrorism and/or organized violence. While disengagement concentrates on promoting behavioural change in the context of denouncing violence, deradicalization aims for fundamental shifts in ideology and attitudes. John (2019) asserts that disengaged terrorists might not even be capable of repentance or deradicalization. Physical disengagement frequently doesn't produce any concurrent alteration or reduction in ideological support (Omar, 2009).

Identity, in the sense that collective action will be unlikely in the absence of a clear sense of collective identity or mutual feeling of belongingness, is one of the major prerequisites for radicalization, according to a prior study (Huddy, 2001). Furthermore, once a group of people are inspired to act collectively, it is challenging to stop them (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2007). Other researchers look at the significance of important moments or turning points, such as painful experiences, which provide followers with the required self-awareness and prompt people to think about deradicalization (Altier et al., 2014). According to the research, identity change may be facilitated by reorientation, therapy, migration, and even by equitable access to educational and empowerment possibilities.

Peacebuilding: Peacebuilding entered the United Nations (UN) lexicon and international practice with the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace, published in 1992. He distinguished sequential but overlapping activities in the conflict management cycle: preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. He described peacebuilding as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in

order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (p.33). This highlights the dual and sometimes conflicting task of peacebuilding – to obtain security and an end to hostilities on the one hand, and on the other hand, to engage in the parallel longer term process of consolidating peace by reconciling people and groups, reforming or building institutions and structures to diminish the possibility of a relapse to violence (Ghali, 1992).

In this sense, Ghali (1992) argued that successful peacebuilding should address three key priorities:

1. Peacebuilding involves action to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.
2. Peacebuilding can not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace; and

There is a new requirement for technical assistance for the transformation of deficient national structures and capacities and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions.

As a concept, peacebuilding has been defined in many contexts and has continued to include other values and indicators in its literature, understanding, and meaning. As conflicts erupt in societies, actors (both local, international, state and non-states) get involved and thereby redefine what peacebuilding is. In the context of a fragile or conflicting society, peacebuilding could be ‘largely equated with the construction of a new social environment that advances a sense of confidence and improves the condition of life’ (Jeong, 2000). Therefore, the peacebuilding process or technique must not be one ‘in which the quantitative and qualitative life expectancy of individuals or communities is intentionally reduced’ but one in which local communities feel compelled to solve their key structural issues such as environmental, social, economic and security issues in response to shaping global responses (Reychler, 2001).

Youth: The United Nations defines the youth as ‘young people’ who fall within the age bracket of 15 and 24 years; without prejudice to the definitions upheld and recognised by other countries or bodies (United Nations, 2008). In the case of Nigeria, youth is used to describe individual males and females, who are between the ages of 18 and 35 (WYEDRSDD, 2019). This paper is adopting the latter since it primarily focuses on Nigeria.

3.0 YOUTH INVOLVEMENT IN CRIMES AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NORTHEAST

One of Nigeria's most at-risk demographics is the country's youth. Faced with a lack of opportunities to give back to their communities, or the skills to contribute to decision-making within their communities, Nigerian youths provide a fertile territory for violent extremist groups and criminal gangs to exploit and conduct their recruitment. With various communities and ethnicities in Northeast Nigeria, often living in isolated enclaves, violent extremist groups can easily perpetuate divisive narratives of hate and foment discord among the youth. However, crimes and violent extremism in Northeast Nigeria are real threats to life and have a significant influence on both operations and daily life. Numerous variables, such as poverty, inequality, pervasive social violence, easy access to drugs, and the availability of firearms, contribute to high crime rates. Armed robberies, assaults, burglaries, carjackings, rapes, kidnappings, and extortion are nevertheless widespread, albeit at relatively lesser levels, as compared to most other regions of Nigeria. Home invasions continue to be a hazard as armed robbers target fortified compounds, scaling perimeter walls, tracking occupants, or incapacitating guards to gain entry (Beacon Consulting, 2017). Kidnapping is also a serious security concern in the Northeast states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Although the occurrences are low, both local and foreign nationals are vulnerable. The insurgent Islamist groups operating in the region are widely suspected of involvement in these incidents and are typically heavily armed. However, the crime level is assessed as being lower in the Northeast states as compared with most other parts of Nigeria.

Concerns have been raised about instances of crimes, violent civil unrest and industrial action throughout Northeast Nigeria. Riots and communal violence can break out suddenly, disrupting traffic, killing a lot of people, and causing property damage. Civil unrest is frequently the work of local politicians and religious leaders, who organize adolescent gangs to attack specific targets. These occurrences are more frequent during election seasons, and in 2011, there were reportedly 800 fatalities related to election-related violence (Beacon Consulting, 2017). Even though there were a lot fewer violent incidents during the 2019 election, there was still substantial unrest in several regions of the nation. The risk of politically motivated violence increased when election preparations for 2023 got underway.

4.0 YOUTHS AS STAKEHOLDERS IN PEACEBUILDING IN THE NORTHEAST NIGERIA

With unfavourable weather changes, rapid population increase, and a near total lack of state presence everywhere but in the state capitals, the Northeast remains one of the poorest regions in Nigeria. The harsh terrains and unpredictable environment of the region are widely recognized as the fundamental causes and triggers of the insurgency which has been ongoing since 2009 (Barkindo, 2017). The last decade has been a dreadful one for the people of the Northeast region of Nigeria. About 73 percent of the violent conflicts and crimes in the area have been caused by the insurgency (Agbiboa, 2013), which has led to significant population displacement and a worsening humanitarian crisis.

While the government of Nigeria and its immediate neighbours have, through concerted efforts been working to find a lasting solution to the insurgency in the region, the conflict seems to have defied all known interventions. The resurgence of Boko Haram attacks from late 2018 to date has resulted in significant setbacks for the Nigerian Army and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The Nigerian military is now battling not only to defend territories captured by the insurgents but also to defend its military barracks, which have become the main targets for attacks. As it is, there seems to be no clear roadmap to stem the tides of terrorism as governments appear to rely more on military solutions. Various scholars have recommended a multisectoral counter-insurgency strategy (Mackinlay & Al-Baddawy, 2008) as a panacea for addressing the menace. For instance, despite the protracted nature of the conflict, communities have developed strategies to deal with either impending violence or the aftermath of the conflict as so to entrench peace in the region. These strategies include community security scheme that helps to prevent violent extremism, and peacebuilding efforts designed to help in both social cohesion and reconstruction. Efforts by these communities in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states have led to a new understanding of community-led peace building strategies with young people championing these initiatives.

The youth constitute the critical mass and key movement of peacebuilding initiatives in Northeast Nigeria. In all the communities surveyed, it is the youth that constitutes the neighbourhood watch group referred to as vigilante or the CJTF which was formed in 2013. Owing to their gallantry the CJTF have provided confidence to their communities in confronting Boko Haram and are said

to be more efficient than the Nigerian army (Okeowo, 2015). The CJTF adopt a two-pronged approach to maintaining security in their respective communities. First, they volunteer to conduct a check on commuters and monitor the movement of stranger elements apart from joining local hunters and government security in joint operations. Secondly, they provide vital security information to both the government security agents and members of the community in countering the insurgents. To show how appreciative of their role, a community leader commented thus:

The CJTF has been very active in enforcing discipline in the community alongside soldiers. The CJTF has been better than soldiers. The CJTF alongside farmers and vigilante groups have been very vigilant and alert as a proactive measure to counter any impending violent attack. ' (KII with a community leader in Maiduguri Metropolis, Borno state, June 2022).

The CJTF was constituted in 2013. It comprises predominantly young male civilians who want to identify and apprehend Boko Haram insurgents amidst growing insecurity in northern Nigeria. Initially, the CJTF 'were not given arms but armed themselves with sticks and machetes,' though over time they came to acquire locally made guns to aid themselves in manning checkpoints and as a complement to government security personnel in preventing, apprehending and punishing miscreants in the metropolis and adjoining local government councils. In communities where they operated, the CJTF members engaged in alternative dispute resolution to settle conflicts among the citizenry. Minor cases such as two-fighting, theft, and family disputes were handled directly by the CJTF while serious criminal cases were referred to the military, police or traditional rulers by the CJTF. Members also provide escort services to dignitaries and farmers or traders on request when they move from one place to the other in crisis-ridden communities. The organisational structure of the CJTF is hierarchical and covers all the areas of the community. The chairman of CJTF in Maiduguri clarified further:

They were divided into 10 sectors corresponding pretty much with the sector command of the army. At the metropolis level, there is the Super Overall Chairman; for each of the 10 sectors is an Overall Chairman, followed by a Sub-overall Chairman in each of the 10 sectors. In each ward of the metropolis, 20 Unit Chairmen are appointed and for each of the units, there are 20 Field Workers to assist the Unit Chairman (KII with the Super Overall Chairman of CJTF in Maiduguri, Borno state, June 2022).

Literature has it that CJTF have several cases before them in different courts, which were brought by relatives of victims against the CJTF for brutalizing, arson, maiming, or wrongfully accusing

their family of being Boko Haram members. They have also been accused of raping women, false arrests, imprisonment, and arson. For example, reports from IDP camps allege the CJTF forcefully coerced females to have sex with them in return for food and protection. The Nigerian government will have to think carefully about how to manage the CJTF once Boko Haram violence is curtailed (https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines_Chapter-4.pdf).

Likewise, in virtually all the affected communities, security agents have been credited with relatively securing the area. The roles played by informal security actors like CJTF, local vigilantes and local hunters are highly acknowledged. Like most African communities, informal security provision has become a strategy for community resilience and peace maintenance (Ogbozor, 2016). The youths have proved to be vital in the security of the region as the CJTF has shown. As discussed in other parts of the study and as various studies have indicated, the youth were involved in issues relating to security, identification of Boko Haram suspects, early warning, and report of suspicious movements to the nearest authority. They coordinate with the neighbouring community and share information. They were able to arrest many insurgents not only in Maiduguri but also in Lagos and other places. There was the recognition that the Borno state government has helped communities to become more peaceful by recognising and empowering the CJTF.

Community-wide efforts and initiatives were instrumental in sustaining peace capabilities and countering extremist narratives. Some of the initiatives such as neighbourhood watch and vigilance, registration of new migrants and visitors, use of religion to preach peace and collaboration between stakeholders in the focal communities were tremendously utilised to counter extremism and extremist narratives. In most communities across Nigeria, residents organise a neighbourhood watch, sometimes partnering with formal security institutions, to securitise their environment. These strategies helped in keeping neighbourhoods under surveillance and also checked the movement of people (Ordu, 2017). With the registration of new migrants and enforcement orientation exercises, the community members were able to checkmate and regulate activities within their areas.

Across the communities, youths provide what is regarded as credible intelligence to the communities as well as security agencies. Above all, they are at the forefront of community-level structures for protection and safety. They were able to communicate using person-to-person contacts and social media platforms to share information on early warning signs. As pointed out,

They are the major sources of information gathering and dissemination to members about their safety. They call for meetings and send information to the entire community. They are the ones that alert members of the community's traditional rulers who in turn alert the security agencies (KII with a Community Leader in Maduganari Area of Maiduguri, Borno State).

It is therefore important to note that youths are already playing decisive roles in preventing and resolving some of the most endemic conflicts around the world, and their full recognition, inclusion, and support are necessary for the sustainability of peacebuilding processes at all levels. A complete paradigm shift in the way governments and stakeholders perceive young people will help to shape new values and norms upon which a transformative culture of youth inclusion in peacebuilding processes can emerge.

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings of the study reveal that youths have contributed immensely to reducing the narratives of Boko Haram and enhancing peacebuilding strategies in the affected communities. Most prominent among such institutions are traditional leadership, youth vigilante organisations including CJTF (which is trusted by the communities more than the formal security and has become the intermediaries between the communities and the formal security) and Hunters groups. There has also been a synergy between the youth and the government. As valuable as youths have contributed to the management of insecurity created by the Boko Haram insurgency, their efforts have been hampered by a series of challenges. One serious challenge is the inability of the security personnel to restore the peace that would enable them to pursue their various livelihoods. Another serious problem associated with managing the insurgency is the lack of capacity on the part of the vulnerable youths to engage in meaningful economic activities. This is because loans and grants from humanitarian organisations and development agencies are not sufficient to cover all those in dire need of them. Other areas of concern raised by the respondents include the increased number of non-state actors - the CJTF, the hunter's association, vigilantes, and youths without

jobs. Small arms proliferation due to the porosity of the Lake Chad region, could pose serious security risks if there is no proper absorption of the CJTF. This is so because easing the crisis will lead to a redundancy of the CJTF. Also, the ensuing lack of economic engagements will potentially turn the youths who have provided protection and security to communities into security threats themselves. The lack of trust in the government's integration programme coupled with reluctance by communities to accept ex-insurgents will pose a serious community crisis.

Against the background of the aforementioned constraints, the following recommendations are proffered.

- Security agencies must intensify efforts to defeat Boko Haram and restore enduring peace in the affected communities.
- The government should embark on a massive clean-up of arms that have found their way into the hands of idle youths including the CJTF and unemployed youths.
- The government should sustain their effort in the absorption of CJTF members into the formal security structures – military, police, and paramilitary for those that are employable. In addition, the Nigerian state should economically empower those who do not have the minimum qualification for absorption into the formal security structures. The government can also involve some of them in intelligence gathering and community policing services that are required for ending the war against the insurgents.
- The government should embark on a program of demobilization, disarmament, rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-Boko Haram members and the sensitization of the public on what the program is all about. The current program – Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) is shrouded in secrecy and this does not give confidence to the public who perceive it with a lot of suspicions; this secrecy may be responsible for the rejection by the community of ex-residents of the Operation Safe Corridor. Thus, the military should find a way of striking a balance between the secrecy of the program and the available information to the public that will ensure the ultimate goal of the OSC – acceptance and reintegration

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Impact of Terrorism on Global Peace: An Appraisal, 2017-2020

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Abstract

Terrorism has become a serious global phenomenon that affects many countries in the world. No nation today is free from the effects of terrorism either directly or indirectly. The reaction from its menace has led to what is currently termed “the war on terror”, an approach that creates collateral damages of its own because of either a faulty adaptation of strategy or open political sentiment by powerful nations for the continued dominance of the weaker countries in the name of fighting terrorism. This paper shall examine the concept of “war on terror” and its legal justifications and ramifications. The Paper has critically analyzed the status of the call for physical force engagement by countries like the USA, the UK, France, Germany, Sudan, Libya and Nigeria among many others that have on several occasions preferred using military force in fighting terrorism rather than utilizing other appropriate means. However, it is not quite correct to refer to some conflicts as the war on terror because we cannot conquer terror through war. Secondary sources of data were utilized to generate relevant information for investigating the problem of terrorism and the application of excessive force to curtail it. The study recommends that nations, regional bodies, international organs and global networks need to adopt an appropriate means of addressing problems by tackling bad governance, poverty and inequality among global communities.

Keywords: Terrorism, Peace, Military engagement, International Collaborations

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Terrorism has been an old scourge to humankind for a very long time and for the past 30 years, terrorist activities in the world have increased to a large extent damaging the value of human existence. (Hay’at, 2018). The activities of terrorists have created fear in the minds of innocent

civilians through the use of violence to achieve their objectives. The current discussion of assessing the ‘root causes’ of terrorism would ideally focus on finding the causes of terrorist engagement in unlawful attacks on innocent citizens to inflict instability in the state. (Doyle,2015). From the above discussion we can understand that the term ‘terrorism’ refers to certain groups or their actions, it risks straying into the realm of subjectivity. The attacks of September 2001 and the terrorism associated with al-Qaeda have added to the existing confusion regarding the definition of terrorism by popularizing new terms and phrases such as ‘international terrorism’, ‘global terrorism’, ‘catastrophic terrorism’ and the like. This paper intends to examine terrorism and its impact on global peace from 2017 -2022 through this sequence: Conceptual definition, Activities of Global Terrorist Groups, US Response to War Against Global Terrorism.

2.0 CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS

Terrorism

The concept of terrorism comes from the French word *terrorisme*, and originally referred specifically to state terrorism as practiced by the French government during the Reign of Terror. The French word *terrorisme* in turn derives from the Latin verb *terreo* meaning ‘I frighten’. The *terror cimbricus* was a panic and state of emergency in Rome in response to the approach of warriors of the Cimbric tribe in 105 BC. The word *terrorism* was first used in France to describe a new system of government adopted during the French Revolution of 1789-1799.

Globally, there are several international conventions that have many looks and perception on the war crimes and acts of violence but there was no universally accepted definition of terrorism. A popular saying describes one man’s terrorist as another freedom fighter. Indeed, the definition quest has haunted the field of terror studies, leading some authors to call it the search for the “Holy Grail” (Coleman,2020). Some other scholars, on the other hand, have conceived the definition of terrorism as a “useless endeavour that should be abandoned”. Most of all, the political use of the term by states to designate varied acts of opposition has further complicated the search for a definition.

Kofi Annan (2004) the former Secretary-General of the United Nations pointed out, “there is no internationally agreed definition of what constitutes a terror act. While there is a shortage of treaties prohibiting acts that are associated with terrorism, the lack of agreement on a clear-cut and well-articulated definition undermines the normative and moral approach against terrorism

(Dunlop, 2015). For instance, almost all Arab States have opposed any definition of terrorism that prohibits the deliberate targeting of civilians, if such activities take place in an occupied territory (e.g., that defines a Palestinian attack on Israeli civilians) as terrorism. These objections are reflected in the refusal of States such as Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan etc., to sign most of the 12 anti-terrorism treaties.

Terrorism has been described variously as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; depends on whose point of view is being represented. For instance, the United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate government or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological”. Whereas the Convention of the Organization of Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism held in 1999, defined terrorism as any act of violence or threat thereof, notwithstanding its motive or intentions, perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing the lives, honour, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or private or public property to hazards or occupying or seizing them (Reisner, 2002).

In Article 2, of the same regional convention, the Conference of Islamic States posits that people's struggle, including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation in accordance with the principles of international law, shall not be considered a terrorist crime (Wedgwood & Kenneth, 2009).

A crystallization of the above scenario shows that the conception of the Islamic world on terrorism, informs the attack on the World Trade Centre by Al Qaeda, as an attack on United States hegemony, and the attacks on Israel by the Palestinian or Lebanese groups seen as a fight against occupation or aggression, cannot serve as instances of terrorist attacks.

Peace

Peace is a reflexive act of interpersonal violence, perpetrated on the spur of the moment against real and/or perceived threats to one's or one's loved ones' existence, are not always mutually exclusive. Similarly, certain acts of political violence may at times advance peaceful ends, as during revolutionary struggles employing controlled and generally non-lethal violence against

clear state representatives of tyranny and oppression, the less violence the better. But in a world of murder and murderers, it is often not possible, no matter how ethically desirable, simultaneously to have justice and ‘clean hands. On the other hand, there is a kind of political and psychological violence that seems always to be reprehensible and avoidable. This kind of violence – terrifying, terroristic violence – almost always increases human pain and suffering and usually diminishes personal safety and peace of mind, without accomplishing ‘higher order’ political goals, such as national liberation and political or socioeconomic emancipation.

Humud, (2020) has seen the concept of peace from a perspective where an individual or group lives in harmony without any threat to them by either internal or external actors. Looking at this definition of Humud, we can understand that if an individual or group in the society are not living in a safe environment with any threat on the lives or property that individual or group enjoy the benefit of relative peace.

Activities of Global Terrorist Groups

Scholars have identified four terrorist groups responsible for the most deaths in 2019 namely: the Taliban, Boko Haram, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al-Shabaab. These four groups were responsible for 7,578 deaths from terrorism, representing 55 per cent of total deaths in 2019. Three of these four were also the deadliest groups in 2018, with Al-Shabaab replacing the Khorasan Chapter of Islamic State in 2019. In 2012, just prior to the large increase in terrorist activity around the world, these four groups were responsible for just over 31 per cent of all deaths from terrorism. Determining which terrorist groups are the most active and responsible for the most deaths can be difficult, as many groups have regional affiliates and other groups working in partnership or partially under the same command (Byman, 2020)

For the purpose of this paper, we are analyzing the activities of major identified terrorist groups and its network affiliation globally and to find out how their operation affect the sustainability of global peace. For instance, ISIL refers to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and does not include the Khorasan chapter or Sinai Province of the Islamic State, despite the strong connections between the two groups. Similarly, Al-Shabaab is counted as a single group, rather than an affiliate of Al-Qa’ida.

In the past 10-20 years there has been a largest surge in terrorist activity for many years. However, the activities of terrorists have escalated since the Boko Haram activities emergence in 2009 in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, and have recorded an increase in the level of terrorism over the years from 2015-2020 with recorded deconstruction of human lives killing millions of peoples, destroying property worth of billions of naira and making over 5 million peoples as Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's).

Emergence of the Taliban Group in Afghanistan

Pantacci (2020) posited that the Taliban Group started as a reactionary group that combined the Mujahideen who had previously fought against the 1979 Soviet invasion, and groups of Pashtun from terrorism. The fall in deaths in Iraq can be attributed to the near-total defeat of ISIL in Iraq, which has decreased the level of internal conflict. The increased number of activities of terrorists has made the global society not safe for humanity but rather a spot of crisis that devalues humanity.

In Africa, the country with the largest total increase in deaths from terrorism was Burkina Faso, where the number of people killed rose from 86 in 2018 to 593 in 2019. This significant increase was predominantly driven by an increase in deaths attributed to three known groups: the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS), Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Burkina Faso branch of Ansar al-Islam. Collectively, these groups accounted for almost 30 per cent of deaths in Burkina Faso in 2019 (Byman, 2020)

The remaining deaths were attributed to Muslim extremists and unknown perpetrators. Sri Lanka recorded the second largest increase in 2019, with the Easter Sunday bombings accounting for the entirety of this increase. Sri Lanka recorded the deadliest attack of 2019 when eight coordinated suicide attacks across the country targeted churches and hotels on Easter Sunday, killing 266 people and injuring at least 500. ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack, with the perpetrators pledging allegiance to former ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi online (US Department of Counter Terrorism, 2020)

Burkina Faso, Sri Lanka, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Yemen, Niger Cameroon, New Zealand and Ethiopia. The Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 1996. The group declared the country an Islamic emirate and promoted its leader to the role of head of state.

The Taliban ruled Afghanistan until 2001 when an invasion by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) toppled the regime, which was thought to be harbouring Al-Qa'ida. After the regime was overthrown, the Taliban regrouped across the border in Pakistan and has since led an insurgency against the government of Afghanistan and the US-led International Security Assistance Force. Since 2001, the Taliban has steadily regained territory across Afghanistan (US Department of Counter Terrorism, 2020)

However, peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government have had setbacks over the role of Islamic law and women's rights. Changes since 2018. The Taliban were responsible for 4,990 deaths in 2019, marking an 18 per cent decrease since 2018. The total number of terrorist attacks by the Taliban increased by five per cent in 2019, rising to 1,025. However, attacks became less deadly in 2019, with an average of 4.9 deaths per attack, compared to 6.3 in 2018. Of the 1,025 attacks attributed to the Taliban in 2019, 14 per cent did not result in any fatalities while 13 per cent resulted in more than 10 deaths. The Taliban is active solely in Afghanistan. Deaths and terrorist attacks in 2019 accounted for 87 and 72 per cent of the country's total. However, the Taliban's Pakistani affiliate group, Tehrik- Taliban Pakistan (TTP), was responsible for 73 deaths and 30 attacks in Pakistan in 2019, demonstrating a Taliban-related presence outside of Afghanistan. In January 2019, the Taliban committed their deadliest terror attack of the year when a suicide bomber and armed assailants targeted a National Directorate for Security (NDS) base in Maydan Shahr district, Wardak, Afghanistan. At least 129 people were killed and 54 people were injured in the attack. Tactics favoured by the Taliban in 2019, was targeting police and military personnel, which accounted for over half of attacks and deaths (Joscelyn, 2020)

As of January 2019, it was estimated that the Taliban controlled territory home to approximately 10 per cent of the population. The Peace negotiations between the Taliban and the US progressed throughout 2019, with an agreement being signed in 2020 outlining plans for a phased withdrawal of US and coalition troops and exchange of prisoners between the Taliban and Afghan government. The US has stated that it will withdraw all troops by May 2021 but we witness the return of Taliban rule in Taliban towards the end of 2021 as a result of a lack of strategies and methods of fighting the menace.

Boko Haram Islamist Group

Boko Haram, formally known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, was formed in 2002 by the sect leader Muhammed Yusuf and was based in the city of Maiduguri with a wide network in Yobe and other North East towns. The group recorded various terrorist attacks in 2019, following a period of steady decline. Boko Haram was ranked as the second deadliest terrorist group in 2019 and remains the deadliest in sub-Saharan Africa. Since its rise in 2009, Boko Haram has been responsible for thousands of deaths throughout the Lake Chad Basin region of West Africa.

The Salafi-Jihadi insurgency has caused over 37,500 combat-related deaths and over 19,000 deaths from terrorism since 2011, mainly in Nigeria. Originally formed in Northeast Nigeria bordering the Lake Chad region, the terror group has spread into Chad, Cameroon and Niger. In 2016, internal tensions led to multiple Boko Haram splinter groups forming the largest splinter group in West Africa Province (ISWAP), which has claimed responsibility for a number of brutal attacks targeting civilians and military personnel in 2019 (Nordland,2019). Since 2018 Terrorism-related deaths attributed to Boko Haram increased by 46 per cent in 2019 compared to the previous year. Terrorism related incidents also increased by 43 per cent in 2019. Despite this increase, terrorism deaths remain over six times lower than their peak in 2014. Of the 1,068 deaths attributed to Boko Haram in 2019, 69 per cent occurred in Nigeria, while the remainder occurred in Cameroon, Niger and Chad at 20, seven and four per cent, respectively. Compared to previous years, the proportion of terrorism deaths recorded in Nigeria fell, while significant increases were recorded in Cameroon and Niger, highlighting the increased reach of the organization into neighbouring countries. In Cameroon, deaths attributed to Boko Haram increased threefold in 2019.

The majority of terrorism deaths in Cameroon resulted from attacks on civilians and military targets at 50 and 48 per cent, respectively. The group's deadliest attack occurred in Cameroon when several hundred assailants, armed with rocket launchers, attacked military positions in Darak, Extreme North. Over 101 deaths were recorded, including at least 37 soldiers and civilians. Niger recorded a 176 per cent increase in terrorism deaths attributed to Boko Haram in 2019. The majority of attacks occurred in the Lake Chad Basin Region in Niger. However, attacks were also recorded in the western regions of Tillaberi and Niamey, where Boko Haram had not previously

conducted attacks. The main counter-terrorism response combating Boko Haram is the Multinational Joint Task Forces (MNJTF), which operates in conjunction with the Nigerian military (Pantacci, 2020)

The MNJTF struggled to reclaim territory from Boko Haram in 2019 and the group maintained limited safe havens in parts of northeast Nigeria and on islands in Lake Chad, where they prevented the reestablishment of state administration, service delivery and humanitarian relief. Tactics favoured by Boko Haram bombings, including suicide bombings, are no longer the most common form of attack used by Boko Haram. At the height of its power, Boko Haram was notorious for highly lethal suicide bombings, which are a relatively rare terrorist tactic in sub-Saharan Africa.

The Global Conflict Tracker (2020) has cited that in 2019, suicide bombings accounted for seven per cent of all attacks by Boko Haram, a significant decline from its peak in 2017 when 46 per cent of attacks were suicide bombings. As a result, the lethality of Boko Haram's attacks has fallen dramatically, from 15 deaths per attack in 2014 to four deaths per attack in 2019. In recent years, Boko Haram has shifted from bombings towards armed assault and hostage takings. In 2019, over 40 per cent of Boko Haram attacks were armed assaults causing 613 fatalities. Hostage taking incidents have increased by 36 per cent since 2018, accounting for 16 per cent of terrorism deaths attributed to Boko Haram. Boko Haram had previously employed a conscious strategy to recruit women and children as suicide bombers, sometimes forcibly.

However, since their peak in 2015, female suicide bombings have declined by 96 per cent. In 2019, four female suicide bombers carried out two attacks, killing nine people. More recently, the group has renewed its focus on recruiting children who were used for intelligence and support roles in order to revive its influence in the Lake Chad region.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

Joscelyn (2020) has observed the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, often referred to as ISIL, ISIS or Daesh, was the third deadliest terrorist organization in 2019. ISIL emerged from local militant outfits in Iraq in the early 2000s, its most immediate predecessor being the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). Emerging in 2010, ISI was formed by surviving members of Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) and disaffected former members of the US-trained Sons of Iraq that supported US operations to

dismantle AQI before the 2010 withdrawal. ISIL emerged in 2014 when Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared an Islamic Caliphate in parts of Iraq and Syria, following significant ISI territorial gains in northern Iraq. Since then, ISIL has been responsible for over 30,000 terrorist deaths. Of these, 79 per cent were in Iraq and 17 per cent in Syria. Changes since 2018 ISIL-related deaths are at their lowest point since 2013. ISIL continued to suffer severe losses in 2019 as a result of successful counter-terrorism operations in Iraq and Syria. In March 2019, US and Syrian forces regained the last remnants of ISIL territory in eastern Syria.

Later in the same year, the US conducted a military operation that resulted in the death of the then ISIL leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Despite these severe losses, ISIL continues to conduct attacks through ‘ sleeper cells ’ in Iraq and Syria and globally through a network of affiliated groups. Deaths committed by the group fell from 1,571 in 2018, to 942 deaths in 2019, a 40 per cent drop from the previous year. This marks the third consecutive year of decline and a significant decrease from its deadliest year in 2016, of over 90 per cent. Attacks fell in tandem with terrorism deaths, from 559 in 2018 to 339 in 2019, with the majority of attacks occurring in Iraq. Despite its decline, ISIL claimed responsibility for attacks in seven countries in 2019, highlighting the breadth of their operations. This included the deadliest attack of the year in Sri Lanka when eight suicide bombers perpetrated coordinated attacks targeting hotels and churches. The attacks resulted in 266 fatalities and injured at least 500 people. The perpetrators pledged their allegiance to former ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi online (US Counter Terrorism, 2020).

The number of ISIL provinces outside of Iraq and Syria continues to rise, as does the number of affiliate groups that have pledged allegiance or support to the core group. In 2019, ISIL-related attacks occurred in 27 countries, excluding Iraq and Syria, resulting in 1,784 fatalities. The group’s influence has continued to push into South Asia via the Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State, as well as sub-Saharan Africa via the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and the Central Africa Province of the Islamic State.

Al-Shabaab Al-Shabaab,

A Salafist militant group active in East Africa, first emerged in a battle over Somalia’s capital in the summer of 2006. As an Al Qa’ida affiliate based in Somalia and Kenya, Al-Shabaab pursues Islamist statehood aspirations in Somalia. Al-Shabaab was estimated to have between 7,000 and

9,000 fighters in 2019. In more recent years, Al-Shabaab has gained global recognition following many years of deadly attacks concentrated around the capital city of Mogadishu and attacks in the neighbouring states of Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. African Union peacekeeping forces known as the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) have been fighting Al-Shabaab since 2007 with the help of US and United Nations (UN) support. In 2017, the first wave of US troops and airstrikes were deployed in Somalia to fight against Al-Shabaab. In 2019, terrorism deaths attributed to al-Shabaab continued to decline, by eight per cent from the prior year. Of the 578 deaths committed by Al-Shabaab in 2019, 87 per cent occurred in Somalia, compared to 13 per cent in Kenya. The total number of terror incidents fell by 40 attacks from 2018 to 2019.

Over 60 per cent of the attacks in 2019 resulted in at least one fatality. This marks a slight decline from 2018, where 64 per cent of attacks resulted in at least one death. Deaths in Somalia decreased by 14 per cent in 2019. This was mainly driven by a decline in terrorist activity in the capital, Mogadishu, by 20 per cent. Mogadishu has long been the epicenter of terrorist activity by al-Shabaab and in 2019 over half of al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia occurred in Mogadishu, causing 280 fatalities. This includes one of the deadliest attacks of 2019 when a suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden truck at a police checkpoint in Darkheyneley, Mogadishu. In addition to the perpetrator, 83 people, including 17 police officers and four foreign nationals, were killed and 148 people were injured. Conversely, in Kenya terrorism deaths attributed to Al-Shabaab increased by 83 per cent in 2019 (Fetter, 2020)

Although deaths have begun to increase in Kenya, they still remain lower than 2014, when the group killed 256 people. The majority of terrorism deaths in 2019 occurred in the capital Nairobi, which had not recorded an attack by the group since 2015. This was followed by Garissa, Wajir, Lamu and Mandera counties, which collectively recorded 58 deaths. In 2019, Kenya suffered its worst attack in four years when al-Shabaab operatives, including a suicide bomber, attacked the DusitD2 hotel complex in Nairobi. At least 26 people, including the five perpetrators and 21 civilians were killed. Tactics favoured by Al-Shabaab Al-Shabaab have consistently utilised bombings, armed assaults and assassinations as its main modes of attack.

Over 57 per cent of terrorism deaths attributed to al-Shabaab in 2019 were the result of bombings, while armed assaults and assassinations accounted for 15 and 11 per cent of deaths, respectively.

The highest proportion of al-Shabaab attacks in both Somalia and Kenya were directed at civilians, followed by government targets. Although attacks against civilians declined in 2019 by 13 per cent respectively, civilian deaths increased, indicating an increase in attack lethality. In 2019, civilian attacks caused an average of 3.2 deaths per attack, compared to 1.9 deaths per attack in 2018 (Thomas, 2020)

3.0 ISSUES AND TRENDS OF TERRORISM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report is a document produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and other sources. Data for the GTD is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland.

The GTD contains over 170,000 terrorist incidents for the period 1970 to 2019. In 2019, deaths from terrorism fell for the fifth consecutive year, after peaking in 2014. The total number of deaths fell by 15.5 per cent to 13,826. The fall in deaths was mirrored by a reduction in the impact of terrorism, with 103 countries recording an improvement in their GTI score, compared to 35 that recorded a deterioration.

The full GTI score takes into account not only deaths, but also incidents, injuries, and property damage from terrorism, over a five-year period. The largest fall in the impact of terrorism occurred in Afghanistan, which recorded 1,654 deaths from terrorism in 2018, a 22.4 per cent decrease from the prior year. However, Afghanistan remains the country most impacted by terrorism, after overtaking Iraq in 2018. Nigeria recorded the second largest reduction in deaths from terrorism in 2019, with the number falling from 2,043 to 1,245, a 39.1 per cent reduction, which was mainly due to a fall in terrorism deaths attributed to Fulani extremists (Nordland,2019).

This reduction occurred despite a small increase in deaths attributed to Boko Haram, which has been the most active terrorist group in the country over the past decade. Deaths from terrorism in Nigeria are now 83 per cent lower than at their peak in 2014. Conflict remains the primary driver of terrorism, with over 96 per cent of deaths from terrorism in 2019 occurring in countries already in conflict. The ten countries with the highest impact of terrorism are all engaged in at least one armed conflict.

Despite the overall fall in the impact of terrorism across the world, it remains a significant and serious problem in many countries. There were 63 countries in 2019 that recorded at least one death from a terrorist attack and seventeen countries that recorded over 100 deaths from terrorism. However, only Afghanistan and Nigeria recorded over 1,000 deaths and both countries had significant reductions in the number of people killed in 2019. By contrast, in 2015 there were six countries that recorded over a thousand deaths from terrorism. ISIL's strength and influence continued to decline, with deaths attributed to the group in 2019 falling to 942, down from 1,571 in the previous year.

4.0 US RESPONSE TO WAR AGAINST GLOBAL TERRORISM

The US Administration's response to the September 11, 2001 events was swift, wide-ranging, and decisive. After Administration officials attributed responsibility for the attack to Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda organization, there was an announced policy shift from deterrence to preemption, generally referred to as the "Bush Doctrine." Given the potentially catastrophic consequences of terrorist attacks employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Administration decision makers felt that the United States could not afford to sit back, wait for attacks to occur, and then respond (Marshall, 2019).

The US mobilization; combating terrorism and crippling Al Qaeda became top national priorities. Preemptive use of military force against foreign terrorist groups and infrastructure gained increasing acceptance in administration policy circles. A full-scale campaign was launched, using all elements of national and international power, to go after Al Qaeda and its affiliates and support structures. The campaign involved rallying the international community, especially law enforcement and intelligence components, to shut down Al Qaeda cells and financial networks. A U.S. military operation was initiated in early October 2001 against the Taliban regime which had harboured Al Qaeda since 1996 and against Al Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan. A total of 136 countries offered a range of military assistance to the United States, including overflight and landing rights and accommodations for U.S. forces.

As a result of this support, the Taliban was removed from power, all known Al Qaeda training sites were destroyed, and a number of Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders were killed or detained. Since then, according to former President Bush in his address to the nation on May 1, 2003, nearly half

of the known Al Qaeda leadership has been captured or killed. Notwithstanding that top Al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, as well as the Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, apparently remain at large. On March 19, 2003, after an intensive military buildup in the Persian Gulf, the United States launched the war against Iraq, as one of seven nations on the State Department's sponsors of terrorism list, with an attack on a suspected meeting site of Saddam Hussein.

President Bush, in his January 28, 2003 State of the Union Address, had emphasized the threat posed to world security by Saddam Hussein armed with weapons of mass destruction and stated that Iraq "aids and protects" the Al Qaeda terrorist organization. After a swift military campaign, President Bush announced on April 15, 2003, that "the regime of Saddam Hussein is no more." Saddam Hussein was arrested by U.S. personnel on December 13, 2003, near his hometown of Tikrit (Wanner, 2017). In addition to U.S. troops currently in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. forces have been dispatched to Yemen, the Philippines, and the former Soviet Republic of Georgia to train local militaries to fight terrorists. In FY 2002 and FY 2003, the Administration sought and received funding (subject to annual review) for U.S. military aid to Colombia to support the Colombian government's "unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to its national security." Similar authorization was granted for FY2004-FY2006. Previously, such assistance had been restricted to supporting counternarcotics operations in Colombia. On February 14, 2003, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism gave added emphasis to the role of international cooperation, law enforcement and economic development in countering terrorism. In the context of this campaign, the United States has stepped up intelligence-sharing and law enforcement cooperation with other governments to root out terrorist cells.

Patterns and Implication of Terrorism: Third World Countries Experience

In the early 1990s, terror attacks in Africa were somewhat episodic and limited to relatively well-defined local contexts (in Algeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda, for example). But now the emergence of groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria (with its regional reach), and the spread of Somalia's Al-Shabaab attacks into Kenya and Uganda, have made terrorism a key security threat in Africa (Coleman,2020). According to research by veteran African security analyst Jakkie Cilliers, head of the Institute of Security Studies, about 37% of the 39,286 violence-related

fatalities recorded in Africa in 2014 occurred in Nigeria, mainly as a result of attacks by Boko Haram. This is followed closely by the percentage of such fatalities related to attacks by Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

In 2014, for example, Boko Haram killed 6,664 people mostly civilians in Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad, not to mention the kidnapping of hundreds of people, including the 250 girl students of Chibok over a year ago. In all, Boko Haram has killed more than 15,000 people and displaced more than 2.1 million Nigerians since it began its extremist activities a few years ago. Mr. Cilliers’s research shows that largely due to terrorist activities, armed conflict incidents in Africa rose from 40% of the global total in 2013 to 52% in 2014. This is despite the fact that Africa has barely 16% of the world’s population. Africa currently hosts several terrorist groups that are affiliated with or influenced by Al-Qaeda. They operate across the vast expanse of the Sahel in Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria, as well as in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Somalia, Mali and Kenya.

The deadly attacks on the Radisson Blu Hotel in Mali’s capital, Bamako, on 20 November 2015, which killed 22 people, including two attackers, and an eerily similar attack on the Splendid Hotel in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, on 15 January this year, which killed 30, have been claimed by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Countries with Highest Level of Issue of Terrorism in the World

Ranking	Countries	Scores
1st	Afghanistan	9.592
2nd	Iraq	8.682
3rd	Nigeria	8.314
4th	Syria	7.778
5th	Somalia	7.645
6th	Yemen	7.645
7th	Pakistan	7.541
8th	India	7.353
9th	Democratic Republic of Congo	7.178
10th	Philippines	7.099
11th	Mali	7.049
12th	Burkina Faso	6.727
13th	Cameroon	6.627
14th	Egypt	6.419
15th	Mozambique	6.400
16th	Libya	6.250

17th	Central African Republic	6.241
18th	Turkey	6.110
19th	Colombia	6.110
20th	Sri Lanka	6.065

Source: Global Terrorism Index 2020

Countries with low Level of Issue of Terrorism in the World.

Ranking	Countries	Scores
1st	Finland	1.74
2nd	Ghana	1.743
3rd	Kuwait	1.795
4th	Code d'ivoire	1.945
5th	Japan	2.14
6th	Honduras	2.023
7th	Malaysia	2.090
8th	Peru	2.141
9th	Australia	2.148
10th	Nicaragua	2.355
11th	Haiti	2.355
12th	Bahrain	2.402

Source: Global Terrorism Index 2020

Global and Tactical Response to Terrorism

The key advocates of the war on terror remain the United States of America and its coalition allies. This is borne out by past events in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan. Iraq was under the leadership of the late President Saddam Hussein when it was invaded by American forces under the accusation that Iraq was producing and piling weapons of mass destruction, which represented a threat to world peace and security. It was also alleged that Iraq had links with Osama bin Ladin's Al Qaeda terrorist group which masterminded the bombing of the twin towers of the American World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001.

The justification offered for the invasion of Iraq at the time was to prevent terrorism or future attacks by the Iraqi government sponsored terrorists against the United States of America, her allies and other nations of the world. The United States of America claimed that the invasion of Iraq was carried out in line with Article 51, of the United Nations Charter, which deals with the principle of self-defence. Consequently, the United States Congress in a joint resolution noted that

the 9/11 attack renders it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defence and to protect United States citizens, both at home and abroad and to prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States”.

As one of the crucial factors militating against the enforcement of international law, the issue is that powerful states like the United States of America, more often than not, interpret international law to suit their actions and policies. These allegations later turned out to be false, rendering the invasion of Iraq unjustifiable. The reason is that there was no substantive evidence about the allegations. The opponents of the war are of the opinion that, the invasion of Iraq failed to fulfill the requirements of a just war and that Iraq's Sovereignty was undermined by the United States and her coalition partners.

The fact is that, Article 33 of the United Nation’s charter states that “the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice”. The United States failed to explore all these avenues for peaceful settlement of disputes before invading Iraq. Furthermore, Resolution 441 of the United Nations on which the United States of America hinged on, did not authorize war. It only called on Iraq to “allow unfettered access by Iraq to U.N weapon inspectors’ which Saddam complied with. The United States of America and her partners could not wait for the outcome of the weapon inspector’s report, before invading Iraq.

The report of the weapon inspectors (which was released after the American invasion of Iraq) shocked the world when the United Nations chief weapons inspector Hans Blix and Mohamed El Baradei, in charge of Nuclear Arms inspection, concluded that “Iraq does not have weapons of mass destruction”. The independent 1,000-strong team (Iraq survey group) sent by Washington to look for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq also concluded that, they found nothing in Iraq, and that Saddam Hussein Iraq has no link with Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks. The war, therefore, was fought under falsehood. The use of force and the requirement of proportionality was not adhered to in this instance which constitutes a serious violation of international law, especially Articles 2 and 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.

Classical international law deals with two generic situations: War and peace. There is a big rule book dealing with the laws of warfare, the law of how to open war, how to end war, what weapons to use, and how to treat captives. Different rules apply to countries when there is peace and when there is war. In peacetime, people are divided into two categories. They are either law-abiding citizens or criminals to be dealt with by the police and courts. In wartime, people are divided into two different categories civilians or combatants (Reisner, 2002).

The question we want raised here, is that how does the United States and her allies classify combatants and civilians in war and peace situations? Do they also abide by the rules of war? The Bush Administration it seems, literalized its war on terrorism by dissolving the legal boundaries between what a government can do in peacetime and what is allowed in wartime? This move according to Ruth may have made it easier for Washington to detain or kill suspects, but it has also threatened basic due process rights, thereby endangering us all (Roth, 2004). The fourth Geneva Convention lays emphasis on the protection of civilian persons in terms of war. But the manifestation of the war on terror saw the ‘collateral’ targeting of civilian populations and the destruction of lives and property. Logically, the staggering proportion of civilian casualties witnessed so far in the war of terror clearly outweighs the so-called threat posed by the terrorists. The bombing of electricity and water plants and even hospitals are issues of reference. Indeed, laws are silent among (those who use) weapons as opined by Cicero (Dunlap, 2002).

The Global fact remains that the war on terror has only succeeded in breeding more terrorists. Terrorism is an ideology, and people will continue to subscribe to it. The disaster in the Iraq war has presented unimaginable gifts to the terrorist cause. The decision to invade Iraq reinforced Al-Qaeda's accusation of Western interference in Moslem territories while the abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison undermined Western claims of moral superiority.

Western actions in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan seem to have exposed the abuses inherent in the application of the principle of self-help or self-preservation in international law, The action also illustrates the difficulties involved in the application of the principle of “reasonableness” in reprisal measures, a principle which demands that attack should be aimed at the destruction of camps or bases of the guerrillas or terrorists without injury to the territorial state (Agwu, 2005). With the politicization of the veto system in the United Nations Security Council, international law is like

a bleeding mother, watching the killing of her children while the war on terrorism continues. The difficulty in resolving the issue of categorizing terrorism, terrorist, and terrorist action, has continued to militate against global consensus of a concept that is vital for the attainment of global peace and security.

Other critics are of the opinion that the war on terror has a double standard connotation. The American government has granted political asylum to several terrorists and terrorist organizations that attacked Cuba in an attempt to overthrow the Castro regime while the American government claims to be anti-terrorist. It is even sad to note that the alleged mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks was part of the Mujadin who were sponsored, aimed trained and aided by the CIA to commit terrorist acts in Afghanistan to fight the Russian army after it invaded Afghanistan. The majority of the terrorists who executed the 9/11 attack in the United States were said to be of Saudi Arabian origin. However, Saudi Arabia has escaped a reprisal attack and has remained an American staunch ally.

5.0 CONCLUSION

Although the overall impact of terrorism has declined in the last few years, new threats continue to emerge. The epicenter of jihadist terrorism has shifted, from the Middle East and North Africa MENA region to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, while far-right terrorism and politically-related violence are a growing threat in the West. The threat of terrorism remains widespread, with over 90 countries experiencing at least one terrorist incident in 2019, and 89 terrorist groups carrying out an attack that led to at least one death. This shows the trend in terror-related deaths over the past twenty years. The last decade was the deadliest period for terrorism on record, with over 182,000 terrorism deaths recorded between 2010 and 2019. Terrorist activity peaked in 2014, at the height of ISIL's territorial strength. However, deaths have fallen 59 per cent since their peak five years ago. While ISIL has declined in Iraq and Syria, the group's influence continues to expand geographically.

Through the spread of affiliates and provinces (wilayats) outside of some regions, ISIL has transformed from a territory-based group into a broader ideological movement with provinces emerging across Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Asia-Pacific and Russia and Eurasia. In Nigeria, contemporary insecurity issues have shifted little bit from Boko Haram attacks to rising cases of

kidnapping, and bandits' attacks. In the West, there has been a recent increase in the frequency and intensity of far-right terrorism. In 2019, multiple mass casualty far-right attacks were recorded, including the Christchurch Mosque shootings in New Zealand, which killed 51 people.

Recommendations

International organizations such as the UN, AU and the European Union, attention should be directed towards identifying the basic root of terrorism so as to critically seek an appropriate means that can address the problem for global peace sustenance. This requires establishing and maintaining tactical measures to thwart terrorist attacks viz:

Public sector intergovernmental offensive and defensive activities to include non-military action, diplomatic engagement, intelligence operations, law enforcement investigations and sanctioning actions

- i. Powerful countries need to support weak countries with technical components of intelligent information sharing and manpower training not turning the event into an avenue of selling out weapons or exploiting resources from those non peaceful countries to their advantage.
- ii. Public and private sector financial disruption activity through disrupting the funding flows to and from terrorist organizations. This is where financial institutions, and more broadly the financial services industry, play a significant role.
- iii. We further need to strengthen and maintain strategic measures to counter the extremist radicalization that fuels its hatred and violence and undergirds its strategy and global appeal. Strategic measures should include:
- iv. Public and private sector community outreach and vigilance to identify and interdict individuals at risk for radicalization.
- v. Public and private sector propaganda strategies using social media and internet communications to dispel and counter the appeal of radicalization.
- vi. Public and private sector should strategise ways to prevent radicalization, promote intervention and reintegration of those engaged terrorists into normal lives in the society.

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Factors Influencing Youth Criminality in Abeokuta, Southwest Nigeria

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Abstract

Exuberance and criminality tendencies among the youth of contemporary periods have made security a critical issue requiring much more attention. The rate of youth involvement in crime in Ogun State is alarming as there have always been cases of cultist attacks and ritual killings, with victims and culprits of less than 25 years of age. Several factors have been implicated in spurring crimes. These include social, political, and economic, while urbanisation and rural-urban migration were underlined as predisposing factors of increased insecurity. This study investigated the factors stimulating and sustaining youth criminality in Abeokuta, in the southwestern axis of Nigeria. Two hundred and ten respondents, including students, traders, and artisans, were surveyed using convenient and purposive sampling techniques. Semi-structured questionnaires and Key Informant Interviews (KII) were used to generate primary data, while secondary data were used to complement the analysis where required. The study identified poverty, unemployment, political influences, socio-physical settings and desire for materialism as factors encouraging criminal activities in the area surveyed. The study recommends that state authorities provide an enabling environment for job creation to engage the youth. Also, better conditions of service should be worked out for key players in Nigeria's Criminal Justice System to reduce the propensities for shielding criminals, while more synergies should be formed between security agencies and their host communities.

Keywords: Crime, Security, Socio-physical settings, Unemployment, Criminal Justice System

1.0 INTRODUCTION

One major problem confronting the human race is youth criminality (Alabi, 2014). Crimes perpetrated by youths worldwide have been inherently laden with social and environmental indices presented by each affected jurisdiction. These socio-environmental influences range from lenient parenting and families, exposure to hazardous neighbourhoods, to peer group influence (Omboto et al., 2013). The rate of criminality among youths has tripled globally, and part of the key reasons associated with such demeanours include poverty, peer pressure, and unemployment, seemingly overlooked by parents and older citizens. Of greater concern is the Violence Prevention Alliance Report (2020), which puts the yearly global homicide estimate at about 200,000, occurring among adolescents and youths who are in the age category of 10–29 years. According to the same report,

the fourth principal cause of death for people aged 10 to 29 is homicide, while 84% of these homicides involve male victims. The Global Terrorism Index (2019) recorded that between 2014 and 2018, deaths in Sub-Saharan Africa (including Nigeria) rose by 3.7%, in which conflicts, terrorism, and insurgency were the dominant causes, having youths and young adults as major actors at every scene. In Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa, underdevelopment, poverty, and peer pressure were essential factors propelling youth criminality (Williams, 2019).

As the records of the Nigeria Police Ogun state show, between January–December 2021, one hundred and twelve (112) rape culprits were sent to prison, out of which ninety-six (96) were of ages 18-31 years. The report further recorded about seventy (70) armed robbery cases, of which the culprits were all below 30 years. Similarly, the Punch Newspaper (2019) reported that the operatives of Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in its manhunt operation arrested 32 suspected internet fraudsters in Abeokuta, Ogun State whose ages were between 15 – 39 years. Fourteen (14) of the thirty-two (32) arrested suspects, according to Vanguard Newspaper (2019), were undergraduates of Universities and Polytechnics, while 18 others were self-employed in various vocations. Apart from the above, the residents of some communities in Abeokuta north had to keep vigils earlier in the year 2020 while the youth combed communities in Olomore Area, Ita-Oshin covering up to Momoh axis. This exercise through the efforts of local vigilantes led to the arrest of over 27 suspected miscreants who were disturbing the communities. All were handed over to the Police as captured in the Rock-City F.M News Report (2020).

Scholars have underscored the influence of family disorganisation on delinquent behaviours. Studies have indicated that arrested youth offenders were mostly from broken homes, single-parent homes and neglected children (Kroese, 2022; Kroese et al., 2021; Howell, 2015; Singh and Kiran, 2014). These factors seem equally applicable to the crime situation in Abeokuta and its environs. Underscoring the prevalence of crime in the study area, Udeh (2018) confirmed that Abeokuta had more hot spots that were reportedly dangerous to trend at night relative to other states in Southwest Nigeria. According to Africa Facts Zone (2020), Nigeria ranked third (3rd) in the countries with the highest crime rates and insecurity in Africa between January and May 2020. The Nigerian Watch (2019) also reported that banditry, armed robbery and cultism claimed 3,425 lives, with 15.8% of these from four states in South West Nigeria, where Ogun State tops the list. In the same

report, fatalities from lethal incidents in Nigeria increased by 5.6% in 2019, with 11,277 violent deaths; Ogun state topped the table in the number of deaths from road fatalities and youth exhibited violence.

In a bid to assess the level of human security across Africa, the International Rescue Committee's Assessment (2020) records that of the top 10 countries most affected by violent conflicts, Nigeria has about 12% of its citizens displaced due to insecurity in the North, while the South West was not left out. Most importantly, among countries suffering from abject poverty, worsened by insecurity as reported by ABHS (2019), Nigeria comes fourth as 33.4 million of its citizens were said to require medical and social amenities after being displaced by conflicts and criminal activities perpetrated mostly by the youths. As reports show, between January and March 2020, over 42 cases of illegal activities were reported across three police stations in the two local governments of Abeokuta, which stimulated swift responses from the Nigeria Police Force operations covering Abeokuta metropolis (Punch Newspaper, 2020). In a bid to protect innocent citizens against cyber criminals by men and officers of the Nigeria Police, some innocent citizens lost their lives on 21 February 2020 at Olomore Area of Ita-Oshin in the ancient city of Abeokuta (Tribune, 2020). This further underscores the gravity of insecurity in this axis of Ogun state, Nigeria.

Lasisi and Olapeju (2017) have established a corresponding nexus between rural-urban migration and urbanisation, determining factors of increased insecurity. Encapsulating the insecurity index in the study area, the authors considered the crime rate in some impoverished communities of Abeokuta as very high due to population density that has become characteristic of urban centres, which has declined the standard of living for over 75% of rural dwellers. Abeokuta is seemingly insecure for certain community dwellers. According to Fischer and Green (2004), security denotes the existence of a tranquil atmosphere in a certain location, which is comparatively probable and could extensively guarantee human lives and property without fear of the unknown. Abeokuta is among the relatively peaceful cities in Nigeria, devoid of structural violence. But due to the persistent rise in unemployment, the Covid-19 pandemic and the usual misappropriation of public funds by political officeholders, youths have generally become hostile, while many take advantage of the situation to indulge in criminal activities that dent the image of Nigerian society.

Statement of the Problem

Scholars have expressed varied views regarding factors influencing youths' criminal behaviour. Likewise, researchers have examined plausible ways to decimate insecurity in Abeokuta. Fury (2019) particularly linked the frequency of insecurity in Abeokuta to the grossly endemic corruption by public office holders and the near absence of a well-mapped welfare system for workers and vulnerable youths, which, if rectified, would to a large scale annihilate insecurity. Reports by the Guardian Newspaper (2020) reveal that targeted killings are rising as pointers to the growing insecurity in Abeokuta. For instance, the Nigerian Police Force arrested an 18-member gang of robbers along Sango Ota route. This incident ushered in a succession of armed robberies around Adiyari, Ijako, Agbado, Alakuko, Daleko and other areas where jungle justice was applied to some innocent people by the youth. Abigbo (2020) underscore the importance of a joint task force spearheaded by indigenous Vigilante Groups across Abeokuta. He advocated for an all-encompassing participatory approach where key stakeholders would play major roles. Ajibefun (2018) took a microscopic view of the socioeconomic implication of the ceaseless insecurity that affects peaceful social life in Abeokuta and its developmental implications. In confirmation of his projection, by 2019, there was indeed a surge in cybercrime in Abeokuta, where an average of three arrests of young boys was announced every week between October and December 2019. The covid-19 pandemic also opened avenues for the perpetuation of crime, especially when people were restricted indoors to refrain even from lawful daily engagements. Against this backdrop, this study critically examined prominent social and environmental factors influencing youths' criminal behaviour in Abeokuta metropolis.

2.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Robert K. Merton (1938), an American sociologist, developed the structural strain theory, which forms the basis for this study's analysis. It argues that crime occurs when there is a disparity between a society's cultural goals (e.g., status or material wealth) and its structural means for achieving those goals (e.g., education, employment). Frustration and resentment result from an individual's inability to achieve societal goals through generally accepted means. This leads some individuals to employ illegitimate or illegal means to achieve success. The theory proposes that a society's cultural values and social structures exert pressure on its citizens to commit crimes. Individuals operating within a particular social system may choose to conform, innovate, ritualise,


retreat, or rebel in response to their respective experiences with the system, depending on the circumstances. The pressures emanating from harsh socioeconomic conditions surrounding Nigerian youths, (e.g., poverty, unemployment, family dysfunction etc.) have made many to innovate by venturing into crime.

3.0 MATERIALS AND METHOD

Quantitative and qualitative data were gathered for this study. Two hundred (210) semi-structured questionnaires were administered to collect firsthand information from respondents of age 18 to 35 years selected from six locations in Abeokuta, the capital of Ogun state. To complement these, Key Informant Interview was conducted with six uniform officers with requisite information regarding the investigated issues. Additional data were generated through secondary sources, including newspapers, articles, journals, thesis, dissertation, books and online materials. Descriptive statistical tools like frequency tables and simple percentages were used to analyse quantitative data. Qualitative and secondary data were thematically and analysed.

4.0 FINDINGS

Demographic characteristics of the respondents indicate that 42.2% were between the age of 26 and 35, primarily the active years between young adulthood and the apex of maturity. Those above 45 years were just 13.3% which corresponds to the assertion of Adeniran& Ibrahim (2021) that Nigeria is overwhelmed with a jobless, unemployed active population which would always aid crime to flourish.



Source: *Fieldwork* (2022)

The research also showed that 71.0% of the respondents were males. This disparity, however, does not suggest a higher proportion of males to females in the area surveyed; rather, the result only points to the fact that more males were available and ready to participate in the study. Therefore, having more males in less productive engagements threatens the security of the communities. The danger posed by the number of male youths clustering around the study area seems to corroborate the Punch Newspaper Report (2022) that linked the high rate of rituals and advance fee fraud in Abeokuta to the “joblessness of the boys perpetrating these crimes”. In Punch’s viewpoint, most of these boys have completed university education, and there is nowhere to put what has been learnt into practice. According to the Report, this would make them vulnerable to crimes made possible by peer pressure and intimidation. Data on marital status show that 64.8% of the respondents were still single. Considering their level of incapacitation as warranted by unemployment, these young folks may find it uneasy to venture into marriage because of the gravity of its responsibilities. As analysed in a programme aired by Rock City FM (2021), marriage is declining faster because only a negligible segment of youths considers institutional obligation important and mandatory in the contemporary period.

Data on levels of formal educational attainment show that all the respondents attended school up to the secondary level, while 79.5% obtained a tertiary institution certificate. This figure, by implication, is contrary to the common belief that the perpetrators of crime are illiterates. Unfortunately, such an educational feat has never translated to the expected source of strength to the economy and security of Nigeria. To corroborate this finding, Williams (2018) found out that most of the miscreants apprehended in Lagos crime cases were majorly graduates who were well-learned. It, therefore, must be emphasised that even though education plays a fundamental role in enlightenment and behavioural modification, involvement in deviant or criminal behaviour goes beyond schooling. The implication of this is that joblessness is on a high and has drastically contributed to the level of criminality in the country because, at the point when willing hands find it difficult to be absorbed in legitimate engagements, tendencies are high that such people might resort to social vices that could endanger the security of the country.

Data gathered concerning the respondents’ employment status indicate that only 25.2% of respondents were employed in corporate, formal organisations; a good number (40%) declared

that they were undergoing additional training to make themselves relevant; 14.3% were business owners. By implication, most of the youths surveyed were struggling to survive, which could be a source of encouragement to seek other means of survival with an eye on crime. The finding on employment status aligns with Abdus-Samii and Akanbi's (2020) observation that most youths in Nigeria are experiencing hardship, which has proven to be one of the reasons why crimes thrive within these age groups. This unfavourable situation has been instrumental to the reoccurrence of crimes. Describing the unfortunate situation, ACLED (2020) notes in respect of Nigeria that the country is prone to real danger given the overwhelming number of employment-ready but unengaged youths. Of utmost concern is the situation where many highly talented and exceptionally brilliant graduates are roaming the streets with neither help nor hopes of securing one. The resulting frustration has led many to become willing tools in the hands of politicians. Many have also been lured into criminality by miscreants who dabble in crimes at will. ACLED cited the October 2020 ENDSARS protest, where the youth nearly ended Nigeria as a sovereign and independent nation. As describes,

Having helpless youths roaming the streets and practically doing nothing about the situation could be used by political gladiators to ferment intended social vices. The looming crisis can eat up the entire nation, a semblance of which was played out during the ENDSARS protest of October 2020. The protest turned violent and worsened as days passed until concrete steps were taken to salvage the situation.

The above shows how unemployment and other factors such as poverty, hopelessness and frustration can threaten human existence in any society. As secondary data contained, several steps were being taken by the Police to control criminal activities in the study area. For instance, appeals included an intelligent report submitted to the then Ogun State government in 2014 by the Nigerian Police Headquarters at Eleweran suggesting that a Night club located in Kuto area of Abeokuta around which ritual murder was observed to be very rampant be closed down to improve security in the area. As the report contained:

Every two or three days, dead bodies of young ladies were always found around the area after intense clubbing activities in which some ritualists were suspected of paying patronage to the clubs in the area. The force implores the state government to consider a drastic option of closing the centre to safeguard young girls from being killed like sacrificial fowls.

The force also recommended to the then-state Government that youths be engaged in productive and lawful activities to curb criminality in the surveyed area. It specifically appealed to state authorities to do everything possible to salvage the situation in the state.

Factors promoting youth criminality

Several factors were discovered to have contributed to criminality in the study area. Table 1 shows poverty, unemployment, love for materialism, peer influence, family dysfunction and political inducement. Of all these, unemployment seems to be the strongest factor that prone the youths to criminal behaviour. This finding aligns with the general assumption that when the younger ones are not productively engaged after some measures of educational achievement, emotional problems, frustration, and other related psychological disturbances may set in. In a short while, the situation may influence crime rates to surge. As the study unveiled, the largest proportion (48.1%) of the respondents ranked unemployment as the most important factor contributing to criminality in the study area. A closely related influence, as ranked by 28.1% of the respondents, is poverty which contributes to a rise in property and non-violent crimes.

Table 1: Factors Influencing Youths Criminality

Factors	Ab. North LGA	Ab. South LGA	Total	Percentage
Peer Influence	3	10	13	6.2
Poverty	19	40	59	28.1
Unemployment	40	61	101	48.1
Love for Materialism	6	3	9	4.3
Family Dysfunction	4	3	7	3.3
Political inducement	10	11	21	10.0
Total	82	128	210	100

Source: Fieldwork (2022)

The above brings to mind some previous reports which established the fact that about sixty per cent (60%) of Nigeria’s population are young, the majority of whom are graduates of various tertiary institutions with no stable or viable jobs (FGN, 2021; United Nations, 2020; Fayehun and Isiugo-Abanihe, 2020). This fact about Nigeria’s demographics has serious implications for criminality. For instance, as recent research has concluded, two in every five criminal suspects arrested in Lagos were graduates between 2018 and 2020 (The Guardian Newspaper, 2021). The report underscores the relevance of an age-long biblical verdict: “Idle hands are the devils’ workshop (Proverbs 16:27). So, when humans are gainfully employed, attraction to crime will diminish. The findings reaffirm the intersection between basic socioeconomic indices and criminality as found by previous studies (Jawadi et al., 2021; Recher, 2019; Lee, 2018; Lee & Holoviak, 2006). Thus, unemployment and other factors like politically motivated crimes, including thuggery, violence, and vandalism resulting from clashes and counter-attacks, have affected the general security atmosphere of the study area, even though this has become a regular feature of Nigerian politics.

Table 2: Criminally Inducing Peculiarities of Key Locations in the Study Area

Locations	Factors	Frequency	Percentages
Panseke, Saje & Lantoro	Exposure to Crime	51	24.3
Ibara GRA, Panseke & Omida	Night Life	25	11.9
Kuto, Amolaso & Brewery	Nearness to parks	37	17.6
Laderin, Olorunsogo & Randa	Level of alcoholism	41	19.5
Ojere, Camp & Asero	Drug addiction	56	26.7
Total		210	100

Source: Fieldwork (2022)

As shown in Table 2, the study identified some environmental factors that contributed to crime, such as proximity to car parks and youths’ exposure to anti-social vices, such as bad adults attempting to negatively influence young, innocent people by luring and corrupting their behaviours. For instance, most students live alongside the locals in the Panseke, Saje, and Lantoro axis. Therefore, mixing with unemployed young adults could provide a breeding ground for criminality. Under the façade of providing entertainment and relaxation services, some nightlife centres around Ibara GRA might have other major reasons criminals are drawn to the area. That the place is frequently visited by the wealthy who spend lavishly may be linked to its attraction to criminals. Areas near motor parks would also likely be characterised by a high prevalence of

alcohol consumption. Adolescents raised in such places may be susceptible to deviant behaviour. Drug abuse was prevalent in the Ojere area because of students’ predominance.

Responses of Security Personnel to Criminality

Regarding the modes of response to security calls and arrest of suspects by security personnel within the study area, most respondents confirmed speedy reactions by the security agents. Table 3 particularly shows that other collaborating agencies do act to avert or checkmate crime when there is a need for intervention, even though the Police Force has the exclusive preserve arresting offenders. The majority (82.0%) of the respondents described police intervention in crime as “fairly regular” or “very regular”.

Table 3: Regularity of the Responses by Security Personnel

Security Organization	Intervention Rating				Total
	VR	FR	OIW	R	
Nigeria Army	74	51	39	46	210
Police Force	119	53	22	16	210
Civil Defence Corps	98	58	39	15	210
Vigilante Group	30	91	49	40	210

Key: VR=Very regular; FR= Fairly regular; OIW=Once in a while; R=Rarely

Source: Fieldwork (2022)

Next in the rating was the Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), where 74.3% of the respondents rated its response as “very regular” or “fairly regular”. The regularity of the intervention by the personnel of the Nigeria Army and Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) was also confirmed. According to reports, many of the arrests by other security organisations end up in the hands of the Police, depending on the jurisdiction. As one of the participants reported,

The collaborative efforts of our security agencies in crime fighting seem to be yielding fruits. The Police respond to distress calls more promptly now than in the past. Just give them a call now, and they will respond. Other agencies also assist in crime fighting. Even the vigilantes have always been

wonderful. We learnt that other agencies transfer criminal cases to the Police for appropriate prosecution (KII/Male 63years/Community leader/Panseke, 2022).

The above indicates commitment and alertness on the side of the security agents, particularly the vigilantes who receive no financial support from governments, particularly at the state level, where the governors revel in an astonishing amount of monthly security votes. Although the Nigerian Army still forms part of the internal security monitoring system despite its mandate concentrating most of its roles on external security, many respondents believed that the Police are the only prudent of all forces. The Police were also reported to have apprehended more offenders, many of whom were appropriately charged. A good number also trusted the Nigerian Army over other security agencies. Mixed reactions have, however, trailed the response mechanism commonly adopted by the Police in controlling crime in the study area generated. While some commended the tactics of the Police, others considered it inadequate and obsolete. A participant specifically recounted a widely reported incident where police personnel had taken the lives of innocent Nigerian whom it was supposed to protect. In most cases, preferential treatment was given to culprits from affluent backgrounds or those belonging to the ‘police family’, whether distant or immediate. As one of the participants recounted,

In 2020, one young boy was accidentally shot dead by a team of the police force who were chasing some Yahoo boys at Olomore Market. The young boy was selling his goods beside the road and was hit by the straying bullets fired by police personnel. The force claimed it to be “accidental discharge,” a blatant lie from the pit of hell. The Nigerian police personnel are meant to protect us and not to kill (KII/M/40years/Trader/Olomore/Abeokuta/2022).

The participants’ experiences were not similar, as the above shows a clear departure from the positive account given by a key stakeholder in security operations around the study area who felt satisfied with the performance of security operatives so far. He stressed that the inter-agency cooperation among the security apparatuses within the state has helped to stabilise security

dynamics due to the security architecture shaped by the inter-dependence technique adopted. As he further clarified,

Crime has been technically conquered and decimated, thanks to the smart antics of the security operatives and agencies working together to make Ogun State safer for all and sundry. This feat was achieved because we gave our all to making security our top priority. This commitment is what the current administration of the state stands for. Criminals have been technically overpowered (KII/M/54years/DC/NSCDC/Abeokuta/2022).

This back-and-forth position presents the current security dilemma in Nigeria as the situation worsens due to a lack of sincerity by security operatives against the collective expectations of the Nigerian public.

Boarder monitoring and management are germane to the security of a particular jurisdiction. The roles of Nigeria Customs in crime control in the study area cannot be over-emphasised. Ukwayi & Anam (2019) highlighted how Nigerian Customs have primarily apprehended smugglers in various corridors entering Nigeria. The effort was to ensure that the Nigerian territory is not amenable to criminal activities. Akinyemi (2013) decried the inadequacy of the Nigerian Customs' workforce. According to him,

The less than eighteen thousand (18,000) workforce of the Nigerian Customs Services is relatively inadequate and grossly too depressing to guard the Nigerian border, with a whooping total land mass of 923,768 square kilometres, with a population of over well over two hundred million people (Akinyemi, 2013).

The above was validated by Ukwayi & Anam (2019), who reported that:

An agency with a statutory charge like the Nigerian Customs saddled with responsibilities of anti-smuggling, revenue generation and security functions along the Nigerian land, air and sea borders is a stain on the reputation of the country because their shortcomings are having

adverse effects on the security of Nigerians. After all, Nigerian Customs has the challenges of effective border policing Ukwayi & Anam (2019).

Nigeria's poorly patterned borders and the deficiency of adequate personnel alongside poorly managed logistics to accurately manage the boundaries have seriously damaged the security of our national frontiers (Ukwayi & Anam, 2019). In other words, any shortage in the personnel handling the security of Nigeria has implications for the safety of the study area. These submissions show how security forces respond to criminality and attacks and how inadequacy has affected the operations of security operatives. On several occasions, the criminals always appear stronger than the personnel of the security operatives. However, one of the key informants from Adatan notes that the Police have a quick response squad which the researcher faults as toothless and clueless in combating crimes and inadequacies in the state. They would have if they had been given all to fight crime or were strong enough to do so.

Summary

Crime rate is undoubtedly on the rise, not only in Nigeria but at the global level. In Abeokuta Ogun State, no day passes without any reportage of major crimes. This development portrays Abeokuta as a hotspot for crimes. As the state capital, it has always been one of the target hubs for miscreants after perpetrating their dastardly acts. One social group commonly associated with criminality is the youth aged 15-25. These are youth in their formative years. However, the key determinants have been poverty, unemployment, peer pressure, family dysfunction and political inducement. It was unveiled that one hundred and twelve rape culprits were sent to prison in 2022 by the Ogun State Police Command at Elewe-Eran in Abeokuta. The researcher also noted that any time ASSU embarks on strike, chances are very high that crime rates in Ogun State will increase. The demographic data gathered by the study also indicates that 42.2% of the respondents were between the age of 26-35 years, primarily the active years between young adulthood and the apex of maturity. Those above 45 years are just 13.3% which means that the assertion of Adeniran & Ibrahim (2021) that Nigeria is overwhelmed with a jobless, unemployed and unengaged active population. The higher number (71.0%) of male respondents that dominated the study was due to the readiness of the males more than the females to participate in the study.

Punch Newspaper's (2020) report associated the high rate of rituals and advance fee fraud in Abeokuta with the joblessness of the boys involved in these crimes. From Punch's viewpoint, most of these boys were graduates of various higher institutions but practically lacked jobs. According to the Report, this would make them vulnerable to crimes made possible by peer pressure and intimidation. This research also brings to the fore previous measures that security operatives have taken to curtail criminality and rectify the situation in Ogun State. Part of the efforts and steps taken was an intelligent report submitted to the last governor of Ogun State in 2014 establishing the recommendation that the nightclub located around MKO Stadium be closed down to checkmate crime. All the 210 respondents acquired Western education up to secondary school. By implication, none of the respondents was stark illiterate. That a sizeable number of youths in Nigeria are well educated should rather be a great source of strength to Nigeria's economy and security, not a weakness. The finding confirms Williams' (2018) account that most of the miscreants apprehended for crimes in Lagos were well leaned. The implication is that joblessness is on the high side and has drastically become a menace in the country because when they do not get what they want, they switch to other anti-social vices, which could be detrimental to the country's security.

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This study has examined the factors contributing to youth criminality in Abeokuta metropolis, the capital of Ogun State, southwest of Nigeria. Most of the respondents in the gathered data were youths who were not legitimately engaged or had no job at all. Report on the respondents' employment status associates crime with factors like poverty, unemployment, love for materialism, family dysfunction, political influence, and proximity to motor parks. Following the assumptions of strain theory, the high unemployment rate and other rops resulting from the strains embedded in the Nigerian social structure have pressured many to seek illegitimate means of achieving their goals. The study also records that education enlightens, informs and modifies behaviour. However, it does not preclude people from engaging in illegal or anti-social conduct, especially where legitimate access to productive engagements has been made difficult. Also, due to the constraints lowering the capacity of the police personnel to fight crime adequately, other security agencies were involved in providing security in the study area. These collaborations

among the Police and other security agencies were adjudged to have yielded fruit even though the crime rate is still high in the study area.

Recommendations

Unemployment and poverty have proven to be the major energisers of criminality in Nigeria. Most youths in Nigeria are largely graduates who are ready to work but cannot secure one. The Government should create an enabling environment to encourage job creation in the private sector of the Nigerian economy. Closely related is that politicians should desist from using youths for election atrocities but rather harness their potential for national development. The restrictive strain built into the Nigerian social structure must be eased so everyone will feel the sweetness of democracy instead of instrumentalising “connections” or influence peddling. The condition of service and welfare packages of the police force should be made more attractive for all officers to ensure maximum servitude to the course of the duty they signed up for and to avert bribery. More measures must also be instituted to protect the interest of the officers and men of the Police who might lose their lives in the line of duty, including prompt payment of remuneration and remediation. The Police and other security agencies should forge stronger cooperation and relate more cordially with host communities to improve their capacities for intelligence gathering. Community sensitisation and enlightenment campaigns regarding the roles of the neighbourhood in society policing must be routinely conducted to achieve a holistic approach to crime fighting in Nigeria.

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**The Impact of Officers Alleged Corruption on Armed Forces War Against Boko Haram
Insurgency in North-East, Nigeria**

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Abstract

The paper examines corruption and insurgency and its effects in the Nigerian military's war against Boko Haram insurgence in North-East Nigeria. Since 2009, the Boko Haram sect group has killed civilians and security forces and destroyed property worth billions of Naira. The sects have destroyed places of worship, raped women, forced women into marriages, made many widows, orphans and displaced many and led them in search of refuge exacerbating humanitarian crises. The study adopts structural functionalism theory which states that conflict is due to social change that leads to social tension which is conceptualised with the insurgency activities that tend to feel that Western education is a sin. Based on findings, the paper recommends curtailing top military officers' alleged corruption, expediting court hearings for corruption cases, and raising the armed forces' salaries to boost morale and help them defeat the insurgency. Thus, the paper concludes that proactive measures should be taken to eliminate corruption, strengthen the organization fighting it, and motivate frontline personnel with welfare packages.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Corruption, Military, War, Insurgency

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Boko-Haram Insurgency has ravaged northeast Nigeria causing hardship to the populace. Scholars have attributed the increasing youth unrest, unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy, as drivers of recruitment into these sects. Weeraratne, (2017), posits that Boko Haram originally known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lid da'awati Wal-Jihad (congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad) is a small Sunni Islamic group that advocates for strict Islamic law in Nigeria, forbids western education and originated in the early 2000s. The sect's early leaders did not advocate violence, but its members clashed with security operatives (Blanchard, 2014).

Most Muslims see it as an extension of the Maitatsine sect, which was founded in 1945 to bring turmoil to Islam, while some Christians see it as an attempt to Islamize Nigerians (Shehu, 2014).

After the government attacked Boko Haram members in some major cities of northern Nigeria in 2009, five days of violent clashes between the group and the Nigerian forces killed the sect leader, Muhammad Yusuf, in Maiduguri and more than 700 others (Blanchard, 2014). This aggravated the group to cause mayhem to the populace and security operatives and also expand ties to Al-Qaeda and ISIS with their full support to engage in a Jihadist war for an independent Islamic state in the northeast of the country (Mordi, 2022).

The group has claimed responsibility for multiple deadly attacks in Nigeria and the countries surrounding Lake Chad in West Africa, resulting in thousands of casualties (Ajise & Omotosho, 2022). The group's new suicide bombing tactics accounted for nearly a third of all casualties in the first half of 2018 (Adelaja & George, 2019) with the tactic primarily targeting schools, mosques, churches and marketplaces in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe and other parts of the country, where the attacks have been concentrated (Adelaja, et. al., 2019). However, the Boko Haram insurgency split into two factions in August 2018, due to ideological differences and with a group being highly extremist that ISIS deemed the group led by Abubakar Shekau too extreme (Agbaje, 2020). Additionally, ISIS thus endorsed the larger faction led by Abu Musab al-Bardawi known as Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) (Agbaje, 2020). However, Shekau continued to command a group of militants under the original name of the group (Agbaje, 2020). Accordingly, Okolo and Akubo, (2019), posited that throughout 2018, ISWAP appears to have expanded its reach in northern Borno, recapturing many previously Nigerian-controlled towns near Lake Chad, including some areas, particularly in the states of Adamawa, Yobe, and southern Borno.

Since Nigeria's independence in 1960, the state has been plagued by an abundance of violent conflicts and wars (Ngige, Badekale, & HammanJoda, 2016). The country has experienced a multitude of ethnic, religious, communal, and politically motivated internal conflicts (Badekale, et., al. 2016), with the most difficult conflict in Nigeria being the war against the Boko Haram insurgency, which appears intractable despite the budgetary allocation of N12.353 trillion to the Nigerian Armed Forces over ten years from 2012 to 2021.

This has prompted policymakers and civil society organizations to demand accountability within the Ministry of Defence to ensure that officers are held accountable for military expenditures

(George, 2019). The inability of the military to promptly neutralize insurgency has, without a doubt, fueled allegations of corruption levelled against senior military officers regarding defence expenditure on arms procurement and military operations (Adelaja, et.al., 2019). The insurgency got to a new height where on the July 6, 2022 Dr Shuaib Belgore, the permanent secretary of the Ministry of the Interior reported and confirmed that over 600 prisoners fled the Kuje prisons in an attacked coordinated by Boko Haram insurgents with only approximately 300 recaptured. During the attack, a member of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, lost his life with the said sect also ambushing a platoon of the presidential guards' brigade in Bwari, Abuja killing three junior officers and one senior officer (Adelaja and George 2022). This forced the Federal Government to shut all schools in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, and place the armed forces on red alert (Adelaja, et. al., 2022).

However, despite the vast sums allocated for the purchase of arms to end the scourge of insurgency, these efforts have not produced much fruit. It has been posited that the problem facing the war against insurgency in North East Nigeria is linked with the corruption that has eaten deeply into the fabric of the system on one hand and on the other hand, there are allegations and counter-allegations of security personnel aiding and collaborating with the groups to carry out their heinous act by providing them with vital information. Also is the lack of community-based collaboration between the community and security is a significant obstacle. In light of this, the study seek to investigate cases of alleged corruption in the fight against Boko Haram Insurgency and to examine corruption's impacts on the war against this insurgency,

2.0 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Corruption and the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northeast Nigeria:

Corruption is viewed as a universal phenomenon that has existed in every society for a very long time and has thus been identified as the bane of the majority of political, social, and economic development as well as democratic stability in many nations around the globe (Bello, Matthew & Cosmas, 2022). It is the misuse of public office for private gain.

Similarly, Frimpong, (2019), observes that corruption is a result or reflection of a nation's legal, economic, cultural, and political institutions. Globally, corruption is found in democratic, military,

capitalist, socialist, developed, and developing societies; only the level or rate of corruption varies (Frimpong, 2019). This demonstrates that corruption exists in every society, which is why its eradication requires a combination of political, economic, and sociocultural measures.

According to Human Rights Watch (2012), a Nigerian journalist who interviewed a senior Boko Haram leader several years ago made this observation.

Corruption became the driving force behind Boko Haram. Mohammed Yusuf, the group's first leader, would have had difficulty gaining a large number of these individuals had he been in a functional state. But his teaching was easily accepted because the environment, the frustrations, the corruption[and] the injustice made it fertile for his ideology to grow fast, very fast, like wildfire.

Even in 2004, the followers of Mohammed Yusuf cited corruption as the reason for their actions (Buchanan-Clarke & Knoope 2017). Thus, Buchanan, et. al. (2017), asserted that the Boko Haram sect envisioned a new society devoid of corruption whose sole objective was to remain close to Allah (God). In pursuit of their goal of establishing an Islamic state in Nigeria, the group drew on the teachings of Taymiyyah, a 13th-century Islamic cleric who argued that "in the face of leadership by Muslims who did not behave benevolently and used their leadership to oppress, it was acceptable to Allah for individuals to withdraw from the corrupt system and fight it with violence" (Kyngäs, 2020). The group's objective was to withdraw from the Nigerian society, which in their view had become irredeemably corrupt, and wage war against it (Kyngäs, 2020). Mbah, Nwangwu, and Edeh (2017), in their statement, opine that understanding Boko Haram's appeal among some citizens in Nigeria's far North requires an examination of the underlying development challenges facing northern Nigeria, where high rates of poverty and unemployment are compounded by rapid population growth and low levels of literacy.

Insurgency is a crime against public order; a pattern of internal disturbances and tensions that poses grave threats to public safety, law, and order (Bello, Matthew & Cosmas, 2022). According to Bello, et al. (2022), an insurgency is a violent effort by an individual or group to resist or oppose the enforcement of the law or the operation of government, to revolt against the constituted authority of the state, or to participate in an insurrection. (Weeraratne, 2017). On this stand, the Boko Haram insurgency, formally known as Jam'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihd, is an

Islamist militant group active in northern Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and Mali. Additionally, Boko Haram is the name popularly ascribed to the dreaded terrorist groups founded in Maiduguri, North Eastern region of Nigeria around 2009.

Their actual name is “Jama’atul Ahlus Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad” which in Arabic translates as: “the Sunni Community committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” (Elomien, Jubril, Ajayi & Folarin, 2022). The Hausa language name, Boko Haram, is translated as “western education is sinful”, but the group’s use of mobile phones, video cameras, DVDs, YouTube, chemical explosives, automatic weapons, and automobiles demonstrates that they are more than willing to utilize the fruits of Western education when it suits their purposes (Elomien et., al.2022). Furthermore, Dokunola, (2016), opines that Boko Haram is however opposed to the “yan boko” of northern Nigeria. The literal translation of Yan boko is “child of the book.” It refers to the elite created in Nigeria by the British colonial policy of indirect rule, whose heads have been turned away from Allah by easy money and corrupting Western values. To be yan boko is to be spiritually and morally corrupt, devoid of religious piety, and criminally wealthy at the expense of the Muslim umma (community). However, corruption has been acknowledged as one of the primary causes of Boko Haram's emergence and prevalence in Nigeria (Dokunola, 2016).

Thus, Boko Haram insurgents defended their existence based on the widespread corruption in Northern Nigeria. According to the Human Rights Watch Report (2012), Mohammed Yusuf’s teachings were readily accepted by unemployed youth due to the fertile ground for corruption. Equally, the ideology behind the formation of the Boko Haram sect and the constant attacks on government institutions and personnel support they claim that corruption is one of the causes of the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria (Omenma, Onyishi and Okolie, 2023).

Military Expenditure against Insurgency in Nigeria

Research by Trading Economics, a global organisation that provides economic statistics for 196 nations, indicates that Nigeria's military spending is expected to rise to around \$2 billion in 2023, based on global macro models and forecasts. "From 1960 to 2021, Nigeria's military expenditure averaged \$1.2 billion, reaching an all-time high of \$4.5 billion in 2021 and a record low of \$23.4 million in 1960," according to the research.

In addition, the Chairman of the House Committee on Defence, Babajimi Benson, has added a twist, stating that the N2.74 trillion allotted for security in the 2023 Appropriation Act is

insufficient. "Show me a prosperous nation; you will see that security in that country is very high," Benson stated. "The budget, while huge in naira terms, becomes somewhat insignificant when converted to dollars." While it is true that Nigeria's military budgetary allocation eclipses that of numerous other nations, such as Algeria, there is no doubting that the billions of dollars appropriated in Nigeria over the years have not been properly accounted for. Furthermore, citizens are not receiving value for the money spent on defence.

Nigeria's defence budget has increased dramatically in recent years, but observers believe it has yet to make a dent in insecurity. Since May 2015, when President Muhammadu Buhari took office, the allocation to the defence sector has steadily increased into the trillions of naira range, in an effort to address the country's varied and expanding security concerns. The country is still dealing with a variety of high-level security challenges.

Thus, the budgetary allocation of the federal government to the Ministry of Defence between 2010 and 2022 see table two;

Table 2 Federal Government Budgetary Allocation to Federal Ministry of Defense (2010-2022)

SN	SUBJECT	TOTAL ALLOCATION	YEAR
1	Ministry of Defence	6,885,000,000	2022
2	Ministry of Defence	1 019 990 360	2011
3	Ministry of Defence	435,416,577,490	2012
4	Ministry of Defence	3,974,756,049	2013
5	Ministry of Defence	349,707,339,871	2014
6	Ministry of Defence	375,497,219,431	2015
7	Ministry of Defence	130,864,439,542	2016
8	Ministry of Defence	465,488,229,573	2017
9	Ministry of Defence	576,399,335,199	2018
10	Ministry of Defence	430,829,700,122	2019
11	Ministry of Defence	900,770,634,390	2020
12	Ministry of Defence	966,410,067,089	2021
13	Ministry of Defence	1,200,712,724,376	

Source: Adopted from the Budget Office of the Federation (Citizen Portal, 2022)

Alleged Corruption in the Nigeria military fight against the Boko Haram Insurgency

The menace of corruption in Nigeria has been discussed at various levels of governance, academic discourse, fora, symposia, and conferences to curb the menace; however, this ugly occurrence continues to exist at all levels of government and non-government (Kyngäs, 2020). Thus, Since the colonial era, corruption has remained a major debilitating problem for Nigeria; the phenomenon has become a cankerworm that has devoured Nigeria's political fabric (Kyngäs,

2020). Corruption within the Nigerian armed forces has rendered the fight against Boko Haram terrorism largely ineffective and consequently has engulfed the state in insecurity that led to destruction of lives and property, and caused fear, and anxiety (Frimpong, 2019). Consequently, major allegations of corruption in the Nigerian military's fight against the Boko Haram insurgency in Northeast Nigeria are presented below.

Table 3: Alleged Corruption in the Nigeria military fight against the Boko Haram Insurgency

Corruption cases	Actor(s) involved	Amount (\$/N)
Bullet Proof Car Scandal/ NCAA Operational Vehicles	Stella Oduah (Minister of Aviation)	N255million & N643million
Private Jet Arm Scandal	Goodluck Jonathan administration	\$15million
Arms Procurement Scandal	Sambo Dasuki & others	\$15billion
Defence Contract Scam	Arthur Eze	\$500million
Bribery Scandal	Farouk Lawan & others	\$3million/ \$620,000
Police Pension Fund Fraud	John Yusuf, Uzoma Cyril & others	N32.8billion
Bribery Scandal to Christian Religious Leaders	Goodluck Jonathan Administration	N6billion
Fuel Subsidy Scam	Mamman Ali, Mahmud Tukur & others	\$6billion
misappropriation of funds allegation from EFCC but never taken to court	Mr Yari Abdulaziz (former Governor of Zamfara)	N300billion
misappropriation of public funds and money laundering.	Theodore Orji (former Governor of Abia) alongside his Son	N500 million
Tanko Al-Makura (Forma Nasarawa Governor)	The EFCC arrested him and his wife on suspicion of involvement in dirty money flow	\$250 million
Godswill Akpabio (forma Akwa Ibom)	In less than six months after completing his second term, the EFCC arrested the former Governor in October 2015 following a petition by an Abuja-based lawyer and activist, Leo Ekpenyong, accusing Mr Akpabio of looting the Akwa Ibom state treasury.	N100 billion
Abdulfatah Ahmed (Former Kwara State Governor)	EFCC arrested the immediate past Governor for money diversion.	N9 billion
Aliyu Wamakko (Forma Deput Governor Sokoto)	Alleged mismanagement and abuse of office.	N15 billion
Ali Modu Sheriff (Forma Governor Borno State)	Misappropriation of found under the guise of enforcing a dubious Boko Haram ceasefire in a neighbouring country in 2014,	N300 billion
Rabiu Kwankwaso (forma Governor of Kano)	mismanaged pension remittances between 2011 and 2015,	N10 billion
Willie Obiano (former Governor Anambra)	Diverted to fund political activities in the state	N5 billion Sure-P and N37 billion security vote which was withdrawn in cash.

Bukola Saraki (former Governor State Kwara)	EFCC investigated Mr Saraki for an alleged conspiracy, abuse of office, misappropriation of public funds, theft, and money laundering.	N15 billion
Kenneth Minimah former chief of the Army	alleged of the siphoning public fund	N13 billion meant for arms purchase
Alex Badeh , a former Chief of Defense staff	Money laundering as alleged by the EFCC	NA
Major General Hakeem Otiki	Guilty of embezzlement and dismissed.	NA

Source: Premium Times, 2022. Joseph, Ahmed and Kazeem 2017

The nature and Location of Assault by the Insurgence.

Table 1: Nature and Location of Assaults

SN	DATE	Nature and Place of Attack	Number of Casualties
1	26 th July 2009	The first confrontation with security forces in Maiduguri following an evening assault in Monguno LGA	42 people, including 39 sect members, two police officers, and a soldier were killed
2	27 th July 2009	First assault in the state of Yobe during an invasion of the Potiskum Divisional Police Headquarters.	33 sects, including 3 policemen, were killed.
3	29 th July 2009	Confrontation with security men at Mamudu village, along Potiskum Damaturu Road Yobe state	Unreported scores were killed and the operational base of the sects destroyed
4	29 th July 2009	An all-night battle with combined security agents at Maiduguri Railway Terminal, Borno State.	Approximately 47 sects and 12 policemen were killed.
5	13 th March 2010	Assault in Northern Jos, State of Plateau	300 people killed
6	8 th September 2010	Attack on the central prison in Bauchi	No kills were scored, but the prisoner was released.
7	24 th December 2010	The explosion of a bomb in Barkin Ladi Jos, Plateau	30 people killed
8	31 st December 2010	An explosion of a bomb in Magodishu mammy market, Abuja	Approximately ten people were reported dead,
9	14 th October 2014	Mubi in the Adamawa State was invaded.	27 people were killed during military formation, was dislodged while a thousand are displaced.
10	February 24th, 2014	Yobe State: Mass murder of college student	Killed 43 people
11	February 27th, 2014	Borno State: Armed attack	Killed 74 and injured 54 people

12	March 2nd, 2014	Borno State: Bomb blast in Maiduguri	Killed 300 and left 250 people injured
13	April 14th, 2014	Abuja: Twin bomb blast attack	Killed over 88 people
14	April 15th, 2014	Borno State: Abduction of 276 Chibok schoolgirls	
15	May 1st, 2014	Abuja: Car bomb blast	Killed 19 people
16	May 5th, 2014	Borno State: Attacked Gamboru and Ngala towns	Killed 300 people
17	May 20th, 2014	Plateau State Car bomb blast in Jos	Killed 118
18	May 27th, 2014	Yobe State: Buni Yadi attack	Killed 49 security personnel and 9 civilians
19	June 1st, 2014	Adamawa State: Bomb blast at Mubi	Killed at least 40 people
20	June 2nd, 2014	Borno State: Gwoza massacre killing mostly Christians	Killed 200
21	July 18th, 2014	Adamawa State: Boko Haram attack in Damboa	Killed 18
22	September 19th, 2014	Borno State: Attack at a busy market in Mainok	Killed about 30 people
23	October 31st, 2014	Gombe State: Explosion at a bus station	Killed at least 4 people and left 32 injured
24	November 2nd, 2014	Kogi State: Prison break which led to the freeing of 99 inmates	
25	November 10th, 2014	Yobe State: Double suicide bombing	Killed 61 people
26	January 3rd/7th, 2015	Boko Haram razed the entire town of Baga and controls 70 per cent of Borno State	Killed at least 2000 people
27	January 10th, 2015	Borno State: Female suicide bomb blast at a State market in Maiduguri	The suicide bomber and 19 other people killed
28	January 28th, 2015	Adamawa State: Boko Haram went on a rampage	Killed 40 people
29	February 1st, 2015	Gombe State: Suicide bomb blast outside a mosque	Killed 5 people
30	January 6th, 2016	Borno State: Boko Haram gunmen raided Izageki village in northern Nigeria, close to Sambisa Forest	Killed at least 7 people
31	March 16th, 2016	Borno State: Three female suicide bombers attacked Umarari Village, on the outskirts of Maiduguri.	Killed at least 22 people about 18 others were injured.
32	March 26th, 2016	Borno State: Boko Haram raided the remote village of Tumpun near Lassa in Askiru/Uba LGA	Killed at least 4 people
33	April 24th, 2016	Borno State: Boko Haram raided Alau village	Killed at least 30 people
34	May 12th, 2016	Borno State: Suicide bomb attack in Maiduguri	Killed at least 6 people including a police officer

35	May 29th, 2016	Borno State: In Biu, a tricycle taxi triggered an old IED	Killed at least 6 people including a soldier and 6 others injured
36	June 17th, 2016	Plateau State: Boko Haram militants attacked a funeral in Kuda	Killed at least 24 people and 10 others injured
37	June 20th, 2016	Borno State: Boko Haram attacked Wumbi	Killed at least 2 people
38	January 7th, 2017	Yobe State: Boko Haram attacked a Nigerian army base in Buni Yadi	Killed at least 5 soldiers
39	January 10th, 2017	Borno State: Two suicide bomb attacks in Kalari town	Killed at least 4 people
40	January 13th, 2017	Borno State: Gun-battle between Boko Haram militants and the Nigerian army in Kangarwa	Killed at least 3 soldiers and 27 others injured
41	January 16th, 2017	Borno State: Two suicide bomb attacks in Nigeria's University of Maiduguri	Killed at least 3 people including a professor 1.
42	February 11th, 2017	Borno State: Boko Haram ambushed soldiers of the Nigerian army	Killed at least 7 soldiers and 19 others injured
43	February 13th, 2017	Borno State: Boko Haram invaded Mifa Community in Chibok	Killed an Islamic scholar and broke the hands of a boy

Source: Omogunloye, et., al (2022), Mapping of Human Displacement by Boko Haram in Nigeria to date

Implications of Corruption and Insurgency in Northeast Nigeria

Corruption and the Boko Haram insurgency have caused astronomical harm to the Nigerian government. Corruption and insurgency contributed to Nigeria's current economic stagnation (Kyngas, 2020). Thus, corruption is a monster that should be blamed for Nigeria's current security problems. This, in turn, harms economic growth and socioeconomic activities by reducing incentives to invest in the economy as a result of bribery frequently requested and received by corrupt officials and the fear of contract breach. By implication, numerous investors have consequently withdrawn their funds from Nigeria (Kyngas, 2020). On the other hand, the Boko Haram insurgency resulted in the closure of numerous businesses in the North-Eastern region, delivering a severe blow to the Nigerian economy (Weeraratne, 2017)

Numerous foreign investors have relocated to neighbouring countries, such as Ghana, where their lives, properties, and capital are safe. However, in the 2014 Business Environment Report, the Lagos Chambers of Commerce and Industry (LCCI) attributed the loss of 30% of firm sales to insecurity in the North-East region (Iyekekpolo, 2020). By implication, investors were discouraged from engaging in business with Nigeria and were unable to establish factories in the affected

region. Consequently, economic and national development goals suffer (Weeraratne, 2017). Corruption has led to a string of political violence in Nigeria, ranging from ethnoreligious conflicts to other forms of social unrest.

Theoretical Framework

The study employs Emile Durkheim 1979 structural-functional theoretical framework. The structure-functional approach was developed by eminent political figures concerned with the provision, deployment, and use of military power to facilitate the protection and promotion of the state's perceived national interests. This "national interest" may involve "core" values, which are relatively constant and few, such as the survival of a society and its population, political sovereignty, and territorial autonomy.

The structural-functional approach explains the relationships that exist between the parts (structures) on the one hand and between the parts and whole (political system) on the other hand. Weeraratne (2017), further affirmed that the approach emphasizes the role and functions of the political structures and functions in understanding politics and political processes and the conditions under which such functions could be fulfilled. However, the structural-functional approach was founded on the premise that a political system is comprised of several essential components and branches of government. The theory holds sway in the study as it pertains to the entire political system of the Nigerian state, as deduced from the preceding. Thus, the Nigerian state is a system comprised of various sectors, including agriculture, transportation, oil and gas, social service, education, health, manufacturing, and the defence and security sector, each of which plays a role in ensuring equilibrium and effective service delivery in the national interest. However, a failure in any of the sectors is equivalent to a severe system malfunction.

3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study uses online journals, newspapers, and the internet to examine the impact of officers' alleged corruption in the Nigerian military's fight against the Boko Haram insurgency in the country's northeast region. Four well-known Nigerian national newspapers, namely The Guardian, Daily Trust, Punch, and Vanguard, in addition to journals and the internet were used. The selection

of newspapers for the study was primarily determined by the availability of data during the period when sectarian violence escalated and worsened. It was also a time when local and international news of the conflict received increased attention. While these newspapers attract the educated to contribute constructively to the conflict, the availability of free data downloads from their websites lends credence to the criticism of the alleged corruption of military officers in the war against the Boko Haram insurgency on the subject matter. Thus, the study examined patterns, analyze and highlight the consequent impact of officers' alleged corruption in the armed forces war against the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast of Nigeria.

4.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The paper demonstrates that corruption has been a significant contributor to the insurgency in Nigeria. However, corruption and insurgency are twin evils that have led to distorted national security, economic growth and development, impeded political development, contributed to infrastructure deterioration, mass poverty, an increase in unemployment and insecurity, and hindered political development. Equally, they have undermined democracy, good governance, human and capital development, political stability, and the international reputation of Nigeria. Nevertheless, eradicating corruption and insurgency requires significant efforts from the government, its public officials and agencies, and the general public. Generally speaking, the Nigerian government's performance in combating corruption has been exemplary. To overcome the current challenge of insecurity in Nigeria, effective mechanisms for poverty eradication, provision of employment opportunities, infrastructure development, and basic human needs such as affordable housing, food, potable water, and quality education should be the government's top priority at all levels.

To achieve stable peace and tranquillity for sustainable development in Nigeria, the following recommendations are made to combat corruption as a means of finding a lasting solution to the Boko Haram insurgency;

- To reduce the prevalence of alleged corruption among military leaders, courts should expedite corruption cases.
- The salaries of military personnel, particularly officers and enlisted men in the theatre of war, should be paid a month in advance to prevent corruption.

- That the disbursement of funds for the prosecution of war against Boko Haram Insurgency should adhere to a transparent procedure to block officers' opportunities for corruption.
- To prevent corruption, the principle of security governance should be applied to the acquisition of arms and ammunition.
- The federal government should, when necessary, assist the armed forces of neighbouring nations to ensure the blockade of terrorist supply routes along our international borders to make the war on terrorism highly effective and finally,
- Technological equipment should be acquired to mount our borders to checkmate the movement of people and goods

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